Anaconda Co. v. Great Falls Mill & Smeltermen's Union No. 16

• Decision Date: 31 October 1968
• Docket Number: No. 21741.,21741.
• Parties: The ANACONDA COMPANY, Appellant, v. GREAT FALLS MILL & SMELTERMEN'S UNION NO. 16 OF The INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE MILL & SMELTERWORKERS and the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelterworkers, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

402 F.2d 749 (1968)

The ANACONDA COMPANY, Appellant, v. GREAT FALLS MILL & SMELTERMEN'S UNION NO. 16 OF The INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE MILL & SMELTERWORKERS and the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelterworkers, Appellees.

No. 21741.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

October 31, 1968.

R. Lewis Brown, Jr. (argued), Butte, Mont., for appellant.

Charles Huppe (argued), Helena, Mont., for appellees.

Before ELY and CARTER, Circuit Judges, and PECKHAM,^* District Judge.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is from a summary judgment which upheld an arbitration award. The arbitrator rested his award upon a collective bargaining agreement between the appellant employer, Anaconda, and the appellee, Great Falls, a labor organization. The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185 and ours is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The parties disagreed as to the order of priority in which employees of Anaconda were to be returned to work following a strike which occurred in January 1964. The union contended that provisions within the collective bargaining agreement relating to "layoffs in a department" were applicable to the order of recall after this strike. The company here takes the position that the seniority provisions of the contract could have no application because they did not specifically apply to post-strike recall. The dispute was submitted to arbitration in the form of a broad question which reads:

"Did the Company violate the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement in recalling and assigning employees to work between January 30th and February 12th, 1964."

The collective bargaining agreement contained no specific provisions relating to the order of recalling employees after strikes. It did, however, provide an order of seniority for recalling employees after layoffs. The provision reads:

"Section 7. Layoffs in a Department:

"(a) When it is necessary to curtail the work force in a department or a department subdivision, the employee at the bottom of the applicable seniority list shall be the first to be curtailed. His plant seniority shall then govern as to whether he shall be retained in the plant or curtailed from the plant. The Company will furnish the local Union a list of those employees who are laid off.

"(b) In recalling employees after a curtailment, they shall be recalled as closely as possible in the reverse order to that described in part (a) of this Section provided they can perform the work available. * * *"

A hearing was conducted, and the arbitrator determined that Anaconda had violated the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement because it failed to recall the employees in order of their departmental seniority.¹ In his opinion, the arbitrator recognized that seniority provisions normally have no application to the order of recalling employees after a strike. As to the present dispute, however, he concluded on the basis of presented evidence that the company "must be held" to have interpreted the collective bargaining agreement in line with the position taken by the union. He wrote:

"It may be, as contended by the company, that the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement ordinarily have no application to the order of recalling employees after a strike, in the absence of specific provisions to that effect. (Citations omitted.)

"In this case, however, the company superintendent agreed to recall the men following this strike by departmental seniority as in the 1959 strike. Thus, the company must be held as having so interpreted the collective bargaining agreement between the parties."

Anaconda now insists that the arbitrator did not confine himself to an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and that hence, the District Court should have overturned the award under the teaching of United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). There the Supreme Court held:

"Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator\'s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."

363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361.

Anaconda's contention is based upon a portion of the arbitrator's opinion in which it is pointed out that the collective bargaining agreement contains no specific provisions pertaining to the order of recalling employees after strikes.² That being true, Anaconda reasons that the arbitrator necessarily exceeded the scope of his authority in reaching his decision.

We cannot accept Anaconda's position. It is taken upon a ground which is too narrow, and it reflects a fundamental misconception of the nature of a collective bargaining agreement and the role of the arbitrator chosen by the parties to interpret such a compact. To hold that once an arbitrator determines that there are no specific provisions in the collective bargaining agreement dealing with the subject...