Amy v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 08 March 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 19-cv-02184-PJH
• Parties: "AMY," et al., Plaintiffs, v. RANDALL STEVEN CURTIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

"AMY," et al., Plaintiffs, v. RANDALL STEVEN CURTIS, Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-02184-PJH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 8, 2021

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 142

Defendant Randall Steven Curtis' motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, summary judgment or partial summary judgment, came on for hearing before this court on February 25, 2021. Defendant appeared through his counsel, Ethan A. Balogh. Plaintiffs appeared through their counsel, Carol L. Hepburn and John A. Kawai. Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES defendant's motion, for the following reasons.

I. Background

Fifteen plaintiffs, proceeding under pseudonyms, collectively bring this civil action against defendant Randall Curtis based on Curtis' possession of child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (criminalizing possession of child pornography). Plaintiffs assert a single cause of action under Title 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ("Section 2255"), which allows victims of child pornography to recover civil damages against people who have committed a violation of certain enumerated statutes, including § 2252(a)(4)(B).

Plaintiffs Amy, Erika, Tori, Jenny, Jessica, Lilly, Sarah, Skylar, Savannah, Sally, Sierra, Maureen, Violet, Pia, and Mya each allege that they were victims of childhood sexual abuse depicted in images of child pornography (alternatively referred to herein as "child sexual abuse material" or "CSAM") seized from defendant's possession.¹ See FAC ¶¶ 3-30, Dkt. 81. On September 6, 2016, the defendant was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for knowingly possessing and transporting child pornography in violation of §§ 2252(a)(1) and (a)(4)(B), respectively. FAC ¶ 35. Defendant pleaded guilty to these offenses on July 13, 2017, and he was sentenced with a judgment entered against him on June 8, 2018. FAC ¶ 36.

Plaintiffs filed this civil action on April 23, 2019. Dkt. 1. Defendant filed his motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on July 22, 2019. Dkt. 25. The motion to dismiss was denied by this court on August 30, 2019. Dkt 42.

Plaintiffs sought leave of court to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") that eliminated their original claims for punitive damages, added no new claims, eliminated many factual allegations of the original complaint, and corrected an error pointed out by defense counsel. Dkt. 77. The court granted leave to file the FAC (Dkt. 80), and plaintiffs did so (Dkt. 81). Defendant filed his amended answer to plaintiffs' FAC on April 10, 2020. Dkt. 82. In response, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike portions of the answer. Dkt. 97. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to strike nine of defendant's affirmative defenses. Dkt. 130. On the same day as the order on the plaintiff's motion to strike affirmative defenses, the court entered a separate order regarding a discovery dispute. Dkt. 131. The court ruled that plaintiffs need not establish actual damages to prevail on their Section 2255 claim, they need only to establish that they are victims of defendant's crime. Id.

On January 19, 2021, defendant filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 142.

II. Legal Standard

"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings "challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings." William Schwarzer et al, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 9:316 (2014). The legal standards governing Rules 12(c) and 12(b)(6) are "functionally identical," Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011), as both permit challenges directed at the legal sufficiency of the parties' allegations. Thus, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when the pleaded facts, accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal applies equally to a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2012); Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; see also Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 378 Fed.Appx. 693, 694, 2010 WL 1841891 at *1 (9th Cir., May 10, 2010) ("To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion, a plaintiff must allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Indeed, "a plaintiff's obligations to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotations omitted). Rather, the allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.

III. Analysis

A. Whether the version of Section 2255 in effect at the time of defendant's 2016 conviction should apply or whether the version of Section 2255 in effect at the time of plaintiffs' 2019 initiation of this suit should apply

The parties dispute whether the application of the 2018 amendments to Section 2255 in this case would be improperly retroactive. Defendant argues that application of the version of Section 2255 adopted after his conviction would be an unfair, retroactive application of the law, while plaintiffs argue that the version of Section 2255 in effect at the time they initiated this civil suit should apply.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactive application of a statute in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). The Court started by acknowledging the "apparent tension" between the rule that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision," and the axiom that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Id. at 264 (internal citations omitted). The Court also made clear that "[a] statute does not operate retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment," but "[r]ather, the court must ask whether the new provision attached new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." Id. at 269-70.

When a court is assessing whether a party seeks impermissible retroactive application of a statutory provision, it first looks to see whether Congress indicated its intent that the statute applies retroactively. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. The plain language of a statute provides the best evidence of legislative intent. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1987); see also Royal Foods Co. Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) ("There is a strong presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent, which is 'rebutted only in rare and exceptional circumstances, when a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed'" (citation omitted)). Under the second step of the analysis, the court asks whether the new statute has a retroactive effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. A law has a retroactive effect if it (1) impairs rights a party possessed when the party acted; (2)increases a party's liability for past conduct; or (3) imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Id.

Here, defendant argues that the application of the 2018 version of Section 2255, particularly the provision for liquidated damages in the amount of $150,000 per victim, cannot apply to him because the acts giving rise to plaintiffs' claims, along with defendant's criminal conviction, took place in 2016. In 2016, the relevant portion of the statute in effect provided that the victims of the enumerated child sexual abuse crimes "shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value" instead of liquidated damages. 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2006). Defendant suggests that some language in the preface of the 2018 amendments ("An Act [t]o prevent the sexual abuse of minors..." (emphasis by defendant)) announces the lack of retroactive intent for the amendment. Plaintiffs do not suggest that Congress specifically indicated that the statute should apply retroactively. Plaintiffs instead focus on the second step of the analysis from Landgraf. Plaintiffs argue that the 2018 amendments do not alter defendant's civil liability, create new burdens for him, nor alter his "relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses." Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 458 (2014). Defendant counters that the liquidated damages provision substantially changes his legal rights by creating new legal consequences for previous conduct.

First, neither party provides clear indication that Congress intended the statute to apply retroactively. Defendant's emphasis on Section 2255's preamble's reference to the prevention of child sexual abuse does not amount to a sufficiently clear statement that the 2018 amendments only apply to conduct following enactment, particularly for a statute that remains substantially the same as previous versions.

Second, in the absence of clear indication of Congressional intent that the statute applies retroactively, the Landgraf test must provide the answer. The amendments do not change, much less impair, a right possessed by defendant. Defendant was prohibited from possessing and transporting CSAM well before the 2018 amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,...