Anastasiadis v. SS Little John

• Decision Date: 06 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 22249.,22249.
• Citation: 346 F.2d 281
• Parties: Iordanis ANASTASIADIS, Appellant, v. S.S. LITTLE JOHN, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

346 F.2d 281 (1965)

Iordanis ANASTASIADIS, Appellant, v. S.S. LITTLE JOHN, Appellee.

No. 22249.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 7, 1965.

Rehearing Denied July 6, 1965.

Sidney Ravkind, Houston, Tex., for appellant.

William C. Bullard, Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Before WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges, and HANNAY, District Judge.

Rehearing Denied July 6, 1965. See 347 F.2d 823.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal in admiralty from a final order of the district court dismissing libelant's cause without prejudice.¹ The suit is in rem by a foreign seaman to recover injuries and damages for alleged breach of contract and an alleged tort committed by the appellee's Master. The only question presented is whether the trial court erred in declining jurisdiction of the cause.

The appellant, a Greek national, entered into a contract of employment in Greece, written in Greek, with an agent of appellee's owner. The contract provided that appellant was to join the vessel at Houston, Texas, and that "for any dispute between the seaman and the ship, the Greek law will apply, competent courts to solve any dispute will be the Greek courts at Piraeus. * * *" Appellant joined the ship while it was berthed at dry dock in Galveston, Texas, but he found the conditions of employment unsatisfactory. He alleges a total breach of his employment contract by reason of failure to furnish quarters, edible food, and proper living conditions. In general, appellant claims that the ship presented a condition of squalor and that it was impossible for seamen to serve on it. He determined to discontinue his service on the vessel and apparently made these intentions known, for he asserts that the Master refused or negligently failed to obtain an extension of his visa, which resulted in his being arrested and incarcerated.

The appellee is a vessel of Liberian registry.² It is owned by a Liberian corporation, which is wholly owned and controlled by an American corporation, which, in turn, is wholly owned and controlled by a United States citizen.

On February 26, 1963, a libel in rem was filed against the vessel seeking damages for breach of contract and for the alleged conduct of appellee's Master in causing appellant to be jailed. The court advanced the cause on the docket so it might be heard before the vessel sailed. The parties could not agree on the applicable law and failed to produce evidence of relevant Greek law. However, the depositions of witnesses were taken and completed about March 25, 1963. Shortly thereafter the ship sailed from the United States. On February 24, 1964, the trial court stayed the action to allow the libelant 120 days after January 27, 1964, in which to institute an action in a forum having jurisdiction, whereupon it would enter an order declining jurisdiction and dismissing the cause without prejudice.³ In order to foreclose any possibility of prejudice by reason of further litigation in the United States courts, the appellee later agreed to extend, for 120 days beyond the date of any final order which might be entered by the trial court after "all appeals," the time within which it would appear generally in the Greek courts to litigate the appellant's claim. After this agreement, on December 18, 1964, the trial court entered an order of dismissal of the cause without prejudice, from which order Anastasiadis appeals.

Undoubtedly, a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction of an in rem suit in admiralty in circumstances here present, regardless of the nationality of the parties or the situs of the events and transactions in controversy, even though the parties have stipulated that disputes shall be settled before a foreign court. The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 5 S.Ct. 860, 29 L.Ed. 152 (1884); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52 S.Ct. 413, 76 L.Ed. 837 (1932); see Benedict on Admiralty (6th Ed.) Vol. 1, §§ 82-84. In such event, there would still remain a choice-of-law problem; whether to enforce the law of Greece as agreed, the law of the country of the vessel's registry, or the law of the forum. However, it has been established in a long line of decisions that an American admiralty court may in its discretion, decline to accept jurisdiction of a controversy between foreigners. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., supra, 285 U.S. at 421, 52 S.Ct. at 415, 76 L.Ed. at 841; 1 Norris, The Law of Seamen, § 26 (2d ed. 1962); 1 Benedict, Admiralty, § 84 (1940). The only question before us in the instant case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction of the controversy, and we therefore need not reach the choice-of-law problem.

Both parties place reliance on the leading case of Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953). That case dealt primarily with the circumstances under which a foreign seaman is entitled to invoke the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, as a remedy for his personal injuries. The real issue in Lauritzen, therefore, was choice of law, not the discretionary assumption of jurisdiction, but it seems generally agreed that the criteria set out in that opinion serve as an appropriate yardstick for a district court in deciding whether the United States courts should accept or decline jurisdiction of a controversy which is essentially foreign. See Zouras v. Menelaus Shipping Co., (1 Cir. 1964) 336 F.2d 209.

The Supreme Court, recognizing the advantages of achieving stability in the application of the general maritime law, held in Lauritzen that the right of an alien seaman to invoke the Jones Act must be determined by "ascertaining and valuing the points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments, whose competing laws are involved," and by weighing "the significance of one or more connecting factors between the shipping transaction regulated and the national interest served by the assertion of authority." 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928, 97 L.Ed. at 1267. Some of the significant contacts outlined in Lauritzen are: (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) the allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) the place of contract; and (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum. The Second Circuit has concluded that "something between minimal and preponderant contacts is necessary," and "that the test is that `substantial' contacts are necessary." Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., (2 Cir. 1959) 263 F.2d 437, 440. Of course, in assessing the points of contact which are relevant in determining whether to accept or decline jurisdiction, appropriate adjustments must be made in the weight to be accorded the various factors set out in Lauritzen because the issue before us is the assumption of jurisdiction, not choice of law.

While the appellant has alleged a tort, his claim is essentially one for breach of contract. He is a Greek national and his allegiance is to that country....