Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Local Union No. 377

• Decision Date: 25 February 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-3396,81-3410,s. 81-3396
• Citation: 700 F.2d 1067
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
• Parties: 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2928, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,204 ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 377, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. TEAMSTERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNION, and Stephen Kindred, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.

Page 1067

700 F.2d 1067

112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2928, 97 Lab.Cas. P 10,204

ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,

WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO.

377, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

v.

TEAMSTERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC UNION, and Stephen Kindred,

Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 81-3396, 81-3410.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 11, 1983.

Decided Feb. 25, 1983.

Don H. Pace, (argued), William W. Allport, David R. Knowles, Kris J. Kostolansky, John A. Zangerle, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.

Anthony P. Sgambati, II, (argued), Green, Schiavoni, Murphy, Haines, & Sgambati Co., L.P.A., Youngstown, Ohio, for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant.

Ellis B. Boal, Detroit, Mich., for Teamsters for a Democratic Union.

Stephen Kindred, pro se.

Before KENNEDY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge.

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. (Anchor) appeals from a summary judgment dismissing its complaint granted by the Honorable John M. Manos, United States District Judge, Northern District of Ohio. Anchor's complaint alleged that International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 377 (Union) had violated Article 7, Section 2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ¹ by failing to "immediately make every effort" ² to persuade its striking members to return to work. Local 377 appeals from the District Court's sua sponte dismissal of its counterclaim for damages (including attorney fees and costs) incurred in defending against appellant's action. Local 377 contends the action was brought in violation of an express term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement providing that Anchor would not bring suit. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and remand for findings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Anchor is a contract motor carrier engaged in hauling automobiles. Local 377 represents various Anchor employees for purposes of collective bargaining. A wild cat strike began at Anchor's Lordstown, Ohio facility on June 10, 1979 and continued until June 25, 1979. ³ Anchor filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on June 11 under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, as amended, alleging that members of Local 377 were engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage and strike. Anchor, with the consent of Local 377, sought and obtained a temporary restraining order from the Honorable William K. Thomas, United States District Judge, Northern District of Ohio, mandating that the wildcat strikers return to work. The strikers failed to comply with the TRO and on June 13 Anchor moved for an order to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. A show cause hearing was held on June 15-16, and an order issued converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction. The strikers again did not comply with the provision of the preliminary injunction and Anchor moved for a second show cause hearing on June 20. Following hearings, Judge Thomas delivered a bench opinion on June 25 finding certain strikers in contempt and imposing fines and imprisonment for their failure to comply with the court's earlier order. Faced with those sanctions, the strikers returned to work. Accordingly, on September 20 Anchor filed a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 on the grounds that changes in circumstances since the court's issuance of the preliminary injunction had rendered all issues moot and that there was no longer any relief for the court to grant. Local 377 consented to the motion and the action was dismissed with prejudice at Anchor's cost on September 28.

Anchor then sought to obtain money damages from Local 377 for its failure to have immediately made every effort to end the unlawful work stoppage. Pursuant to Article 7, Section 2(b) of the Agreement, Anchor submitted its grievance to the National Joint Arbitration Committee. A decision was not rendered within thirty days and the matter was considered "deadlocked," thereby allowing Anchor to institute this suit for damages. The instant action was filed on January 8, 1981 and the complaint was amended on January 26, 1981.

The District Court held that the prior show cause proceedings were res judicata on the issues raised in Anchor's complaint and granted Local 377's motion for summary judgment. It also held that Local 377 was entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that the Union supported, ratified or encouraged the strike. The court further dismissed sua sponte Local 377's counterclaim for costs incurred in defending this action, which the Local contends Anchor filed in violation of its agreement not to sue. Anchor and Local 377 each appeal from the final order of the District Court.

I.

Res judicata bars a claim when (1) the same party or parties in privity with them were present in the prior litigation; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a valid, final judgment on the merits; and (3) the present action concerns the same subject matter or cause of action as the prior suit. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579, 94 S.Ct. 806, 812, 39 L.Ed.2d 9, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 986, 94 S.Ct. 1582, 39 L.Ed.2d 883 (1974); Harrison v. Bloomfield Building Industries, Inc., 435 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.1970). This Court recently iterated a summary of the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as set forth in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).

A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a "right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies ...." Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 [18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355] (1897). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. [citations omitted] Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1970); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 2-3 (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 68 (Tent.Draft No. 4, Apr. 15, 1977) (issue preclusion). Application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions. Southern Pacific R. Co., supra, 168 U.S. at 49, 18 S.Ct. at 27; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S.Ct. 506, 507, 61 L.Ed. 1148 (1917). To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.

United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1180 (6th Cir.1982).

The prior cause of action against the striking union members for violation of their no strike clause differs from the instant cause of action against the Union for violation of its agreement to immediately make every effort to persuade the unauthorized strikers to return to work. Local 377 was, however, entitled to dismissal of a portion of Anchor's claim under the closely related collateral estoppel doctrine on the basis of particularized findings of fact made by Judge Thomas in his bench opinion.

The June 17 bench opinion of the District Court held in pertinent part:

Before proceeding to discuss and decide these central issues, I desire to make certain findings as to Local 377:

The evidence indicates that on June 12, 1979, notices were posted by one or more officers of 377 at the Lordstown Terminal in conspicuous places, and further that by letters and telegrams to union members and committeemen and elected stewards, each of these persons was notified that the work stoppage was unauthorized and in violation of the no strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement.

These notices and other communications...