Anastaplo v. Radford

Decision Date18 September 1958
Docket NumberNo. 34823,34823
Citation153 N.E.2d 37,14 Ill.2d 526
PartiesPete ANASTAPLO, Admr., et al., Appants, v. Nora RADFORD et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

A. D. Morgan, Herrin and Frank E. Trobaugh, West Frankfort (Stephen E. Brondos, West Frankfort, of counsel), for appellant.

D. L. Duty, Marion, for appellees.

DAVIS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Williamson County denying injunctive relief and dismissing for want of equity a complaint which sought to establish the right of plaintiff to maintain a sewer line on the lands of defendant. After testifying before the master and during the pendency of further proceedings, Theodore Anastaplo, plaintiff, and Miles Radford, defendant, died. The substituted parties to this appeal are the personal representative and heirs of Anastaplo, as plaintiffs, and the heirs of Radford, as defendants. Since the decree determines the ultimate right of the plaintiffs to a perpetual easement, a freehold is involved and we have jurisdiction on direct appeal. Kling v. Ghilarducci, 3 Ill.2d 454, 121 N.E.2d 752, 46 A.L.R.2d 1189; Liberty Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Lux, 378 Ill. 329, 38 N.E.2d 6; Burke v. Kleiman, 355 Ill. 390, 189 N.E. 372.

The complaint alleged that plaintiff purchased two tracts of land from defendant, the first upon which he built a residence, and the second upon which he constructed the Hi Point restaurant and motel; that plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement whereby plaintiff was given the right to connect to and permanently use a sewer line serving the homes of both parties, which extended across vacant lands of the defendant located north and west of plaintiff's residence. The complaint further alleged that at the time the plaintiff purchased the land upon which the motel was later built, and as part of the consideration, defendant orally agreed that plaintiff should have the right to construct a sewer line from the tract over defendant's vacant land, lying north of that property and west of plaintiff's residence, to connect with the existing sewer line at the rear of the plaintiff's residence; that plaintiff constructed the motel and built the sewer line from the motel property across the lands of the defendant to connect with the existing line and, with defendant's consent, used it for several years; that the original intention of the parties was that a written agreement would be signed granting this right, but such agreement was never executed; that in June of 1949, after giving notice to plaintiff to remove all of the sewerage facilities from his premises, defendant destroyed and obstructed the sewer, causing sewage to spread over adjacent premises; that plaintiff requested defendant to open the sewer line and restore it, but defendant refused to do so or to permit plaintiff to repair it; and that as a result of defendant's acts, plaintiff was compelled to close his motel and thereby suffered substantial damage. The plaintiff prayed for specific performance of the verbal agreement granting the right to construct and maintain the sewer; for injunctive relief to compel defendant to restore the sewer line and henceforth restrain him from interfering with it; and for damages.

The answer denied all of the material allegations of the complaint and set up by way of special defenses the parol-evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 59, pars. 1 and 2. Plaintiff's reply questioned the pertinency of the special defenses and re-alleged certain portions of the complaint. The court denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, as well as plaintiff's motion to withdraw the reply to the special defenses and substitute in lieu thereof a motion to strike them. The cause was referred to a master to take proofs and make findings. After taking testimony and receiving documentary evidence, the master found that the equities were with the defendant but recommended that the court order that a sewer be constructed by plaintiff across the lands of defendant at plaintiff's expense in accordance with plans submitted by an engineer who had testified as a witness for plaintiff. No findings or recommendations were made relative to damages. The court disregarded the master's recommendations as to construction of a sewer, overruled exceptions to the master's report, and dismissed the complaint for want of equity.

