Anacker v. Sillas

• Decision Date: 28 December 1976
• Citation: 135 Cal.Rptr. 537,65 Cal.App.3d 416
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Paul C. ANACKER, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Herman SILLAS, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of California, Respondent and Appellant. Civ. 49116.

Page 537

135 Cal.Rptr. 537

65 Cal.App.3d 416

Paul C. ANACKER, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Herman SILLAS, as Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of California, Respondent and Appellant.

Civ. 49116.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 28, 1976.

Hearing Denied Feb. 23, 1977.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and Thomas Scheere, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent and appellant.

Paul C. Anacker, in pro. per.

LILLIE, Associate Justice.

The Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles appeals from judgment granting peremptory writ of mandate commanding him to set aside an order suspending respondent's driving privilege under section 16070, Vehicle Code ¹ for failure to establish proof of financial responsibility.

The facts are not in dispute. In January 1975 respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which he suffered bodily injury. An accident report was made and revealed that respondent did not possess automobile liability insurance; he did not otherwise demonstrate financial responsibility, ² then or since. Upon receiving information of these facts the Department of Motor Vehicles ordered respondent to obtain and/or show proof of financial responsibility. Upon his failure to do so, respondent received notice of suspension of his driving privilege. At respondent's request an administrative hearing was held, and suspension was stayed pending the outcome of the hearing. The referee found that respondent had been in a motor vehicle accident which did not result in property damage in an amount greater than $250 but in which respondent had suffered bodily injury; and that respondent had not established proof of financial responsibility. ³ Respondent's driving privilege was suspended.

Respondent thereupon petitioned for writ of mandate herein, contending, Inter alia, that the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions prohibit the suspension of an uninsured motorist's license without a prior showing of fault on his part. The trial court concluded that this contention would be correct if the Financial Responsibility Law (Veh.Code, § 16000, et seq.) applied to respondent in the circumstances, but construed the law to require proof of financial responsibility 'when a driver involved in an accident causes bodily injury or death or the requisite amount of property damage to another person.'

Appellant considers the issue to be whether the Financial Responsibility Law requires proof of financial responsibility when a driver involved in an accident causes injury to himself. Respondent focuses on whether the law constitutionally can require proof of financial responsibility of a driver involved in an accident without some showing of fault on his part.

The former California financial responsibility laws created a fault-based scheme. (Orr v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.2d 220, 226, 77 Cal.Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712; Escobedo v. State of California, 35 Cal.2d 870, 878, 222 P.2d 1.) ⁴ The United States Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 held that where suspension of a driver's license depends on fault, due process requires a presuspension hearing which includes consideration of this issue. Our Supreme Court in Rios v. Cozens (1973) 9 Cal.3d 454, 107 Cal.Rptr. 784, 509 P.2d 696 (originally 7 Cal.3d 792, 797--799, 103 Cal.Rptr. 299, 499 P.2d 979, vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 425, 93 S.Ct. 1019, 35 L.Ed.2d 398; on remand, 9 Cal.3d 454, 107 Cal.Rptr. 784, 509 P.2d 696, the prior opinion was reiterated and reinstated) followed Bell in declaring the California fault-oriented scheme to be constitutionally invalid in the absence of provision for meaningful presuspension hearings. 'Following Rios, over 20,000 persons have requested such hearings, and the Department of Motor Vehicles, unable to conduct adequate hearings due to a lack of funds and manpower, stayed all proceedings on revocation (sic) until the Legislature either changed the law or provided the funds.' (Review of Selected 1974 California Legislation, 6 Pac.L.J. 335, 340 (1975).) In 1972 the Legislature enacted as an interim measure section 16080.5, Vehicle Code, subdivision (a) of which provided that upon receipt by the Department of Motor Vehicles of a request for a hearing regarding prejudgment suspension for failure to prove financial responsibility, provisions of the law relating to suspension would be stayed. (Stats.1972, ch. 1179, § 1.)

