Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 85-1982
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | Before MERRITT and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE; PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 823 F.2d 928 |
| Parties | 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1358, 43 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,231 ANA LEON T., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO; Richard Surel; Frank Calloway; and Dorothy Hardy, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1982 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 1987 |
Page 928
43 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,231
v.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO; Richard Surel; Frank
Calloway; and Dorothy Hardy, Defendants-Appellees.
Sixth Circuit.
Page 929
Ana Leon T., pro se.
Teri J. Lieberman, William H. Gram, M. Kathleen O'Brien, Yurii Skorin, Thomas G. Fischer, Chicago, Ill., Andrew J. Haliw, III, Sullivan and Leavitt, P.C., Northville, Mich., for defendants-appellees.
Before MERRITT and NELSON, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Ana Leon T. appeals from the order of the district court granting the defendants' motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim. Leon challenges the district court's order of dismissal on the grounds that she raised a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2101 et seq. Leon also claims error in the district court's denial of her request for appointment of counsel. For the reasons which follow, we reverse and remand in part.
I.
On August 27, 1982, Leon, a woman of Columbian origin, was discharged from her employment with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. She had worked for the Reserve Bank for approximately eight years. Leon subsequently filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in which she alleged that her discharge was wrongful because it was based on her national origin and the fact that she had suffered an on the job injury to her lower back which she claimed resulted in a disability. On April 26, 1983, Leon was informed by the EEOC that it was about to make a determination in her case. On April 29, 1983, the EEOC issued both a determination letter stating that it had dismissed Leon's charge and a notification of the ninety-day period in which Leon had the right to sue. Leon claims that she never received the decision of dismissal or the notice of her right to sue. Nevertheless, on May 3, 1983, Leon purportedly requested reconsideration of her case because the EEOC's determination was "one-sided" and "unfair." Leon allegedly had no further knowledge of the status of her case until January 23, 1985, when she claims that she was informed for the first
Page 930
time that her case was dismissed on April 29, 1983.On September 9, 1985, Leon filed the instant action with the district court, naming as defendants the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and three individual members of the Reserve Bank's management and supervision, Richard Surel, Frank Calloway, and Dorothy Hardy. Leon also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted on September 9, 1985. Leon further requested counsel and proceeded pro se pending determination of her request.
In her complaint, Leon did not explicitly set forth the legal bases of her claims; she merely stated the factual circumstances of her employment with the Reserve Bank and concluded that she was discharged on false grounds of chronic tardiness and that she was discriminated against. However, in her application to proceed in forma pauperis, Leon summarized her action as presenting claims under the federal civil rights statutes, particularly 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1983, and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2101 et seq.
On October 9, 1985, the defendants moved for dismissal of Leon's complaint for failure to state a claim. That same day, Leon filed a motion for default judgment. The district court held a hearing on the motions on November 18, 1985, at which Leon appeared on her own behalf. At the hearing, the court denied Leon's motion for default judgment and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss from the bench. An order to that effect was filed on November 26, 1985. Leon then brought this timely appeal.
II.
On appeal, Leon argues that she sufficiently stated a claim of discrimination under Title VII and the Elliott-Larsen Act, and that she should have had counsel appointed pursuant to Title VII to represent her at the district court hearing. As grounds for her Title VII and Elliott-Larsen Act claims, Leon alleges on appeal that she was discharged on the basis of race and national origin.
This court has stated that district courts should examine three factors in considering applications for appointment of counsel under Title VII: (1) the plaintiff's financial resources; (2) the plaintiff's efforts to obtain counsel; and (3) whether the plaintiff's claim has any merit. Henry v. Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757, 760 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S.Ct. 604, 88 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985). A district court's disposition of a motion for appointment of counsel is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Id. In the instant case, we find it necessary to only consider the third factor--whether Leon's complaint has any merit--and, finding that most aspects of it does not, while one aspect may or may not depending on further inquiry, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appointment of counsel. We further conclude that the district court properly dismissed all but one of Leon's claims for failure to state a claim.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, ...
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...are merely conclusory. See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987); Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 67 (6th Cir.1983). Plaintiff only sets forth wholly conclusory allegations ......
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Peatros v. BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA, No. S076454.
...274 Cal.Rptr. 81.) However, most courts finding full preemption merely cite Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (6th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2d 928, 931, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated without 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 683 discussion, "Section 4, Fifth, of the Federal Reserve A......
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James v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 01CV1106(RJD)(VVP).
...have held that the FRA accomplishes a sweeping preemption of state employment law. See, e.g., Ana Lean T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the FRA "preempts any state-created employment right to the contrary."). Others have held that the FRA en......
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Riley v. Kurtz, 94-CV-71263-DT.
..."censored". Conclusory unsupported allegations of constitutional deprivation do not state a claim. Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945, 108 S.Ct. 333, 98 L.Ed.2d 360 As to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim that Defendant read his......
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Ashiegbu v. Purviance, C-2-98-28.
...are merely conclusory. See Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987); Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 67 (6th Cir.1983). Plaintiff only sets forth wholly conclusory allegations ......
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Peatros v. BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA, No. S076454.
...274 Cal.Rptr. 81.) However, most courts finding full preemption merely cite Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (6th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2d 928, 931, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated without 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 683 discussion, "Section 4, Fifth, of the Federal Reserve A......
-
James v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 01CV1106(RJD)(VVP).
...have held that the FRA accomplishes a sweeping preemption of state employment law. See, e.g., Ana Lean T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, 823 F.2d 928, 931 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the FRA "preempts any state-created employment right to the contrary."). Others have held that the FRA en......
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Riley v. Kurtz, 94-CV-71263-DT.
..."censored". Conclusory unsupported allegations of constitutional deprivation do not state a claim. Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 823 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945, 108 S.Ct. 333, 98 L.Ed.2d 360 As to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim that Defendant read his......