A threshold question is presented by defendant's contention that this appeal should be dismissed because it was not perfected within the time allowed by the statute, which provides, inter alia: 'No appeal may be taken from a trial court to the Supreme or Appellate Court after the expiration of 60 days from the entry of the order, decree, judgment or other determination complained of, * * *.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 110, par. 76. The record shows that the decree in question was filed on December 21, 1957, and that notice of appeal was given and filed on February 10, 1958, 51 days later, and within the period prescribed by statute. However, defendants state that the decree recites that a hearing was held on December 3, 1957, and that the judge's minutes show pronouncement of the decision on that date, 68 days before the notice of appeal was filed. They contend that December 3, rather than December 21, is the date from which the 60-day period must be computed. We have often observed the difference between judgments at law and decrees in chancery relative to their effective dates. While judgments at law are operative when pronounced, a decree in chancery is final and effective only when it is reduced to writing, approved by the chancellor and filed for record. Freeport Motor Casualty Co. v. Tharp, 406 Ill. 295, 94 N.E.2d 139; Miller v. Miller, 376 Ill. 628, 35 N.E.2d 62; Moore v. Shook, 276 Ill. 47, 114 N.E. 592; Horn v. Horn, 234 Ill. 268, 84 N.E. 904. While the decision of the chancellor in this case was apparently announced on December 3, the written decree was not approved or filed until December 21. The decree was entered when it was reduced to writing, approved by the chancellor and filed for record. Thus, the notice of appeal was served and filed within the time allowed.

We must next determine whether there was an agreement between Miles Radford and Theodore Anastaplo whereby Anastaplo was given the right to build a sewer line from the motel property over Radford's land to connect with the sewer at the rear of his residence.

The evidence establishes that in 1941 Radford was the owner of a 20-acre tract of land south of the city of Carterville, bounded on the east by the Carterville road and on the south by State route 13. This land was without public sewer facilities and drained generally in a northwesterly direction. A large ditch or creek ran through this property in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction, generally north of the improved properties hereafter mentioned. Radford platted a part of this property into lots bounded by the Carterville road on the east and north of its intersection with State route 13. He then had a residence and store north of the intersection and lots designated 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were platted further north along Carterville road. These lots appear from the plat to be about 70 feet wide and 183 1/2 feet in depth. On February 26, 1952, Theodore Anastaplo and wife purchased lot 3 from Radford and constructed a residence thereon. The plat shows that the south line of this lot is about 200 feet north of State route 13. At this time a sewer line of six-inch tile extended from the Radford properties in a northerly direction and ended in a ditch at the rear of lot 3 on vacant lands of Radford just west of the platted strip. This open ditch extended downhill to the north and connected with the large ditch or creek heretofore mentioned. By a written contract dated March 11, 1942, Radford and Anastaplo agreed that 'the Sewer draining from lot (2) two, from the basement of Miles Radford, to and across lot (3) three, known as the property of Theodore Anastaplo, and thence running to and across the property of Miles Radford, known as lot (4) four; all to be known as a permanent and natural drain, and the above mentioned drain to be in permanent operation without the interference of either of the above mentioned parties,' and that each property owner would maintain his own portion of the sewer. Pursuant to this agreement, Anastaplo connected to this sewer line from a septic tank which he built at the rear of his residence. The line was also used by residences north and south of Anastaplo.

On January 2, 1945, Anastaplo purchased from Radford another parcel of land 70 feet wide and 200 feet deep bounded on the south by State route 13 and on the north by a line approximately even with the south boundary of his residential property. A narrow strip of land on which a filling station had been constructed was east of this land. The east line of the filling station premises corresponded with the west line of the lots which had been platted on the Carterville road. After Anastaplo purchased the second tract, Radford continued to own the vacant unplatted land which was north of this tract and west of the Anastaplo residence. Anastaplo testified that at the time he purchased the second lot, he advised Radford that he intended to build a restaurant and motel; that Radford then agreed that he should have the right to build a six-inch tile sewer line over his land and extending in a north and easterly direction to connect with the sewer line serving the residences on Carterville road; that Radford then and later told Anastaplo that he would give him a written agreement to that effect, but after the sewer had been built, Radford stated that Anastaplo already had the sewer and needed no written agreement.

Anastaplo improved the second tract with a two-story concrete block building, used as a restaurant and living quarters, and added several motel units...

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