Amos v. Prom, Inc.

Decision Date11 January 1954
Docket NumberCiv. No. 571.
Citation117 F. Supp. 615
PartiesAMOS v. PROM, Inc.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

George D. Dunn and William Pappas, Mason City, Iowa, for plaintiff.

Frederic M. Miller and Thomas B. Roberts (of Brody, Parker, Miller, Roberts & Thoma), Des Moines, Iowa, and Edward R. Boyle (of Boyle & Schuler), Clear Lake, Iowa, for defendant.

R. Bruce Hughes, Waterloo, Iowa, for Iowa Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

GRAVEN, District Judge.

The plaintiff is a citizen and a resident of the State of Iowa. The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. It is engaged in the operation of a public ballroom, or dance hall, in the City of Clear Lake, Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, known as the Surf. The plaintiff brought this action in this Court. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff is a Negro. In her complaint she alleged that on December 8, 1951, the defendant, because of her color, refused to admit her to its dance hall and that such refusal constituted a violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Sections 735.1 and 735.2, Code of Iowa 1950, I.C.A. The plaintiff asked for the recovery of compensatory and exemplary damages because of such refusal. The pivotal question in the litigation was whether the defendant's dance hall came within the provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Iowa Civil Liberties Union requested, and was granted, leave of Court to file a brief as amicus curiae. The brief and argument of the amicus curiae was in favor of the construction of the Act urged by the plaintiff.

The defendant, Prom, Inc., is a subsidiary of the Aragon Ballroom Corporation. The Aragon Ballroom Corporation owns and operates either directly or by means of subsidiary corporations the Surf Ballroom at Clear Lake, Iowa, the Terp Ballroom at Austin, Minnesota, the Prom Ballroom at St. Paul, Minnesota, and the Aragon and Trianon Ballrooms at Chicago, Illinois. The defendant purchased what was known as the Surf Ballroom in 1946. The ballroom which was on the premises at the time the defendant purchased it burned down in 1947. The present ballroom on the premises was constructed by the defendant in 1948 at a cost of approximately $400,000. The ballroom consists of a large building approximately 175 × 150 feet. There is a ticket cage or box office, the window of which opens to the outside. Beside the ticket cage or entrance, there is a door opening into a large hallway. There are doors in the hallway leading to the dance floor proper. The dance floor is approximately 90 feet by 70 feet in area which will accommodate approximately 800 couples dancing. Outside of the dance floor are rows of booths. There are 203 booths with a seating capacity for 800 people. The booths are available for patrons by reservation. Those desiring to enter the ballroom first purchase tickets at the ticket cage or box office. They then go through swinging doors alongside the ticket cage and enter a large hallway. The ticket seller is not authorized to decide who shall be permitted to purchase tickets. There are doors leading from the large hallway into the ballroom proper. In front of those doors there are aisles formed by posts. The aisles may be opened or closed by means of covered ropes or chains. Ticket takers are stationed at the head of the opened aisles. Those ticket takers take the tickets. They also "screen" the ticket holders for purposes of admission to the ballroom proper. The admission charges range from 90 cents to $2 per person depending upon the day of the week and the orchestra. Patrons who are admitted to the ballroom proper may dance the entire evening without further charge.

The defendant holds dances regularly at the ballroom on Friday and Saturday nights of each week. During the summer months five dances a week are usually held. Dance orchestras of local and national reputation furnish music for the dances. On dance nights the music for dancing begins at 9:00 p. m. and ends at 1:00 a. m. of the following day with intermission for the orchestra during the evening. The members of the orchestra do not leave the platform except for the intermission. The ballroom is open approximately 30 minutes before the music starts and is closed as soon as the music stops and the patrons can secure their wraps and leave. The defendant advertises its dances in newspapers of general circulation, by posters and other means. The advertisements are addressed to the public generally and contain no mention of any restrictions in the matter of attendance. Around 200 people in the area in which the defendant solicits patronage receive passes to the ballroom for their assistance in advertising the dances conducted by the defendant.

