Amore v. Ridgely (In re Doc's Truck Ctr.)
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Adversary 3:20-ap-25,3:20-bk-120 |
| Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fourth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | In re: DOC'S TRUCK CENTER, LLC, Debtor. v. SHIRLEY BRANNON RIDGELY and HARRY RIDGELY, Defendants, AARON C. AMORE, Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff, SHIRLEY BRANNON RIDGELY, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. WENDY PATRICK, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Rodney Patrick, and ELIZABETH ANN McCORD, Third-Party Defendants. |
Wendy Patrick and Elizabeth Ann McCord (the "Third-Party Defendants") seek summary judgment on the third-party complaint Shirley Brannon Ridgely (the "Third-Party Plaintiff") filed against them. The Third-Party Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate for a variety of reasons, including because the Third-Party Plaintiff failed to plead her claims with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 9(b); she cannot prove her allegations for several reasons, including specifically the death of Rodney Patrick, the defendants' late spouse and father, respectively; her claims here are barred because she failed to make a claim in probate upon Mr Patrick's death; and anything Mr. Patrick took from the business can be reasonably construed as compensation for otherwise uncompensated employment. In response, the Third-Party Plaintiff asserts that summary judgment is not appropriate based upon genuine disputes of material facts. Therefore, the Third-Party Plaintiff contends that the court should permit her to prove her action at trial.
For the reasons stated herein, the court will dismiss the third-party complaint.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56, made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, provides that summary judgment is only appropriate if the movant demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment must make a prima facie case by showing: first, the apparent absence of any genuine dispute of material fact; and second, the movant's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of undisputed facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of proof to establish that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Demonstrating an absence of any genuine dispute as to any material fact satisfies this burden. Id. at 323. Material facts are those necessary to establish the elements of the cause of action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Thus, the existence of a factual dispute is material - thereby precluding summary judgment - only if the disputed fact is determinative of the outcome under applicable law. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). A movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if "the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-movant." Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
If the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. The court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 798. However, the court's role is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter [but to] determine whether there is a need for a trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Nor should the court make credibility determinations. Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, the court has a duty to prevent claims and defenses not supported in fact from proceeding to trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317, 323-24. Additionally, the court has an independent duty to ensure a plaintiff has standing upon which to invoke the court's jurisdiction. See Citizens for Quality Educ. San Diego v. Barrera, 333 F.Supp.3d 1003, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).
The Third-Party Defendants are the spouse and daughter, respectively, of Rodney Patrick, who died on November 17, 2019. According to the Third-Party Plaintiff, Mr. Patrick acted as a manager of Doc's Truck Center, LLC (the "Debtor"), from 2014 until his death. The Debtor's sole member was the Third-Party Plaintiff. According to the Third-Party Plaintiff, Mr. Patrick converted personal property of the Debtor, including cash, for his personal benefit throughout his employment. Mr. Patrick was otherwise uncompensated despite working as many as fifty hours per week.
On May 29, 2020, the Chapter 7 trustee administering the Debtor's bankruptcy estate filed an adversary proceeding against the Third-Party Plaintiff and Harry Ridgley based generally upon a fraudulent transfer theory. On January 15, 2021, the trustee amended his complaint and included a brief allegation against Mr. Patrick. In that regard, the trustee's allegations regarding Mr. Patrick are minimal and do not relate to his action against the Third-Party Plaintiff and Mr. Ridgley. Specifically, the trustee alleges that "[i]t appears that both Brannon and Patrick used the cash and diverted checks as income to support their personal lives and expenses." Notably, that claim is distinct from the various and numerous claims the trustee makes against the Third-Party Plaintiff. Indeed, the trustee's amended complaint is 164 numbered paragraphs, the overwhelming majority of which allege misconduct by the Third-Party Plaintiff that is unrelated to any allegation against Mr. Patrick.
The Third-Party Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment for a variety of reasons. For instance, they allege that the Third-Party Plaintiff failed to state her claim with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Additionally, the Third-Party Defendants allege that the Third-Party Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case entitling her to relief, particularly given Mr. Patrick's death in 2019. In that regard, the Third-Party Defendants note the absence of evidence supporting the contention that Mr. Patrick took personal property, including cash, from the Debtor. Additionally, they contend that anything Mr. Patrick took from the Debtor should be reasonably construed as compensation for the many hours he spent working for the Debtor without compensation otherwise. Finally, the Third-Party Defendants contend that the Third-Party Plaintiff cannot make a claim against them after she failed to make a claim against Mr. Patrick's death estate.
The Third-Party Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment. In that regard, she contends that the record developed through discovery-including purported admissions by Ms. Patrick-supports going to trial on her claims. She acknowledges, however, that the claims she made in her third-party complaint "rightfully belong to the Plaintiff Trustee . . . ."
Having considered the parties' respective arguments and the record before it, the court finds it appropriate to dismiss the third-party complaint against the Third-Party Defendants. Importantly, the Third-Party Plaintiff's claim is not a third-party claim at all. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1) (). Rather, the Third-Party Plaintiff pleaded an action belonging to the bankruptcy estate and Chapter 7 trustee.[1]The Third-Party Plaintiff acknowledges as much in opposition to the extant motion for summary judgment. See Response, p. 3 (). Indeed, the Third-Party Plaintiff does not contend in response to the trustee's complaint that the Third-Party Defendants are liable to her if she is liable to the estate. To the contrary, she contends that Mr. Patrick also took personal property, including cash, from the Debtor such that the Third-Party Defendants are liable to the bankruptcy estate. Importantly, she made her claim without seeking derivative standing, to the extent such standing would be available in this context.
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