Amunrud v. Board of Appeals

• Decision Date: 21 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 76590-1.,76590-1.
• Citation: 158 Wn.2d 208,143 P.3d 571
• Parties: Greg AMUNRUD, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF APPEALS and the Department of Social and Health Services, State of Washington, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 571

143 P.3d 571

158 Wn.2d 208

Greg AMUNRUD, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF APPEALS and the Department of Social and Health Services, State of Washington, Respondents.

No. 76590-1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued November 9, 2005.

Decided September 21, 2006.

Robert Harold Stevenson, Seattle, for Petitioner/Appellant.

Lianne Schain Malloy, Jay Douglas Geck, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, for Appellee/Respondents.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 Greg Amunrud challenges a decision by the Court of Appeals affirming an order from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) suspending his commercial driver's license for failing to pay child support for his son. He claims that he was denied procedural due process prior to the suspension because he was not given a "meaningful" hearing. He also claims that he has a fundamental economic right to pursue an occupation as a taxi driver and that suspension of his commercial driver's license under RCW 74.20A.320 does not survive strict scrutiny, contravening substantive due process.

¶ 2 We hold that Amunrud was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to and postsuspension of his commercial driver's license consistent with procedural due process. Further, consistent with long-standing law, we apply a rational basis test and hold that the enforcement of child support obligations is a legitimate state interest and RCW 74.20A.320 is rationally related to that interest. We affirm the Court of Appeals, finding that Amunrud received due process consistent with the federal and state constitutions.

FACTS

¶ 3 In 1996, the United States Congress enacted Title III of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. § 1305, which imposed greater federal oversight over the states' participation in the Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69. While states are not required to participate in the Child Support Enforcement Program, in order for a state to receive the federal block grant under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program and federal money to assist in collecting child support under PRWORA, the state must operate a child support enforcement program that meets federal requirements. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000). A state "shall have in effect all of the laws to improve child support enforcement effectiveness which are referred to in [42 U.S.C. § 666]." 42 U.S.C. § 654(20)(A). Under 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16), a state must establish procedures under which it would have the "authority to withhold or suspend, or to restrict the use of driver's licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and recreational and sporting licenses of individuals owing overdue support or failing, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support proceedings."

¶ 4 In 1997, the Washington State Legislature established a program by which certain licenses may be suspended if a responsible parent is six months or more in arrears on child support payments. Laws of 1997, ch. 58, § 801. RCW 74.20A.320 allows DSHS to serve on a responsible parent the department's intent to seek revocation of a license of the parent. A parent may request a hearing to contest the issue of compliance with the child support order, but the issues in the adjudicative proceeding are limited to whether the parent is required to pay child support and whether the parent is in compliance with that order. RCW 74.20A.320(2)(a). "[I]f the parent agrees to make timely payments of current support and agrees to a reasonable payment schedule for the payment of the arrears," the department will stay the action to certify the parent to the department of licensing. RCW 74.20A.320(2)(e). The Division of Child Support (DCS) must take into account the financial situation of the parent and the needs of the children when setting the repayment amount. WAC 388-14A-4520(4). Furthermore, RCW 74.20A.320 does not prohibit the "parent from filing a motion to modify support with the court or from requesting the department to amend a support obligation established by an administrative decision[, and i]f there is a reasonable likelihood that a pending motion or request will significantly change the amount of the child support obligation, the department or the court may stay action to certify the responsible parent to the department of licensing." RCW 74.20A.320(11).

¶ 5 In conjunction with a paternity action filed in November 1997, Amunrud was ordered to pay $350 per month in child support for his son. Initially, Amunrud paid $150 per month, but in January 1998, he began to pay only $75 per month and also made occasional payments of $50 or $100 per month. He was cited for contempt several times for failing to pay child support.

¶ 6 In 2002, with assistance from the prosecutor's office, Amunrud petitioned the court for a modification of child support. Rather than reducing the child support obligation, the court ordered Amunrud to pay $421 per month (the standard calculation). The order of child support notified Amunrud that his privilege to maintain a driver's license or a license to engage in a profession may be suspended under chapter 74.20A RCW if he failed to comply with the order. Amunrud did not appeal the support order, and he has not sought to modify it.

¶ 7 By April 2002, Amunrud was $16,255 in arrears on his child support payments. On April 9, 2002, the DCS sent Amunrud a notice of noncompliance and intent to suspend licenses. Certified Appeal Bd. R., ex. 3, at 34. Amunrud requested a hearing, which was held on June 18, 2002. In upholding the department's decision to suspend Amunrud's license, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Amunrud was the noncustodial parent named in the court orders requiring him to pay child support and that he was at least six months in arrears under each of the orders.

¶ 8 Amunrud appealed the initial suspension order, arguing that the ALJ's decision violated his rights to equal protection and due process by depriving him of his means to make a living by driving a taxi.¹

¶ 9 The DSHS Board of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's decision, finding no irregularities in the proceedings affecting the fairness of the hearing. The Board of Appeals did not address Amunrud's arguments regarding validity of the underlying superior court order for child support, opining that it did not have the authority to do so. Amunrud's request for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the King County Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals.

¶ 10 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court. Amunrud v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 124 Wash.App. 884, 103 P.3d 257 (2004). First, the court held that RCW 74.20A.320 does not violate Amunrud's right to substantive due process under the rational basis test. The court specifically noted that license suspension, or threat of license suspension, had proved an effective child support enforcement tool, resulting in over $48.5 million in voluntary payments from October 2001 to September 2003. Id. at 890, 10, 103 P.3d 257. Second, the court found that Amunrud's right to procedural due process was not violated because Amunrud was provided an administrative hearing and was able to challenge the underlying amount of support through modification.

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Amunrud challenges DSHS's order suspending his commercial driver's license for failing to pay child support pursuant to RCW 74.20A.320 on two bases: he claims that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge the suspension in violation of his right to procedural due process, and he contends that the statute upon which the suspension rests violates substantive due process because it impinges on his fundamental right to pursue a profession or occupation.

¶ 12 Constitutional challenges are questions of law subject to de novo review. City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 668, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). This court shall grant relief from an agency order if we determine that "[t]he order, or the statute or rule on which the order is based, is in violation of constitutional provisions on its face or as applied." RCW 34.05.570(3)(a). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden to show unconstitutionality is on the challenger. In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash.2d 255, 258, 634 P.2d 877 (1981). A party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the heavy burden of establishing its unconstitutionality. Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash.2d 752, 757, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) (citing Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wash. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash.2d 523, 528-29, 520 P.2d 162 (1974); Hemphill v. Tax Comm'n, 65 Wash.2d 889, 891, 400 P.2d 297 (1965)). This standard is met if argument and research show that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution. Larson, 156 Wash.2d at 757, ¶ 9, 131 P.3d 892 (citing Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 205, 11 P.3d 762); Johnson, 96 Wash.2d at 258, 634 P.2d 877; Aetna, 83 Wash.2d at 528-29, 520 P.2d 162; Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash.2d 425, 431, 353 P.2d 941 (1960). See also Parrish v. W. Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 597, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936) (statute must be unconstitutional "beyond question"), aff'd, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934) (every possible presumption is in favor of a statute's validity, and that although a court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of a law, it may not be annulled unless "palpably" in excess of legislative power).

Procedural Due Process

¶ 13 We first address Amunrud's procedural due process claim. The United States Constitution...