Amos v. State

• Decision Date: 05 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. S15A1143.,S15A1143.
• Citation: Amos v. State, 297 Ga. 892, 778 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. 2015)
• Parties: AMOS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

297 Ga. 892

778 S.E.2d 203

AMOS

v.The STATE.

No. S15A1143.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 5, 2015.

Mitchell D. Durham, Marietta, James C. Bonner, Jr., Brandon Alexander Bullard, Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, Atlanta, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Daniel James Quinn, Asst. Dist. Atty., D. Victor Reynolds, Dist. Atty., Cobb County District Attorney's Office, for appellee.

Opinion

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Eddie Matthew Amos was tried by a Cobb County jury, which found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder, both in connection with the killing of Robin Crankshaw.The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter into the felony murder, and it sentenced Amos for the murder.Amos appeals, contending only that the trial court should have sentenced him instead for voluntary manslaughter.We find no merit in this claim of error, and we affirm the judgment below.¹

1.Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Amos drove his van on the morning of August 7, 2007 to the auto repair shop at which Crankshaw worked, where Amos fatally shot Crankshaw in the chest.A responding officer found Crankshaw's body lying face down on top of a baseball bat, and two .32 caliber shell casings were found about 35 feet away.Crankshaw's employer saw Amos drive off in an older-model white van and remembered the first three letters on the van's license plate.

After a couple of years passed, investigators were able to locate and interview Amos, with whom they had connected the van.Although Amos initially denied any involvement in the killing of Crankshaw, he eventually admitted that he shot Crankshaw, but Amos claimed that he did so in self-defense.According to Amos, Crankshaw's vehicle had bumped into his van, but Crankshaw drove away while Amos was inspecting his van for damage.Amos said that he pursued Crankshaw to obtain insurance information, and after they arrived at Crankshaw's workplace, Amos claimed, Crankshaw came at him with a baseball bat and attacked him.Amos acknowledged that he then retrieved a .32 caliber firearm from his van and fired two shots.Amos explained that he fled because, as a convicted felon, he feared explaining the situation to police officers.The evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Amos was guilty of murder in the commission of a felony, the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979);see alsoShaw v. State,292 Ga. 871, 872(1), 742 S.E.2d 707(2013)(“jury is free to reject a defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense”)(citation omitted).

2.Because the jury found Amos guilty of both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, Amos contends, the trial court should have merged the felony murder into the voluntary manslaughter and sentenced him only for voluntary manslaughter.We disagree.In Edge v. State,261 Ga. 865, 866–867(2), 414 S.E.2d 463(1992), this Court adopted what has become known as the “ modified merger rule,” concluding that, when a defendant is found guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, the trial court should sentence the defendant only for voluntary manslaughter.Otherwise, we reasoned, almost every voluntary manslaughter would amount to a felony murder (predicated on a felonious assault), and such a rule “would eliminate voluntary manslaughter as a separate form of homicide.”Id. at 866(2), 414 S.E.2d 463.Since Edge,however, we have consistently held that this “modified merger rule” is limited to cases in which the felony murder is predicated on a felony that itself is integral to the homicide, such as aggravated assault.SeeKipp v. State,296 Ga. 250, 252, 765 S.E.2d 924(2014);Wallace v. State,294 Ga. 257, 258–259(2), 754 S.E.2d 5(2013)( Edgerule does not apply where felony murder was predicated on unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon);Lawson v. State,280 Ga. 881, 883(3), 635 S.E.2d 134(2006)(same);Sims v. State,265 Ga. 35, 36(3), 453 S.E.2d 33(1995)(same);see alsoGrimes v. State,293 Ga. 559, 561(2), 748 S.E.2d 441(2013);Smith v. State,272 Ga. 874, 879–880(5)(a), 536 S.E.2d 514(2000).Because the felony murder in this case was predicated on unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon—a crime that is (on the facts of this case) independent of, and not integral to, the killing of Crankshaw²—the Edgerule does not apply, and the trial court properly sentenced Amos for felony murder, not voluntary manslaughter.³

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

1The crimes were committed on August 7, 2007.Amos was indicted on November 19, 2009 and charged with one count of malice murder, one count of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, one count of felony murder predicated on...