Ananiev v. Wells Fargo Bank

• Decision Date: 12 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–1804(BAH).
• Citation: 968 F.Supp.2d 123
• Parties: Vesko Borislavov ANANIEV, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

968 F.Supp.2d 123

Vesko Borislavov ANANIEV, Plaintiff,

v.WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–1804(BAH).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 12, 2013.

Vesko Borislavov Ananiev, Santa Rosa, CA, pro se.

Mark D. Meyer, Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, Bethesda, MD, Sharon Ingrid Theodore–Lewis, Lanham, MD, Pavan I. Khoobchandani, Akerman Senterfitt LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Vesko Borislavov Ananiev, who is proceeding pro se, has brought two claims against eight named and ten unidentified “Doe” defendants allegedly involvedin the foreclosure of his Sonoma County, California home. The plaintiff seeks various relief, including a declaratory judgment with respect to the title of this California property and an injunction against any eviction from or foreclosure of the property on grounds that actions against the property violate his due process rights, have caused intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violate a consent judgment entered against multiple financial entities, including Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), in an unrelated matter pending in this Court (“Unrelated Consent Judgment”).¹

Pending before the Court are four motions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), (3), and (6), to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue and failure to state a claim, by seven of the named defendants either individually or in groups as follows: (1) the Superior Court of California has moved to dismiss the complaint on all three grounds, see Super. Ct's Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 3–1, at 3–5 (“Super. Ct. Mem.”); (2) the law firm of Rosenthal Withem & Zeff and three of its partners, Robert L. Rosenthal, Michael L. Withem, and Michael D. Zeff (collectively, the “Law Firm Defendants”) have also moved to dismiss on all three grounds, see Law Firm Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5–1, at 4–6, 10–12 (“Law Firm Mem.”); ² and (3) Aurora Bank, FSB (“Aurora Bank”) and Aurora Loan Services, LLC (“ALS”) have moved to dismiss only on grounds of improper venue, see Aurora Bank & ALS's Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 9–1, at 3–5 (“Aurora Mem.”). For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint for improper venue are granted, and the Court finds that transfer in lieu of dismissal is not in the interest of justice.³

I. BACKGROUNDA. PLAINTIFF'S MORTGAGE

In 2004, the plaintiff obtained a mortgage in the amount of $511,200 from non-party International Home Capital Corporation (“IHCC”), that was secured by a deed of trust on real property at 1243 and 1247 Kodiak Court, Santa Rosa, California (the “California Property”). See Compl. Ex. E. (“Deed of Trust”), ECF No. 1–1. Through subsequent transactions that occurred without the involvement of the plaintiff, IHCC transferred ownership of the mortgage to Wells Fargo, and ALS became the servicing agent with the purported “right to enforce the Note evidencing the debt, and [ ] the right to receive payment of the debt for and on behalf of the owner of the debt.” Compl., Exs. A, B, C (Letter, dated Nov. 24, 2010, from ALS's law firm Kahrl Wutscher LLP), ECF No. 1–1, at 2, 4. In May 2012, Aurora Bank “acquired title to the Property at a Trustee's Sale following foreclosure proceedings,” and, as discussed below, shortly thereafter sought to evict the plaintiff from the California Property. Compl., Ex D (Aurora Bank Complaint for unlawful Detainer, filed on June 22, 2012, in Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma), ECF No. 1–1, at 2 (“Unlawful Detainer Compl.”).

B. PRIOR LAWSUITS REGARDING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY

1. Plaintiff's Lawsuit in the Northern District of California

On May 7, 2012, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against multiple defendants, including Aurora Bank, ALS, and the Law Firm defendants, for the allegedly fraudulent servicing of his loan and for the allegedly fraudulent foreclosure on his property. Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, et al., No. C 12–2275–SI, 2012 WL 2838689, at *1–2, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95441, *3–4 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2012). This lawsuit was shortlived since the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, with limited leave to amend Id. at *8, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95441, at *22. The plaintiff's effort to amend his complaint against the same defendants was not successful, however. The court granted the defendants' renewed motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, et al., No. C 12–2275–SI, 2012 WL 4099568, *4, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132489, *12 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 17, 2012). The plaintiff's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit apparently remains pending. Compl. ¶ 28; Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No. 12–cv–17108 (9th Cir.2013).

