Las Ams. Immigrant Advocacy Ctr. v. Trump

• Decision Date: 31 July 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:19-cv-02051-IM
• Citation: 475 F.Supp.3d 1194
• Parties: LAS AMERICAS IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER; Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.; Innovation Law Lab; Santa Fe Dreamers Project ; Southern Poverty Law Center; and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Plaintiffs, v. Donald J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; William Barr, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; U.S. Department of Justice; Executive Office for Immigration Review; and James McHenry, in his official capacity as EOIR Director of the United States, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

475 F.Supp.3d 1194

LAS AMERICAS IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER; Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.; Innovation Law Lab; Santa Fe Dreamers Project ; Southern Poverty Law Center; and Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Plaintiffs,

v.Donald J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; William Barr, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States; U.S. Department of Justice; Executive Office for Immigration Review; and James McHenry, in his official capacity as EOIR Director of the United States, Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-02051-IM

United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division.

Signed July 31, 2020

Gracie H. Willis, Pro Hac Vice, Rebecca M. Cassler, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, GA, Heidee Stoller, Nathan R. Morales, Thomas R. Johnson, Alletta S. Brenner, Bryan D. Beel, Perkins Coie, LLP, Jordan Cunnings, Nadia H. Dahab, Tess Hellgren, Stephen W. Manning, Innovation Law Lab Immigrant Law Group PC, Portland, OR, Christopher G. Parker, Pro Hac Vice, Perkins Coie, San Francisco, CA, Melissa Crow, Pro Hac Vice, Southern Poverty Law Center, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Brian C. Ward, Erez Reuveni, United States Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

IMMERGUT, District Judge,

This matter comes before this Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF 24. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations which serve individuals in the immigration court system, including refugees and asylum seekers. ECF 1 ¶¶17–22. They allege, broadly, that Defendants have adopted certain policies and practices that have rendered it nearly impossible for Plaintiffs to deliver their legal services to their clients because the immigration court system has been modified in such a way as to be biased and grossly inefficient. Id. ¶¶ 1–14 (providing summary of allegations).¹ The allegations focus heavily on three policies or practices that Plaintiffs have identified: (1) "asylum-free zones" in which asylum applications are almost categorically denied, (2) the Enforcement Metrics Policy ("Metrics Policy") that establishes performance metrics for immigration judges, and (3) the family docketing (FAMU) directive. Id.

These allegations give rise to six claims for relief:

1. The asylum-free zones and the immigration court backlog violate the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA);

2. The administration of the immigration courts violates the INA's "impartial adjudicator" requirement;

3. The Metrics Policy violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it is unlawful;

4. The Metrics Policy violates the APA because it is arbitrary and capricious;

5. The FAMU directive violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it is unlawful, and;

6. The FAMU directive violates the APA because it is arbitrary and capricious.

Id. at 53–62. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief to end these programs and to implement any necessary corrective actions. Id. at 63.

Defendants filed this motion in an effort to dismiss all six claims for relief. They proffer four distinct theories of why Plaintiff's lawsuit should be dismissed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring these claims, either under the Constitution or under the INA, because they have not asserted the type of injury that is necessary to give rise to a lawsuit. ECF 24 at 17–26. Next, they argue that this court does not have jurisdiction over these claims because Congress has promulgated statutes that strip federal district courts of jurisdiction over claims arising out of decisions made by immigration courts. Id. at 26–32. Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 32–42. Finally, they argue that Oregon is not the proper venue for this case. Id. at 42–45.

Each of these arguments is addressed below.

LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Knievel v. ESPN , 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, Plaintiff is the nonmoving party. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Mere legal conclusions are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

DISCUSSION

Although Defendants raise lack of venue as their final ground for dismissal, this Court addresses venue first because it is a threshold procedural question. ECF 24, at 42. If venue were improper, there would be no reason to address the substantive issues raised in the motion. Otherwise, this Court addresses each of Defendants’ arguments in the order they appear in the motion.

I. Venue

Defendants argue that the District Court of Oregon is not the proper venue for Plaintiffs’ claims because the only Plaintiff bearing a connection to Oregon is Innovation Law Lab, which Defendants claim has not alleged that Oregon is where it "maintains its principal place of business" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ECF 24 at 42. Further, Defendants argue that even if Innovation Law Lab were doing business in Oregon, the venue statutes were not meant to allow organization plaintiffs to "forum shop" and bring claims alleging violations of immigration law occurring in other venues and other circuits. Id. at 42–43. Defendants urge this Court to sever the claims in this complaint and force the Plaintiffs to bring them as challenges to individual removal proceedings, rather than the systemic claims that have been alleged in this lawsuit because they "do not present common questions of law or fact." Id. at 43–44. Notably, Defendants do not identify which venue they believe is proper. See id. at 42–45.

Venue is proper if it is satisfied under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Venue against United States officers, acting in their official capacity, can be proper where "(C) the plaintiff resides." § 1391(e)(1). For an organization, venue is satisfied for a plaintiff's residency requirement "in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal place of business." § 1391(c)(2). To decide where a "principal place of business" is maintained, a court will consider the "nerve center" test which looks to "where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U.S. 77, 92–93, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010). Where there are multiple plaintiffs, only one plaintiff must be a resident of the district to satisfy the residency requirement of venue under § 1391(e)(1)(C). See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass'n v. ICC , 958 F.2d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Exxon Corp. v. FTC , 588 F.2d 895, 898–99 (3d Cir. 1978) ) ("[R]equiring every plaintiff in an action against the federal government ... to independently meet section 1391(e) ’s standards would result in an unnecessary multiplicity of litigation ... There is no requirement that all plaintiffs reside in the forum district.").

Here, Plaintiff Innovation Law Lab was founded and incorporated in Oregon and directs and controls its operations out of its Portland office. ECF 57 at 56 (citing ECF 1 at ¶ 20). From the Portland office, Innovation Law Lab manages nationwide programs that do work in a number of other states, including Georgia, Missouri, California, North Carolina, and Texas. Id. This explanation of Innovation Law Lab's activities establishes that its "nerve center" is in Portland and that it is therefore a proper plaintiff in the District Court of Oregon. As noted above, no other plaintiff needs to reside in Oregon in order for venue to be proper here.

As to Defendants’ other arguments, they are not persuasive. Plaintiffs are not challenging individual orders of removal or outcomes of individual cases—a point that will be relevant repeatedly in the analysis below as well. They are alleging systemic, executive-level harms that cause injury to themselves as organizations, and they have these harms in common. ECF 57 at 56–57. These claims have questions of law and fact in common, and severance is therefore not required. Further, not only is it not required, it would be improper in this case because it would require this Court to either force Plaintiffs to bring identical claims in multiple circuits or to change their claims into attacks on individual orders of removal. It is not the court's role to do either.

Finally, Defendants suggest that this Court should transfer venue under the forum non conveniens doctrine. ECF 24 at 45 (citing Bos. Telecommunications Grp., Inc. v. Wood , 588 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2009) ). They argue that two factors weigh in favor of dismissal under this doctrine: "the lack of local interest in the lawsuit" and "the court's familiarity with governing law." Id. (citing Wood , 588 F.3d at 1211 ).This argument is not persuasive. The District of Oregon is home to immigration courts, immigrants, foreign nationals, and one of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit. That is sufficient to establish "local interest." Further, the argument that this court is not familiar with "governing law" is not well taken. It is not clear what Defendants believe the "governing law" is, but to the extent it is the constitutional and statutory law of the United States, this federal court is sufficiently familiar with it to apply it in this case.²

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of venue...