Amsel v. Brooks
Decision Date | 18 May 1954 |
Citation | 45 A.L.R.2d 1234,106 A.2d 152,141 Conn. 288 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | , 45 A.L.R.2d 1234 AMSEL et al. v. BROOKS et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
John J. Darcy, Fairfield, for plaintiffs.
Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen. with whom, on the brief, was William L. Beers, Atty. Gen., for defendants.
Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.
The plaintiffs, who are partners doing business as the Amsel Dental Laboratory, brought an action in the Superior Court against the defendants, who comprise the dental commission of the state of Connecticut, asking for a judgment declaring unconstitutional 'An Act concerning the Practice of Dentistry,' being No. 486 of the Public Acts of 1953. General Statutes, Cum.Sup.1953, §§ 1696c, 1697c. By stipulation, the case has been reserved for the advice of this court upon the questions set forth in the footnote. 1
The stipulated facts may be abbreviated as follows: The plaintiffs have been carrying on the business of a dental laboratory in New Haven and Bridgeport. They are not licensed dentists. They furnish, supply, construct, reproduce, and repair prosthetic dentures, bridges, appliances and other structures to be worn in the human mouth. When they construct an original denture, they do so from an impression or cast made by a duly licensed dentist. In conducting their business, the plaintiffs advertise to the public that they will furnish, supply, reproduce or repair prosthetic appliances. They contract directly with the members of the public and deliver their products directly to their customers.
At its 1953 session, the General Assembly enacted 'An Act concerning the Practice of Dentistry.' Cum.Sup.1953, §§ 1696c, 1697c. The first section of the act was a re-enactment, in part, of § 4458 of the General Statutes, § 921b of the 1951 Cumulative Supplement in certain particulars not pertinent to this case. Section 4458 defined what conduct constituted the practice of dentistry. The 1953 legislation now being questioned enlarged the definition to embrace every person 'who, directly or indirectly, by any means or method, furnishes, supplies, constructs, reproduces or repairs any prosthetic denture, bridge, appliance or any other structure to be worn in the human mouth, except on the direction of a duly licensed dentist, or who places such appliance or structure in the human mouth or attempts to adjust the same, or delivers the same to any person other than the dentist upon whose direction the work was performed, or who advertises to the public, by any method, to furnish, supply, construct, reproduce or repair any prosthetic denture, bridge, appliance or other structure to be worn in the human mouth * * *.' This enlargement of the definition of the practice of dentistry, when read in conjunction with § 4446 of the General Statutes, providing that no person shall engage in the practice of dentistry without a license, has the effect of bringing the additional acts within the prohibition of § 4446.
By § 2 of the 1953 act, § 1697c, the dental commission is required to appoint three licensed dentists to be a grievance committee in each county. Section 1698c of the 1953 Cumulative Supplement should be mentioned at this point because it prescribes penalties for violations of the statutes relating to the practice of dentistry and gives the dental commissioners power to apply to the courts for an injunction restraining such violations. The first section of the 1953 act, which is the one questioned directly, appears in full below. 2 If the plaintiffs continue to operate their business as they have been doing, they will be subject to the penalties and to an injunction.
The statute now challenged purports to regulate the conduct of a lawful business or profession. Its enactment was an exercise of the police power of the state. To be a constitutional exercise of that power, it must operate in a field wherein the public health, safety and welfare are affected. State v. Porter, 94 Conn. 639, 642, 110 A. 59. So far as we are aware, the power of the legislature to regulate the practice of dentistry in this state has never been questioned on grounds of constitutionality. See State v. Faatz, 83 Conn. 300, 76 A. 295; Jones v. Dental Commission, 109 Conn. 73, 145 A. 570.
