Ancrum v. South Carolina
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-04264-DCC |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Parties | Eric Ancrum, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina; Bryan P. Stirling; and Warden Rafael Vargara of CoreCivic, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Petitioner a state prisoner represented by counsel, is seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 37. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Return and Memorandum on January 18, 2022. ECF Nos. 44, 45. Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Respondent filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 56 59.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges for pre-trial proceedings and a Report and Recommendation (“Report”). On April 11, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and the Petition be denied. ECF No. 60. Petitioner and Respondent filed objections to the Report, and Respondent filed a Reply to Petitioner's objections. ECF Nos. 61, 62, 63.
Petitioner was indicted on charges of trafficking cocaine (more than 400 grams), possession with intent to distribute cocaine within proximity of a school, manufacturing cocaine base, possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and manufacturing cocaine base within proximity of a school; he was later indicted for trafficking cocaine base (200-400 grams) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within proximity of a school. App. 12-13.
Petitioner's trial began on October 8, 2007, and he was represented by John Delgado and William Nettles (“trial counsel”). App. 85-843. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. App. 863-64. The jury found Petitioner not guilty of possession of the firearm charge, but otherwise found him guilty as charged. App. 864. Petitioner was sentenced to life without parole for trafficking cocaine (400 grams or more), trafficking cocaine base (200 grams or more), possession with intent to distribute cocaine within proximity of a school, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within proximity of a school and fifteen years' imprisonment for manufacturing cocaine base and fifteen years' imprisonment for manufacturing cocaine within proximity of a school, to run concurrently. App. 878-79.
Petitioner did not timely serve a notice of appeal on opposing counsel. App. 7-9. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed on October 24, 2007, and the remittitur was issued on November 9, 2007. Id.
Petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on March 25, 2008, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to properly file the notice of appeal. App. 22-28. A hearing was held on the application on November 18, 2009. App. 885-969. Petitioner was represented at the hearing by Stephen Schmutz and Anthony P Lamantia, III (“PCR counsel”), who raised additional claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On December 14, 2009, the PCR Court issued an order granting Petitioner a belated appeal pursuant to White v State, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974),[1] but denying relief on all other allegations and dismissing his application. App. 12-19.
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he appealed the PCR court's order by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. App. 971-83. The petition was denied on May 14, 2012. ECF No. 12-14.
Petitioner filed a second PCR action requesting to file a direct appeal, which was granted, and to which the State consented. ECF No. 12-16. Petitioner then filed a White v. State appeal. ECF No. 12-20 at 4. The South Carolina Court of Appeals issued a per curiam opinion affirming Petitioner's conviction. ECF No. 12-22.
Petitioner filed the present action on December 9, 2020. ECF No. 1. On July 16, 2021, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report, recommending the district judge grant Respondents' first Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 25. On October 6, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend his Petition, which was granted on November 15, 2021.
ECF Nos. 29, 34. Plaintiff filed his Amended Petition on November 30, 2021. ECF No. 37.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report of the Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) .
Petitioner's claims are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his petition cannot be granted unless the claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). Importantly, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In the event that a ground was not adjudicated on the merits in any state court, then the court reviews the merits of the claim de novo. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 553-54 (4th Cir. 2010) ( ).
Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief based on an issue he failed to raise at the appropriate time in state court, removing any further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the petitioner has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. Id. Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if a state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion. Id.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal that could have been raised at an earlier time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1727-90; Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (S.C. 1991). Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR application and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. S.C.App.Ct. R. 203(d)(3), 243. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); see also Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995). As the United States Supreme Court explained:
[State procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.
However, if a federal habeas petitioner can show both (1) “‘cause' for noncompliance with the state rule” and (2) “‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation[,]'” the federal court may consider the claim. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). When a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Further, if the petitioner does not raise cause and prejudice, the court need not consider the defaulted claim. See Kornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1363.
If a federal habeas petitioner has failed to raise a claim in state court and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his...
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