In 1974, the Legislature repealed the old Vehicle Code division 7, chapter 1, and enacted the present sections 16000 to 16075. (Stats.1974, ch. 1409, §§ 7, 8.) The legislature left no doubt that fault was no longer to be at issue when the question of the financial responsibility of a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident arose: 'The Legislature finds that as a result of the difficulty of ascertaining a likelihood of fault in connection with vehicle operation, the number of financially irresponsible motor vehicle owners and operators has increased dramatically. The Legislature further finds that such fault determinations, and the costs associated therewith, do not further the purpose of the financial responsibility laws. Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is the policy of this state that those owning or operating motor vehicles on the streets or highways of this state shall be financially capable of providing monetary protection to those suffering injury to their person or property by reason of the ownership or use of such vehicles Without regard to the negligence, liability, carelessness, or culpability of the owners or operators thereof, and further, that such capability shall be deemed a concurrent responsibility of such motor vehicle ownership or operation. The Legislature further declares that it is the public policy of this state that those owning or operating motor vehicles on the streets or highways thereof shall evidence such financial capability by the methods specified in this act.' (Stats.1974, ch. 1409, § 1.) (Emphasis added.) ⁵

Respondent would have us hold that the Legislature impermissibly excluded fault as an issue at the presuspension hearing. Essentially his argument is that by requiring proof of financial responsibility from those drivers involved in accidents but not from those not so involved creates a classificatory scheme which bears no rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation. But respondent's position is premised on too narrow an appreciation of the Financial Responsibility Law. The law does not require that only negligent drivers be financially responsible; rather, it requires that 'Every driver of, and owner of, a motor vehicle shall, at all times, maintain in force one of the forms of financial responsibility specified in Section 16021.' ⁶ (§ 16020.) It is true that only those drivers involved in accidents of the kind described in section 16000 must Prove financial responsibility, but involvement in the accident does not create the obligation to be financially responsible, it merely provides the occasion for demonstrating that a preexisting obligation has been satisfied. Thus respondent misstates the purpose of the law as being to assure that 'negligent drivers, i.e., those likely to cause future accidents are financially responsible.' Instead the assurance is that all drivers, negligent or not, are financially responsible. ⁷

While one's driving privilege is an 'important interest' (Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90), we do not conceive it to be a 'fundamental right' ⁸ of the kind which demands heightened judicial scrutiny in the face of an equal protection claim. Nor do we perceive the classification based on involvement in an accident to be in any way 'suspect.' ⁹ Accordingly, if equal protection analysis is to be employed, we must apply "The . . . basic and conventional standard for reviewing economic and social welfare legislation . . . (which) manifests restraint by the judiciary in relation to the discretionary act of a co-equal branch of government; in so doing it invests legislation involving such differentiated treatment with a presumption of constitutionality and 'requir(es) merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.' (Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487, 500. . . .)' (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 16, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 797, 520 P.2d 10, 21.)' (Schwalbe v. Jones, 16 Cal.3d 514, 517--518, 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 323, 546 P.2d 1033, 1035.) Respondent must bear the burden of demonstrating the alleged invalidity of the scheme. (id. at p. 518, 128 cal.rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033.) he has failed to do so. The Legislature could have required proof of financial responsibility as a condition precedent to the issuance of a driver's license (Ex Parte Poresky (1933) 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152); instead it has required that proof upon involvement in an accident. Effectively, then, the Legislature has opted for a random spot-check on the financial responsibility of California drivers.

In some sense a person may rightly complain that it is unfair for him to have to establish proof of financial responsibility while others, not involved in an accident, do not. In the same sense it might be unfair to audit the tax return of one person and not of another (Int.Rev.Code of 1954, § 7602; see United States v. Powell (1964) 379 U.S. 48, 57--58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112, or to conduct a passenger vehicle equipment inspection on one automobile but not on a second one. (Veh.Code, § 2414.) ¹⁰ But 'unfair' is not 'unconstitutional.' While one might propose other, perhaps better ways to assure that owners and operators of motor vehicles are financially responsible this is not to say that the method adopted by the Legislature is irrational. ¹¹ Weighing of the...