In one corner of the ballroom there is a counter where patrons may purchase refreshments. Waitresses also take orders and serve refreshments to patrons in the booths. The articles available for sale to patrons consist of soft drinks, peanuts, popcorn, gum, beer, and cigarettes. The prices charged for those items are those normally charged at other retail outlets. The purchase of those items is optional with the patrons. However, no sales are made to those not patrons. There are no facilities for cooking and the ballroom has no silverware, table linens, or general dishes. The advertisements of the defendant do not represent or advertise the ballroom as one where meals or other food is served. The defendant has a license from the City of Clear Lake to conduct a public dance hall. It also has a beer license and a cigarette license from the same city. The primary purpose of those attending the ballroom is to dance. There are no floor shows, vaudeville acts, plays, dramatic sketches, or similar entertainment provided to the patrons of the ballroom. The number of people who purchase tickets to the ballroom and who do not avail themselves of dancing privileges is negligible.

At different times the defendant conducts what are known as "old time" dances consisting largely of square and mixer dances. On occasions the defendant conducts a dance at which only unescorted men and women are admitted. On occasions the defendant conducts a "teen age" dance at which only those in their teens are admitted. Usually, at the dances conducted by the defendant, the dancing consists of the usual type of couple dancing, i. e., waltzes, two steps, and fox trots, interspersed with so-called group and mixer dances. The so-called group and mixer dances consist of circle and square dances, grand left and right marches and "Bunny Hops." In "Bunny Hops" the dancers form a continuous line and proceed around the dance floor doing rhythmic steps. In the grand right and left marches the dancers form two lines—one line composed of women and the other of men—and couples are formed as the two lines come together. In the so-called circle dances the women form one circle facing out and the men form an outside circle facing in. The circles move in opposite directions. At times designated by the orchestra leader the circles are stopped and couples are formed for couple dancing. The couples are formed by the men taking for their dancing partners the women opposite them at the time the circles are stopped. The square dances are of the usual type. It is optional with the patrons whether they participate in any particular dance or dances. The defendant denies dancing privileges to those who are improperly dressed, to those who are lacking in cleanliness, to those who are under the influence of liquor, and to those who are guilty of misconduct. There was no claim on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff, or any of the members of her group, came within those categories.

Some time prior to December 8, 1951, Lionel Hampton's Dance Band had played at the Surf. It is an all colored band. At that time a number of colored men and women, including the plaintiff and her husband, sought admittance to the Surf and were admitted. The defendant advertised in a Mason City newspaper that on December 8, 1951, the same band would again appear at the Surf. The plaintiff is a married woman whose character and standing is not questioned. Her husband is in the employ of the City of Mason City. Mason City is approximately ten miles from Clear Lake. The advertisement of the coming appearance of Lionel Hampton's Band attracted the attention of the plaintiff, her husband, and some of their acquaintances. They decided to attend the Surf on the evening of that appearance. On the evening of December 8, 1951, a group of eight, consisting of the plaintiff, her husband, and six of their acquaintances, went to the Surf. All of the group were colored. Tickets were purchased by members of the group for the group and they entered into the large hallway. When the group sought to go from the large hallway into the ballroom proper they were refused admittance by a ticket taker stationed at one of the aisle entrances. They asked to see the manager. After some delay the manager was located and came to the hallway and met with the group. One of the group stated to the manager that colored people had been admitted at the previous appearance of Lionel Hampton's Band and asked why they were now being refused admittance. The manager informed them that personally he had nothing against the members of the group or against colored people in general but that he had received word from the main office of the defendant at Chicago that it was against the policy of the defendant to admit colored people to its dances. After some discussion the group left. Refunds were made of the purchase price of the tickets. There was no disorder at any time. The character and deportment of the members of the group was not and is not questioned. Earlier in the trial of the case the defendant apparently sought to claim that the group were refused admittance because the ballroom was filled to capacity at the time the group sought...

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12 cases
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    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 9 May 1955
    ...128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231, 124 N.W. 901, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 407; Amos v. Prom, Inc., D.C.N.D.Iowa, 117 F.Supp. 615. Had the statute been properly brought to our attention and the case thereby put into proper focus, the case would have assume......
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