AmSouth Bank v. Dees
Citation | 847 So.2d 923 |
Parties | AmSOUTH BANK v. Leffie Terrell DEES III and Yvette Dees. |
Decision Date | 04 October 2002 |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Edward A. Dean and Mary Carol Ladd of Armbrecht Jackson, LLP, Mobile, for appellant.
James Lynn Perry of Daniell, Upton, Perry & Morris, P.C., Mobile, for appellees.
On June 26, 2001, Leffie Terrell Dees III and Yvette Dees sued AmSouth Bank and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., asserting claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, fraud, suppression, deceit, negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy, allegedly arising from the wrongful handling of a mortgage loan. On August 23, 2001, AmSouth filed a motion to compel arbitration of the Deeses' claims on the basis that two agreements between it and them—a "Customer Agreement for Depository Account," associated with a checking account the Deeses opened on June 11, 1992, and a April 16, 1996, "AmSouth Equity Line of Credit Agreement"—contained arbitration clauses applicable to the dispute.1 On September 10, 2001, the Deeses filed their "Response and Objection to Defendant, AmSouth Bank's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Defendant, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.'s Joinder In Same and Motion to Strike" (hereinafter referred to as the "response").2 On October 12, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on AmSouth's motion to compel arbitration and, at the conclusion of the hearing, denied it both orally and by a terse entry on the case action summary stating "October 12, 2001—DENIED."3 On October 17, 2001, the court entered an order on the case action summary stating that Countrywide's joinder in seeking to compel arbitration was likewise denied. On November 9, 2001, AmSouth filed a notice of appeal from the denial of its motion.4 We reverse the order denying AmSouth's motion to compel arbitration and remand the cause.
On February 4, 1994, the Deeses mortgaged their home to AmSouth Mortgage Company, Inc., to secure a 20-year loan in the amount of $55,090 (that mortgage is hereinafter referred to as "the first mortgage"). AmSouth Mortgage is not a party to this action. The mortgage documents provided for an annual interest rate of 7%. Neither the mortgage nor the underlying promissory note contained an arbitration clause. On October 31, 1994, AmSouth Mortgage assigned the mortgage to Countrywide.
On April 16, 1996, Mr. Dees entered into an "AmSouth Equity Line of Credit Agreement" (hereinafter referred to as the "credit agreement") in connection with obtaining a $15,000 line of credit. Although Mrs. Dees did not sign the credit agreement, she did sign a contemporaneously executed document captioned "Opening an AmSouth Equity Line of Credit Account"; that document identified her as an "account holder." The document stated in its introduction that "[AmSouth has] agreed to establish an open-end account for you...," and went on to explain her right to cancel the account upon taking certain steps. In describing this particular transaction in their complaint, the Deeses state the following: (Emphasis supplied.) The Deeses were given "special checks" to use to obtain advances from the line of credit. The credit agreement stated, in pertinent part:
Section 33 of the credit agreement contains an arbitration clause, which states, in pertinent part:
The line of credit was secured by a second mortgage of the same date on the Deeses' home, signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Dees. The mortgage document did not contain an arbitration clause. The annual interest rate of the line of credit was 1.5% above prime, which, at the time the agreement was executed, translated to an annual interest rate of 9.75%.
Mr. Dees subsequently requested an increase in the line-of-credit limit, and on June 10, 1997, he and Mrs. Dees signed an "Amendment to Adjustable-Rate Line of Credit Mortgage" (hereinafter referred to as the "amended second mortgage"). AmSouth increased the line of credit from $15,000 to $20,000. Subsequently, as the Deeses state in their complaint, "[b]y March 2001, ... the Deeses had fallen behind on the Equity Line." On March 13, 2001, AmSouth purchased the Deeses' first mortgage from Countrywide and increased the amount owing under the Deeses' line of credit to $72,352.20. This amount reflected the addition of $51,210.74 that AmSouth had paid Countrywide for the assignment of the first mortgage. AmSouth proceeded to charge the Deeses interest based on the higher interest rate applicable to the line of credit, instead of the 7% interest rate of the first mortgage. AmSouth did not seek the approval of the Deeses for that course of action.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying AmSouth's motion to compel arbitration of the Deeses' claims.
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is settled:
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 2, provides in pertinent part:
"A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Section 2 preempts conflicting Alabama law, including in particular Ala.Code 1975, § 8-1-41(3), which states that "[a]n agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration" cannot be specifically enforced.
However, the FAA applies to render enforceable a predispute arbitration agreement only if the contract containing the agreement, or the transaction the contract evidences, "substantially affects interstate commerce." Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So.2d 759, 766 (Ala.2000); accord Equifirst Corp. v. Ware, 808 So.2d 1, 4 (Ala.2001). The party moving to compel arbitration has the burden of proving that the contract in question evidences a transaction substantially affecting interstate commerce. Chesser v. AmSouth Bank, 846 So.2d 1082 (Ala.2002). Undertaking to carry that burden, AmSouth supported its motion with affidavits from four of its officers: a vice president serving as manager of its equity loan center; a senior vice president serving as wholesale funding manager; a senior vice president serving as manager of electronic banking; and a senior vice president serving as manager of deposit operations. Collectively, those affidavits set forth the following information concerning the effects of the equity-line-of-credit transaction on interstate commerce:5
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