The portion of § 1696c hereinbefore quoted contains a description of two separate and distinct series of facts. We shall discuss first the part which specifically concerns the making and repairing of prosthetic dentures, and later in the opinion we will deal with the part which pertains to the advertising of those services. The plaintiffs concede that the construction and repair of prosthetic dentures is a calling affected with the public interest and is a proper field for the exercise of the police power of the state. They claim, however, that the statute under attack is unconstitutional because (1) it serves only the interest of licensed dentists and fails to furnish the public with any protection; (2) its provisions do not clearly define the act or acts which constitute a violation of it; and (3) it is an unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the dental commissioners. For these reasons, the plaintiffs charge that the statute is an unwarranted and arbitrary interference with their right to carry on a lawful business and subjects them to arrest, conviction and penalities for a crime which is stated in general and indefinite terms, all in violation of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and of §§ 1 and 10 of article first, as well as articles second and third, of the constitution of Connecticut.
The plaintiffs' claims under (1) and (2) are predicated upon the assertion that while the law classifies the repair and reproduction of prosthetic dentures as acts constituting the practice of dentistry, it excepts these very same acts when they are undertaken on the direction of a duly licensed dentist. The dentist, it argues, is under no duty to examine the patient or the work to be done, either before or after he directs the patient to the dental laboratory. Furthermore, the person whom he directs to do the work need possess no particular skill or training. In short, the requirement of the statute is met when a patient is directed by a dentist to some dental laboratory. Thereafter, it is entirely up to the dentist how much further direction and supervision he shall give. Consequently, no real protection is furnished to the public and no clear and understandable definition of what constitutes a violation of the statute is furnished.
When the constitutionality of legislation is in question, it is the duty of the court to sustain it unless its invalidity is beyond a reasonable doubt. Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 705, 81 A.2d 266. All police legislation is subject, in the courts, to the test whether it serves the public health, safety and morals at all and whether it does so in a reasonable manner. State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 105, 147 A. 294. It cannot parade under the banner of service to the commonweal and restrict or destroy private rights in the furtherance of some special interest. The regulation and prohibition it imposes must have a rational relationship to the preservation and promotion of the public welfare. Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 129, 14 A.2d 754; Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, supra, 137 Conn. 706, 81 A.2d 268, 269; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) pp. 1231, 1329 n. 6. The case of Hart v. Board of Examiners of Embalmers, 129 Conn. 128, 132, 26 A.2d 780, illustrates this point aptly. In that case, we held unconstitutional a statute which provided that the board of examiners of embalmers should issue a funeral director's license when an application was made upon the ground that the former licensee was dead or disabled and his financial interest in the funeral home had been transferred to the applicant, who was related to him by blood or marriage. We ruled that such a ground could have no reasonable relation to the public health, safety or welfare. It is a rule of statutory construction, however, that courts are bound to assume that the legislature, in enacting a particular law, did so upon proper motives and to accomplish a worthy objective. State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 107, 90 A.2d 862; Walsh v. Jenks, 135 Conn. 210, 222, 62 A.2d 773. Furthermore, courts must, if possible, construe a law so that it is effective. DeMond v. Liquor Control Commission, 129 Conn. 642, 645, 30 A.2d 547; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Town of Southbury, 95 Conn. 242, 247, 111 A. 363; Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 320, 47 A. 327. It is to be presumed that legislatures do not deliberately enact ineffective and unconstitutional laws. Antman v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 117 Conn. 230, 237, 167 A. 715; Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 679, 179 A. 195, 980 A.L.R. 897; State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 208, 91 A.2d 773.
The statute prescribes, in effect, that certain acts, described in detail therein shall not be done by a layman 'except on the direction of a duly licensed dentist.' The acts forbidden include the placing of any structure or applicance in the human mouth or the attempt to adjust such an appliance, or the delivery of it to anyone other than the dentist 'upon whose direction the work was performed.' The word 'direction' is one of common usage. It means '[a]ct of directing; guidance; management; * * * [t]hat which is imposed by directing; command; also, authoritative instruction; information as to method * * *.' Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd Ed.); 12 Words and Phrases, Direction, p. 476. The word, as used in the statute, is peculiarly appropriate and understandable. It sets forth a clear concept of the respective responsibilities of the dentist and the dental laboratory. Moreover, the making, fitting and repair of...
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