And the Educ. Trust of the Grandchildren of Gary D. Kent v. Kerr (In re Supervised Estate of Kent)
| Decision Date | 25 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 55A01-1612-ES-2907. |
| Citation | 82 N.E.3d 326 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Supervised ESTATE OF Gary D. KENT, Deceased; and In the Matter of the Educational Trust of the Grandchildren of Gary D. Kent; John David Kent, Kevin Kent, Jacob Anderson, Garrett Kerr, Griffin Kerr, Nicholas Kent, and David Kent, Appellants/Cross-Appellees-Respondents, v. Cynthia Kerr, Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellants/cross-appellees : Darla S. Brown, Sturgeon & Brown, PC, Bloomington, Indiana
Attorney for Appellee/cross-appellant : Robert M. Hamlett, Carmel, Indiana Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Following the death of her father, Gary Kent ("Gary"), Cynthia Kerr ("Cynthia") filed with the probate court a verified petition to revoke the probate of Gary's will and, under a separate cause number, a complaint to revoke the probate of the will. Under a third cause number, Cynthia's brother John David Kent ("John") filed with the probate court a verified petition to docket Gary's educational trust. Following a consolidated hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the probate court dismissed, with prejudice, both the trust proceeding and the will contest. Specifically, the court denied Cynthia's summary judgment motion, which sought to enforce a family settlement agreement that had been executed by Gary, John, and Cynthia before Gary's death. And the court ordered the Personal Representatives, John and Gary's cousin, Kevin Kent ("Kevin"), to "proceed with administration of the probate estate pursuant to decedent's Last Will and Testament, executed on June 23, 2008." Cross-Appellant's App. at 25.
[2] John and Kevin filed a notice of appeal, but this court granted Cynthia's motion to dismiss that appeal after John and Kevin1 failed to timely file an appellants' brief. We retained jurisdiction, however, to hear Cynthia's cross-appeal, where she presents a single dispositive issue for our review, namely, whether Indiana Code Section 29-1-9-1 permits the prospective beneficiaries of a future inheritance to execute, prior to the decedent's death, a family settlement agreement to determine their anticipated rights or interests in the decedent's estate. We reverse and remand, and we instruct the trial court to enter judgment for Cynthia on her motion to enforce the parties' agreement.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 19, 2015, Gary, who was terminally ill, asked John and Cynthia to sign a settlement agreement ("the agreement") regarding "how their inheritance [would] be divided" upon his death. Cross-Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 46. At that time, Gary had a valid will, which provided in relevant part that the majority of his personal property and his entire residuary estate would be divided equally between John and Cynthia, with a few personal items going to Gary's grandson Jacob Anderson.2 The agreement provided as follows: Cynthia would receive Gary's coin collection; John would receive certain rental properties; John would "remove the mortgage on [real estate on Hacker Creek Road] at his sole expense"; and John and Cynthia would "subdivide" the Hacker Creek Road property "equally." Id. Gary, John, and Cynthia each signed the agreement, and Gary's attorney notarized it. Unbeknownst to Gary, a few days later, on December 26, John executed a written notice purporting to rescind the settlement agreement, and he notified Cynthia by certified mail.
Cross-Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24. Thus, the probate court denied Cynthia's "motion to enforce" the agreement. Id. at 25. The court also dismissed the will contest and ordered that the Personal Representatives "promptly proceed with administration of the probate estate pursuant to decedent's Last Will and Testament, executed on June 23, 2008." Id. This cross-appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Cynthia contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for summary judgment to enforce the agreement.
"When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment we stand in the shoes of the trial court." SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick , 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). When "the challenge to summary judgment raises questions of law, we review them de novo." Rogers v. Martin , 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016) (citing Ballard v. Lewis , 8 N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014) ). Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, which are particularly appropriate for summary resolution. Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Health Dep't , 17 N.E.3d 922, 927-28 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted).
City of Lawrence Util. Serv. Bd. v. Curry , 68 N.E.3d 581, 585 (Ind. 2017).
[6] Initially, we note that Cynthia complied with Trial Rule 9.2(A) by filing a copy of the agreement with her petition in the trial court. As such, the agreement became a part of the record and execution of the instrument was deemed established pursuant to Trial Rule 9.2(B).
[7] In her cross-appeal, Cynthia contends that the settlement agreement is a valid contract on its face and that there is no authority for John's purported rescission of the agreement. Cynthia presents an issue of first impression for our courts, namely, whether Indiana Code Section 29-1-9-1 permits family settlement agreements to be executed prior to a decedent's death. The statute provides as follows:
Ind. Code § 29-1-9-1 (2017). Indiana Code Section 29-1-9-2 provides in relevant part that the terms of the compromise shall be set forth in an agreement in writing which shall be executed by all competent persons having interests or claims which will or may be affected by the compromise. And Indiana Code Section 29-1-9-3 provides in relevant part that the court shall, if it finds that the contest or controversy is in good faith and that the effect of the agreement upon the interests of persons represented by fiduciaries is just and reasonable, make an order approving the agreement.
[8] Cynthia maintains that Section 1 does not "specif[y] a time when an agreement may or must be made, or a time before which it may not or must not be made." Cross-Appellant's Br. at 10. But John maintains that Section 1 unambiguously and plainly prohibits "pre-mortem" family settlement agreements. Cross-Appellees' Br. at 19. "As is apparent [from] the arguments of both sides we are presented with a question of statutory construction which is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo." Suggs v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016).
When construing a statute our primary goal is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Adams v. State , 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012). To discern that intent, we look first to the statutory language itself and give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory terms. Pierce v. State , 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). "If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning." State v. Evans , 810 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). However, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, then it is ambiguous; and we thus resort to rules of statutory interpretation so as to give effect to the legislature's intent. Adams , 960 N.E.2d at 798. "For example, we read the statute as whole, avoiding excessive reliance on a strict, literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words." Id...
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