An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological University

• Decision Date: 11 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. M76-62 CA.,M76-62 CA.
• Citation: 493 F. Supp. 1137
• Parties: AN-TI CHAI, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, Dr. Raymond L. Smith, Individually and as President of Michigan Technological University; Dr. C. E. Mandeville, Individually and head of the Department of Physics, Michigan Technological University; and Dr. Zane C. Motteler, Individually and head of the Department of Mathematics, Michigan Technological University, Defendants. Dr. C. E. MANDEVILLE, Cross-Plaintiff and Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY and Dr. Raymond L. Smith, Individually and as President of Michigan Technological University, jointly and severally, Cross-Defendants, and D. W. Stebbins, Individually and as Vice-President of Academic Affairs of Michigan Technological University; and William J. Powers, Individually and as Dean of the College of Sciences and Arts at Michigan Technological University, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

493 F. Supp. 1137

AN-TI CHAI, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, Dr. Raymond L. Smith, Individually and as President of Michigan Technological University; Dr. C. E. Mandeville, Individually and head of the Department of Physics, Michigan Technological University; and Dr. Zane C. Motteler, Individually and head of the Department of Mathematics, Michigan Technological University, Defendants.

Dr. C. E. MANDEVILLE, Cross-Plaintiff and Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY and Dr. Raymond L. Smith, Individually and as President of Michigan Technological University, jointly and severally, Cross-Defendants, and D. W. Stebbins, Individually and as Vice-President of Academic Affairs of Michigan Technological University; and William J. Powers, Individually and as Dean of the College of Sciences and Arts at Michigan Technological University, jointly and severally, Defendants.

No. M76-62 CA.

United States District Court, W. D. Michigan, N. D.

June 11, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John C. Evans, Jr., Ravenna, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Robert M. Vercruysse, Detroit, Mich., Peter H. Shumar, Donald W. Bays, Marquette, Mich., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOUGLAS W. HILLMAN, District Judge.

An-Ti Chai, a former, non-tenured professor at Michigan Technological University (hereinafter "MTU") brings suit against the University and three of its officers (in both their individual and official capacities) alleging discriminatory treatment and illegal termination of employment. One of the defendants, Dr. C. E. Mandeville, has cross-claimed against the University because of an alleged violation of due process arising out of Mandeville's demotion as head of the University's Department of Physics. As set out more specifically below, the University and the individual defendants move to dismiss the complaint and cross-claim. At issue are the questions who is a "person" for purposes of the civil right statutes, and whether the parties' terminations violated due process or equal protection. For the reasons that follow, I grant in part and deny in part defendants' motions.

I.

An-Ti Chai is a physicist hired by MTU on January 1, 1968, as a non-tenured professor in its Department of Physics. On September 25, 1972, plaintiff was transferred from the Department of Physics to the Department of Mathematics without his consent and without having been first consulted. Thereafter, on November 6, 1972, plaintiff was informed that he would be denied tenure. Chai was discharged by the University on June 16, 1973, and received his final paycheck on June 30, 1973.

On September 12, 1973, plaintiff filed a claim with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") alleging that the denial of tenure and subsequent termination resulted from discrimination based upon race, national origin, and ancestry in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq). The Michigan Civil Rights Commission investigated the claim throughout the remainder of 1973 and all of 1974. However, no formal disposition was adopted by either the Michigan Agency or the EEOC, although on June 25, 1976, the EEOC did finally send plaintiff a "right to sue" letter. Plaintiff commenced this action July 30, 1976. Jurisdiction for the action arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983)¹ and Title VII.