2. Aurora Bank's Lawsuit in the Superior Court of California

While the plaintiff's federal lawsuit was pending, defendant Aurora Bank, on June 22, 2012, filed an unlawful detainer action against the plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sonoma (“Superior Court”), seeking possession of the California Property. See Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 16; see also Unlawful Detainer Compl. at 3. Defendant Michael D. Zeff, an attorney with the defendant law firm of Rosenthal, Withem & Zeff, represented Aurora Bank in its unlawful detainer action. See. Unlawful Detainer Compl. at 3. In its Unlawful Detainer complaint, Aurora Bank claimed that it had acquired title to the property at a trustee's sale on May 15, 2012 and was entitled to possession of the property. See id. at 2. The Superior Court found in favor of Aurora Bank and issued a writ of possession. See Compl. ¶ 74.

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2, 2012, the plaintiff filed the instant complaint, which totals with exhibits over 150 pages. To the extent that the Court can make sense of the plaintiff's myriad factual allegations, he is alleging that the defendants' foreclosure and eviction efforts with respect to the California Property constitute violations of California state law, the Due Process Clause, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Unrelated Consent Judgment. Id. ¶¶ 42–86. Apparently underlying these claims is the plaintiff's fundamental dispute about whether Wells Fargo and its agent, Aurora Bank, have any rights, or standing, to enforce the loan. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10, 12, 16, 45. According to the plaintiff, Wells Fargo and Aurora Bank “are not the original lender” and “are strangers to the transaction and have absolutely no property interest in the note and deed of trust.” Compl. ¶ 13. The plaintiff, as noted, seeks declaratory relief, including the issuance of a cease and desist order preventing Aurora Bank from finalizing foreclosure actions against the plaintiff, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 89–91, 97–99.

The plaintiff asserts that “jurisdiction to hear this case” is proper in this Court because “this court issued a prior ruling in the United States v. Bank of America, et al. case number 120361,” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 45, referring to the Unrelated Consent Judgment. That consent judgment requires that certain financial service entities, including Wells Fargo, comply with certain loan servicing standards and further provides that “[Wells Fargo's] obligations under this Consent Judgment shall be enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.” Consent Judgment at ¶¶ 6–8, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12–CV–361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), ECF No. 14 (“Unrelated Consent Judgment”). The Unrelated Consent Judgment limited any enforcement actions to “any Party to this Consent Judgment or the Monitoring Committee.” Unrelated Consent Judgment, Ex. E (“Enforcement terms”), ECF No. 14–1, at E–14–15. The only named party in the instant action that is a party to the Consent Judgment is Wells Fargo. See generally Unrelated Consent Judgment.

Pending before the Court are motions by all moving defendants to dismiss this action for improper venue, as well as motions by the Superior Court and the Law Firm Defendants to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons explained below, the motion to dismiss for improper venue is granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARDA. Improper Venue

To prevail on a motion to dismiss for improper venue, under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “ ‘the defendant must present facts that will defeat the plaintiff's assertion of venue.’ ” See Slaby v. Holder, 901 F.Supp.2d 129, 132 (D.D.C.2012); See also Wilson v. Obama, 770 F.Supp.2d 188, 190 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Khalil v. L–3 Commc'ns Titan Grp., 656 F.Supp.2d 134, 135 (D.D.C.2009)). Nevertheless, the burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that venue is proper since it is “ ‘the plaintiff's obligation to institute the action in a permissible forum....’ ” Williams v. GEICO Corp., 792 F.Supp.2d 58, 62 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Freeman v. Fallin, 254 F.Supp.2d 52, 56 (D.D.C.2003)); see also14D Charles Alan Wright Et Al., Federal Practice And Procedure § 3826 (3d ed. 2012) (“[W]hen [an] objection has been raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the district he [or she] chose is a proper venue.”).

In reviewing such a motion, the court “ ‘accepts the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations regarding venue as true, draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor and resolves any factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor.’ ” Wilson, 770 F.Supp.2d at 190 (quoting James v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 639 F.Supp.2d 9, 11 (D.D.C.2009)). “The Court, however, need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, and may consider material outside...