Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. City of Manchester

• Decision Date: 27 July 1900
• Citation: 47 A. 74,70 N.H. 336
• Parties: AMOSKEAG MFG. CO. v. CITY OF MANCHESTER.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

47 A. 74

70 N.H. 336

AMOSKEAG MFG. CO.

v. CITY OF MANCHESTER.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsboro.

July 27, 1900.

Petition by the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company against the city of Manchester for the abatement of taxes. Case discharged.

The plaintiffs paid, December 1, 1897, the tax in question. Under the decision in this case at the last term (46 Atl. 470), the plaintiffs moved for judgment for $28,440.04, and interest thereon from December 1, 1897, at 6 per cent. The defendants claimed the plaintiffs could have judgment for $20,002.91 only, without interest, and that, if interest were allowed, it should be at a less rate than 6 per cent.

David Cross and Frank S. Streeter, for plaintiffs.

Elijah M. Topliff, George A. Wagner, and Arthur O. Fuller, for defendants.

PARSONS, J. By an unbroken line of decisions in this state during the last 73 years, —from the opinion of the justices in 1827 (4 N. H. 505) to the decision in this case at the last term (46 Atl. 470),—it has been conclusively settled that the constitutional rule of equality in taxation requires that throughout the same taxing district the same tax shall be laid upon the same amount of property, "so that each man's taxable property shall bear its due portion of the tax according to its value." Opinion of the Justices, 4 N. H. 565, 568. The share which every person is bound to contribute for the protection in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, to which he is entitled (Bill of Rights, art. 12), is his proportional part of the expense of such protection according to the amount of his taxable estate (Id. 568). These fundamental propositions were restated at the last term, and the extent of the plaintiffs' right to an abatement thereby determined. A practical method for the arithmetical computation of the amount of such abatement in accordance with the principles laid down was suggested, and the making of such computation, in case the parties did not agree, was left for the trial term. The method by which the constitutional rule which requires the plaintiffs to pay on their taxable estate in the city, in taxes, the same sum only that is paid by others on the same amount of property, is worked out, is immaterial. While the method suggested may not be the simplest or best that can be found or invented, the test of the accuracy of this or any other method for the practical application of the constitutional rule of equality is whether the result sought is reached by the rule used. If the result of any process of mathematical reasoning applied to the facts assesses against the plaintiffs the same tax in amount which was in fact assessed against others upon the same amount of taxable estate, the process satisfies the constitutional rule, and is correct and sufficient for the purpose, although other methods may be found or invented producing the same result with less labor or less liability of error. On the other hand, any scheme of mathematical reasoning which, similarly applied, produces a different result (i. e. assesses against the plaintiffs a tax greater or less than that assessed to others upon the same amount of taxable estate,—a result in conflict with the constitution and fundamental principles of justice), is inevitably unsound and erroneous, either in the theory itself, or in the premises upon which such system is based. If the method is correct, the result must be right. If the result is wrong, the reasoning is fallacious. Search for the fallacy by which in such case the wrong result is produced may be interesting as a study in mathematics or logic, but would be entirely unprofitable in the administration of constitutional rights. The accuracy of the method of computation is safely and sufficiently tested by the result. It is conceded that, by computation according to the rule suggested at the last term, the plaintiffs are entitled to an abatement of $28,446.64. As, to reach this result, the plaintiffs' taxable estate was appraised at the same ratio to its true value as all the other taxable estate was in fact appraised by the assessors in proportion to its value, and the same percentage or part of such appraisal taken as the tax, it is evident that the plaintiffs' tax, so assessed upon their $8,000,000 of taxable estate, in round numbers, must be of the same amount as was laid upon an average upon each other $8,000,000 of taxable estate owned by other taxpayers. This result complies with the constitutional rule of equality, and the process by which such result is obtained must be correct. Since this result is right, any other result, however attained, is wrong; for there cannot be two different sums, each of which is equal to the tax laid by the assessors upon the same amount of property in the hands of others.

The defendants have urged upon our consideration different processes of mathematical reasoning, founded upon the referees' report, by each of which it is claimed that the abatement to which the plaintiffs are entitled is established to be $26,062.91, or, in other words, that the tax which the plaintiffs ought to pay exceeds that paid by others upon the same amount of property by the sum of $2,383.75. For this reason the sum for which the defendants contend is wrong, because it unavoidably implies that for some reason the plaintiffs ought to be required to pay more than their constitutional, equal share. As was elaborated in the former opinion in this case, upon the numerous authorities in this jurisdiction, the abatement to which the plaintiffs are entitled is one which will leave them to pay the same sum on their taxable estate as other taxpayers paid on taxable estate of the same value. The contention of the defendants cannot be sustained, because it violates this rule, which must be regarded as so firmly established by the decisions...