Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. City of Man Chester

• Decision Date: 16 March 1900
• Citation: 70 N.H. 200,46 A. 470
• Parties: AMOSKEAG MFG. CO. v. CITY OF MAN CHESTER.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

46 A. 470

70 N.H. 200

AMOSKEAG MFG. CO.

v. CITY OF MAN CHESTER.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsboro.

March 16, 1900.

Petition by the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company against the city of Manchester for abatement of taxes. Case discharged.

Petition for abatement of taxes. Trial by referees, who reported in favor of the plaintiffs. In 1807, Herman F. Straw, as clerk and agent of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, seasonably made to the assessors of Manchester, under oath, and on the blank prescribed by law, the return or inventory required by law of the estate of the plaintiffs on which they were liable to taxation, in which, under proper heads, he valued their property as follows:

Factories and machinery........... $2,250,000

Outside lands and buildings........ 500.000

Locks and canals................. 250,000

Stock in trade.................... 1,250,000

$4,250,000

Factories and machinery$

$2,250,000

Outside lands and buildings

500.000

Locks and canals

250，,000

Stock in trade

1，,,20.000

$4,250,000

At the time the inventory was made Straw knew that the plaintiffs had in Manchester, during the year ending April 1, 1897, stock in trade of the average value of $3,100,000 to $3,200,000, and he stated its value for taxation at $1,250,000, because he believed, "after thorough investigation, that $1,250,000 was valuing the stock in trade of said company in Manchester at that time fully as high, and at even a higher rate per cent. than any stocks in trade in Manchester were valued at for taxation." Upon these facts the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief, on the ground that the return made by Straw was not a compliance with the requirements of chapter 57, Pub. St. The referees found that the return was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute; that it was received by the assessors without objection, or request for change and correction; that the assessors did not request or receive from the plaintiffs any information concerning the actual value of their stock in trade other or further than that contained in the inventory, until Straw testified at the trial that the average true value of the plaintiffs' stock in trade for the year ending April 1, 1897, was $3,217,971; that the return of the plaintiffs' stock in trade of the value of $1,250,000 was made in good faith, and without intent to mislead the assessors, and they were not misled by it.

David Cross and Streeter, Walker & Hol-11s, for plainliffs. George A. Wagner and Elijah M. Topliff, for defendants.

PARSONS, J."Selectmen, for good cause shown, may abate any tax assessed by them or by their predecessors." Pub. St c. 59,

§ 10. "If they neglect or refuse so to abate, any person aggrieved, having complied with the requirements of chapter fifty-seven, may, within nine months after notice of such tax, and not afterwards, apply by petition to the supreme court, * * * who shall make such order thereon as justice requires." Id. § 11. The defendants contend that the plaintiffs cannot maintain this petition because of failure to comply with the requirements of chapter 57, Pub. St But they appear to concede in argument that "fraud, accident, or mistake are equitable grounds for relief when the petitioner has failed to conform to the statute." Assuming this to be a correct statement of the law (Parsons v. Durham [Strafford; Dec, 1899] 47 Atl. —), the objection to the maintenance of the petition is disposed of by the findings of the referees. Whether any inventory was returned; whether any statements made in it were incorrect; whether, if incorrect such statements were made in good faith, in honest mistake, or were false with fraudulent intent,—are all questions of fact which are not open here. Consequently, we are not at liberty to consider the defendants' argument that "the inventory returned was a fraudulent deception, intended to mislead the assessors." Until the findings of fact made by the referees are set aside by appropriate proceedings at the trial term as either contrary to or against the weight of the evidence, such findings are conclusive. Searles v. Churchill (N. H.) 43 Atl. 184. It appears that the inventory or return prescribed by law was seasonably made, under oath, to the assessors. In answer to the interrogatory calling for the average value of the plaintiffs' stock in trade during the preceding year, the sum named was only about one-third the actual value known to the agent making oath to the inventory. Such statement was not the statement the law requires, which was its full and true value in money. But the referees find that the statement was made as it was made in good faith, and with no intent to mislead the assessors, and that they were not misled. If made in good faith, it was an honest statement. An honest statement is not, and cannot be, a false statement. As there was no mistake or misunderstanding in the mind of the agent who made the inventory as to the actual value of the stock, the statement made could have been made honestly only through a misunderstanding of the import of the question in answer to which the statement was made. It appeared that the illegal action of the assessors in Manchester in failing, as required by law, to appraise all taxable property at its full and true value in money (Pub. St. c. 58, § 1),—a dereliction in duty not peculiar to Manchester assessors, —had created a distinction known to those interested in taxing questions between the actual value of property and the sum at which it should be appraised for taxation; the latter being known as its "taxable value." Fundamental principles of justice and equality, recognized in the constitution and numerous decisions of the court, have established that each taxpayer is entitled to have his property valued for taxation by the same standard as that of other taxpayers. If Mr. Straw, the plaintiffs' agent, understood the interrogatory he essayed to answer to call for the taxable value of the plaintiffs' stock in trade as that term was understood in Manchester, and had exercised due diligence to ascertain what ratio such taxable value bore to the real value of similar property, he might in good faith have answered the question by a statement of the sum at which his investigation led him to believe the plaintiffs' stock in trade should be appraised, in view of the illegal action of the assessors in the appraisal of the property of others. Whether he did honestly make the statement in this way was a question for the referees. They have answered the question in the affirmative, and it cannot be said as matter of law that their finding is wrong. The statement complained of was incorrect, was not a compliance with the statute, and was not legally justified by the illegal action of the assessors. But as the referees find, in substance, on all the evidence, that the making of the statement was an honest mistake, upon the defendants' concession as to the law and the authority of Parsons v. Durham, supra, such mistake does not deprive the plaintiffs of their right of appeal. The only objection to the inventory that appears to have been insisted upon before the referees, or that was suggested before us until after the case was submitted, related to the statement as to the stock in trade. In the defendants' last brief, recently filed, claim is made that the inventory does not sufficiently describe the plaintiffs' real estate. This objection was known to the defendants before the trial commenced. It involves a question of fact, and should have been taken before the referees, and, not being suggested until this late day, must be regarded as waived. Melvin v. Weare, 56 N. H. 436, 441. If it was taken before the referees, it is disposed of by their general finding that the inventory was a substantial compliance with the statute. Whether the language used was a sufficient description of the plaintiffs' real estate was a question of fact.

The remaining question is what "order justice requires" upon the facts found. This question is for the court. Oocheco Mfg. Co. v. Town of Strafford, 51 N. H. 455, 475. The defendants urge that the report of the referee should be set aside because different rates of taxation were imposed upon different species of property. But there is no occasion to set aside the report, or even to recommit it, should the method suggested by the referees for determining the amount of the abatement to which the plaintiffs are entitled not meet our approval. The report contains clearly stated all the facts essential to the present inquiry. The case does not show any motion for judgment at the trial term, or order as to what judgment should be rendered upon the facts found. The report is before us, and the questions arising thereon have been fully argued. We have, therefore, considered the principles governing such order as must finally be made. The referees have appraised the plaintiffs taxable estate in three classes,—real estate, stock in trade, and other personal property. The plaintiffs claim that, to determine the proportional appraisal upon which the tax against them should have been assessed, their real estate should be appraised at six-tenths of its true value, their stock in trade at one-third, and their other personal property at its full value; the referees having found that the assessors' valuation of other property than that of the plaintiffs of these classes was in such proportions to its true value. The defendants claim that the plaintiffs' whole property should be appraised at 60 per cent. of its true value as found by the referees,...