Defendants named in plaintiff's action are MTU, Dr. Raymond L. Smith, in his individual and official capacity as President of Michigan Technological University, Dr. C. E. Mandeville, in his individual and official capacity as Head of the Department of Physics, and Dr. Zane C. Motteler, in his individual and official capacity as Head of the Department of Mathematics. Plaintiff requests a declaratory ruling pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202) that defendants discriminated against plaintiff by (1) transferring plaintiff from the Physics Department to the Mathematics Department even though other, non-tenured assistant professors with less seniority were available and who were better qualified to teach mathematics; (2) denying plaintiff tenure without cause; (3) urging plaintiff to resign his position as Assistant Professor; and (4) making derogatory remarks about plaintiff's ancestry. Plaintiff seeks preliminary² and permanent injunctive relief resulting in restoration of plaintiff's teaching position (including tenure), back pay, compensation for lost benefits, punitive damages and costs. A jury trial is demanded.

Defendants move to dismiss certain counts of the complaint. Specifically, defendants insist that the claims arising under Sections 1981 and 1983 are barred by the statute of limitations.³ Defendants further contend that plaintiff's demand for punitive damages and a jury trial should be denied because punitive damages and trial by jury are not permitted in lawsuits arising under Title VII. For the reasons that follow, I grant defendants' motion.

Statute of Limitations

A. Which State Statute Applies?

Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for actions arising under Sections 1981 and 1983, federal courts look to the most analogous state law in determining limitations periods. See, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1973). Plaintiff contends that because civil rights deprivations result in a wide variety of injuries to plaintiffs (e. g., harm to reputation, financial security, professional standing, etc.), the catch-all provision in Michigan's limitations statute, applying to "all other personal actions" (M.C. L.A. § 600.5813)⁴, as opposed to the more specific state limitations law set out in M.C. L.A. § 600.5805⁵, ought to apply. Plaintiff, therefore, asserts that because suit was brought within six years of the alleged discrimination, as permitted under Section 5813 of the Michigan law, suit is timely.

However, in EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 2668, 53 L.Ed.2d 267 (1977), the Sixth Circuit held that M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7), and not the catch-all provision embodied in Section 600.5813, applies to injuries arising under Section 1981. Under M.C.L.A. § 600.5805(7), a three-year rather than a six-year limitations period applies.

This same three-year period is also employed in actions arising under Section 1983. See, Geromette v. General Motors Corp., 609 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1979); Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969). It is clear, therefore, that unless plaintiff has initiated suit within three years of accrual of his claim, the Section 1981 and 1983 aspects of his suit are barred.

B. Tolling.

Plaintiff contends, however, that even if a three-year statute of limitations applies to suits arising under Section 1981 and 1983, running of the statute of limitations is deferred because of plaintiff's having filed a claim with the EEOC. Since the present suit was brought within 90 days of his having received a "right to sue" letter, plaintiff argues, his suit is timely.

To the contrary, defendant contends that the filing of a complaint with the EEOC, prerequisite for maintaining a suit in Federal Courts under Title VII, does not delay the running of the statute of limitations as it applies to plaintiff's Section 1981 and 1983 charges. Because plaintiff did not timely file suit following accrual of his claims, defendant argues, those charges must now be dismissed.

The United States Supreme Court resolved this issue in the 1975 case, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra. There, the Court stated at 460-461 of 421 U.S. at 1720 of 95 S.Ct.:

Petitioner, and the United States as amicus curiae, concede as they must, the independence of the avenues of relief respectively available under Title VII and the older § 1981. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416-417, n. 20 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). Further, it has been noted that the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503-504 (CA6 1974); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 92 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed.2d 785 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 761-763 (CA3 1971). Cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 487 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. International Harvester Co. v. Waters, 400 U.S. 911 91 S.Ct. 437, 27 L.Ed.2d 151 (1970).

We are satisfied, also, that Congress did not expect that a § 1981 court action usually would be resorted to only upon completion of Title VII procedures and the Commission's efforts to obtain voluntary compliance. Conciliation and persuasion through the administrative process, to be sure, often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, too, that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could weaken the Commission's efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one.

Under some circumstances, the administrative route may be highly preferred over the litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true. We are disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon the existence and independence of the

...