Amos v. Gunn
Decision Date | 07 April 1922 |
Citation | 94 So. 615,84 Fla. 285 |
Parties | AMOS, Comptroller v. GUNN. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
On Petition for Rehearing, May 29, 1922.
On Rehearing, Reversing Order, August 18, 1922.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 1922.
Action by Shelton J. Gunn, individually and as a citizen and taxpayer and as member of the Legislature suing on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, against Ernest Amos Comptroller. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
On Petition for Rehearing.
On Rehearing.
Syllabus by the Court
Requirement that all bills and joint resolutions he signed by presiding officers and Secretary of Senate and Clerk of House mandatory. The provision in section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution that all bills and joint resolutions passed by the Legislature be signed by the presiding officers of the 'respective houses, and by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives,' is mandatory, and requires such procedure to be observed while the Legislature is in session.
Constitutional provision that every bill passed by Legislature be presented to the Governor during session mandatory. The provision in section 28 of article 3 of the Constitution that every 'bill that may have passed the Legislature shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the Governor,' etc., is mandatory, and requires the presentation of every bill passed to be made to the Governor while the Legislature is in session. (Whitfield and West, JJ., dissent from the last six words.)
Governor's power of veto cannot be ignored or lessened by Legislature nor its presiding officers. The provision in section 28 of article 3 of the Constitution, relating to the veto power of the Governor, invests the chief executive of the state with a power in trust to be exercised to the end that its full purpose of providing a check upon errors and protecting the constitutional rights of the people against abridgments be realized, and it cannot be ignored nor lessened by the Legislature nor its presiding officers.
Demurrer does not admit allegations of fact not provable or inconsistent with law. A demurrer to a pleading admits the truth of all essential matters of fact as are well and sufficiently pleaded, but it does not admit as true allegations or averments of fact which the law would not allow to be proved or that are inconsistent with law.
Allegation in bill attacking validity of act held not susceptible of proof by parol evidence or other means aliunde the legislative journals, etc., and not admitted by demurrer. An allegation in a bill of complaint, attacking the validity of an act of the Legislature that a certain document on file in the office of the Secretary of State, purporting to be an official act of the Legislature, and purporting to be duly enrolled and signed by the presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature and their respective clerks and duly approved by the Governor, is not in fact an act of the Legislature because it was never presented by that body to the Governor, nor signed by the presiding officers and clerks of the two houses of the Legislature while that body was in session, is not susceptible of proof by parol evidence or other means aliunde the legislative journals or other public records in the office of the Governor or Secretary of State. And such allegation, standing alone, which does not also affirm the existence of a public record in the office of the Governor or Secretary of State, which shows the alleged defect to exist, is not admitted by a demurrer to the bill of complaint. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Document on file, purporting to be an enrolled bill duly passed, prima facie valid act, and not to be impeached by evidence of less dignity than public record of official, executive, or legislative act. A document on file in the office of the Secretary of State, purporting to be an enrolled bill duly passed by the Legislature and duly signed by the presiding officers and clerks of the two houses of the Legislature, is prima facie a valid act of the Legislature, and may not be impeached by any evidence of less dignity than a public record of an official executive or legislative act. (Browne C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Word 'bill' in constitutional provision as to presentation to Governor, and in constitutional provision as to signatures held to refer to document as finally passed. The word 'bill' as used in section 28 of article 3 of the Constitution, providing that every 'bill' that may have passed the Legislature shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the Governor, and as used in the proviso to section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution, providing that all 'bills' so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective houses, etc., refers not to the original document containing the proposition as first submitted, but to the last writing containing all the amendments, if any are made, by the Legislature in the 'bill's' passage. It is the original proposition in its altered or amended form. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series Bill.]
'Public record' written memorial by public officer authorized to make it. A public record is a written memorial, made by a public officer authorized by law to make it. It is required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept, in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written, said, or done. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases First and Second Series, Public Record.]
Document on file with Secretary of State, purporting to be enrolled bill passed by Legislature and signed by presiding officers and clerks of both houses and approved by Governor, held 'public record.' A document on file in the office of the Secretary of State, purporting to be an enrolled bill duly passed by the Legislature and duly signed by the presiding officers and clerks of both houses and duly approved by the Governor, is a public record of an official act of the legislative and executive departments. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Approval of bill by Governor equal to certificate that it came into his possession in due course; judicial branch of government without power, in absence of a specific charge of fraud, to adjudicate bill approved by Governor not legally enacted; 'public record.' The approval by the Governor of a bill purporting to have been duly passed by the Legislature and presented to him in conformity with the requirements of section 28 of article 3 of the Constitution is equivalent to a certificate by the Governor that it came into his possession in due course. Such a document is a public record of a co-ordinate branch of the state government and the judicial branch of the government has no power to adjudge it to have been made in a manner not in conformity with the rules and regulations of law, in the absence of a specific and unequivocal charge of fraud on the part of the officials concerned, or the existence of some public record of equal dignity to show the abuse of authority or violation of law by them. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Court will not take judicial notice of fact existing in pais, depending on parol testimony to destroy public record, under suspicion of fraudulent conduct in officer making it. The court has no power to take judicial knowledge of facts existing in pais, depending upon parol testimony to establish them, that will destroy the faith and credit which the law requires to be given to a public record, and leave the officer, whose duty or power in law it was to make the record, under suspicion of fraudulent conduct in the making of it. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Judicial knowledge when official act of legislative or executive department questioned confined to record which is authentic and complete in itself. Judicial knowledge is confined to the record when an official act of the legislative or executive department is called in question, and such record is authentic and complete in itself. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Invalidity cannot be proved by admissions of parties whose rights are involved. The invalidity of a statute cannot be proved by the admissions of parties in a cause in which rights are involved under such statute. (Browne, C.J., and Taylor, J., dissent.)
Provision that Legislature may provide for tax or license not limitation upon power to impose excise or other taxes in nature of license or privilege taxes. Section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution, providing that the 'Legislature may provide for * * * a tax on licenses,' is not a limitation upon the inherent power of the Legislature to impose excise, occupational, or other taxes that are in the nature of license or privilege taxes. It is an express declaration of a power that exists in the Legislature.
Imposition of tax on place of business and per gallon on gasoline held not double taxation. The provisions of chapter 8411, Acts of 1921, imposing a tax of $5 for each place of business and 1 cent per gallon on gasoline sold, is not objectionable as double taxation. Both exactions amount to but one license tax.
'Excise tax' defined. An 'excise tax' is one laid on licenses to pursue certain occupations, corporate privileges, or sales or consumption of commodities. [Ed. Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Excise.]
Excise tax partakes of nature of license tax. An excise tax partakes of the nature of a license tax.
Tax on sales of products within state after they have lost interstate character excise tax, which is in effect...
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