Amy v. City of Watertown
Citation | 32 L.Ed. 946,130 U.S. 301,9 S.Ct. 530 |
Decision Date | 08 April 1889 |
Docket Number | No. 196,196 |
Parties | AMY et al. v. CITY OF WATERTOWN |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
George P. Miller, for plaintiffs in error.
Daniel Hall and George W. Bird, for defendant in error.
The principal question in this case is whether the defendant, the city of Watertown, was served with process in the suit so as to give the court below jurisdiction over it. In order to understand the bearing of the facts of the case, it will be necessary to give a brief abstract of the laws of Wisconsin which relate to it, and these are mostly to be found in the charter of the city of Watertown, and the acts supplementary thereto. The state laws are referred to because they govern the practice of the federal courts in the matter under consideration. By the fifth section of the act of June 1, 1872, (Rev. St. § 914,) it is declared that 'the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which such circuit or district courts are held.' Were it not for this statute, the circuit courts themselves could prescribe by general rule the mode of serving process on corporations as well as on other persons. By the temporary process act of September 29, 1789, (1 St. 93,) if not otherwise provided, the forms of writs and executions (except their style) and modes of process in the circuit and district courts in suits at common law were directed to be the same as in the supreme courts of the states respectively. By the permanent process act of May 8, 1792, (1 St. 275,) it was enacted that the forms of writs, executions, and other process, and the forms and modes of proceeding, in suits at common law, should be the same as directed by the act of 1789, subject to such alterations and additions as the said courts should deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the United States should think proper by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court. So that the practice in United States courts in the old states was made to conform to the state practice, as it was in 1789, subject to alteration by rule of court. In 1828 a law was passed adopting for the federal courts in the new states, admitted since 1789, the forms of process, and forms and modes of proceeding, of the highest courts of those states respectively, as then existing, subject to alteration by the courts themselves or the supreme court of the United States. 4 St. 278. By the act of August 1, 1842, the provisions of the act of 1828 were extended to the states admitted in the intermediate time. This review of the statutes shows that after 1792 it was always in the power of the courts by general rules to adapt their practice to the exigencies and conditions of the times. But the statute of 1872 is peremptory, and whatever belongs to the three categories of practice, pleading, and forms and modes of proceeding, must conform to the state law and the practice of the state courts, except where congress itself has legislated upon a particular subject, and prescribed a rule; then, of course, the act of congress is to be followed in preference to the laws of the state. With regard to the mode of serving mesne process upon corporations and other persons, congress has not laid down any rule; and hence the state law and practice must be followed. There can be no doubt, we think, that the mode of service of process is within the categories named in the act. It is part of the practice and mode of proceeding in a suit.
Assuming, therefore, that the question is one to be governed by the local or state law, we proceed to give an abstract of the charter of Watertown, and such other laws of Wisconsin as bear upon the subject. We find this mostly made to our hand in the brief of the plaintiffs in error, taken from the consolidated charter of 1865, and it is as follows: * * *' The common council is then given, in 26 * * *'sections, the usual powers which are commonly vested in the common councils of cities. * * *' * * *'
Chapter 61 of the Private and Local Laws of Wisconsin for 1867 provides: * * *'
Chapter 204 of the Private and Local Laws of Wisconsin for 1871 provides: Chapter 2, P. & L. Laws 1872, amended said chapter as follows: ...
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Ex Parte Wolters
...vested in him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case, not to the courts, but to the people." Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 530, 32 L. Ed. 946; People v. Orange County Sup'rs, 17 N. Y. 235; Com. v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. 61; Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147......
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Oltremari v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitative Service
...speculate whether some other mode will not answer as well.'" Knight, 1990 WL 154206, at *2 (quoting Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 316-17, 9 S.Ct. 530, 535-36, 32 L.Ed. 946 (1889)). Kansas law does allow service by certified mail. K.S.A. 60-303(b). In this instance, however, it als......
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