Amos v. CIR
| Citation | 360 F.2d 358 |
| Decision Date | 07 December 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 9963.,9963. |
| Parties | John W. AMOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Fortescue W. Hopkins, Roanoke, Va. (Hopkins, Pearson & Engleby, Roanoke, Va., on brief), for petitioner.
Burton Berkley, Atty., Dept. of Justice (Richard M. Roberts, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lee A. Jackson and David O. Walter, Attys., Dept. of Justice, on brief), for respondent.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges.
In Moore v. United States, 4 Cir., 360 F.2d 353, decided today, we held that a criminal conviction for tax evasion works a collateral estoppel on the issue of fraud in a subsequent civil suit over a fraud penalty covering the same years. For the reasons fully stated in that opinion, and which need not be repeated, we sustain the Tax Court's reliance on collateral estoppel in the present proceeding.
This case is not significantly different. Moore was a suit in a district court by a taxpayer for the refund of additional taxes and penalties assessed and paid. We held collateral estoppel applicable because the issue of fraud had been adjudicated in the previous criminal prosecution. We see no reason to establish a different rule in this case, where the suit was brought in the Tax Court by a taxpayer to contest assessment of an unpaid penalty for fraud for the years as to which he had earlier been convicted in a district court and sentenced for tax evasion.
There is precedent for the Tax Court's use of collateral estoppel based on earlier adjudication of issues by that court. See Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 222 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838, 76 S.Ct. 76, 100 L.Ed. 748 (1955), Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948). That in the present instance effect was given to a prior adjudication made not in the Tax Court itself but in a district court of competent jurisdiction, is not material.
We dismiss as without substance taxpayer's further contention that the application by the Tax Court, a non-Article III Court, of the principle of collateral estoppel is unconstitutional. The Tax Court's invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel raises no issue of constitutional dimensions in this case, and we have no occasion to explore the broad questions the taxpayer...
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DiLeo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
...354 (4th Cir. 1966); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1964); Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50, 55 (1964), affd. 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965). Mycek was convicted of income tax evasion under section 7201 for 1979. DiLeo was convicted of income tax evasion under section 720......
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Estate of True v. Commissioner
...927, 928-929 (2d Cir. 1944) (Evergreens)). In Amos v. Commissioner [Dec. 27,012], 43 T.C. 50 (1964), affd. [66-1 USTC ¶ 9130] 360 F. 2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965), this Court adopted the Evergreens "ultimate facts" test, which limited the use of collateral estoppel to ultimate facts found in the s......
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Meier v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
...141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). This Court adopted the ‘ultimate facts‘ approach. Amos v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50 (1964), affd. 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965). More recent commentators and court opinions recommend or use evidentiary or intermediate facts, which may be facts in support of ‘ultim......
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...* the fraud addition to tax in section 6653(b)." Amos v. Commissioner Dec. 27,012, 43 T.C. 50, 55 (1964), aff'd 66-1 USTC ¶ 9130 360 F. 2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965). See also Moore v. United States 66-1 USTC ¶ 9399, 360 F. 2d 353 (4th Cir. 1965), modified 1966; Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz 64-2 USTC ¶ ......