Anderberg v. The Hain Celestial Grp.

Decision Date26 January 2023
Docket Number3:21-cv-01794-RBM-NLS
PartiesHEIDI ANDERBERG, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT [DOC 16]

HON RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On March 2, 2022, Defendant The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (Defendant) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Heidi Anderberg's (Plaintiff) First Amended Class Action Complaint (“Motion”). (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion on April 11, 2022 (Doc. 19), and Defendant filed a reply on April 18, 2022 (Doc. 20). Plaintiff subsequently filed notices of supplemental authority on June 20, 2022 (Doc. 21) and August 29, 2022 (Doc. 22). For the reasons discussed below Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background

On October 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendant on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. (Doc. 1.) On January 12, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) on February 2, 2022. (Doc. 13.) The FAC asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (2) violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.; (3) violation of California's False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.; (4) breach of express warranty; and (5) breach of implied warranty. (Id. at 26-34.) On March 2, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion requesting the Court dismiss Plaintiff's FAC with prejudice and without leave to amend. (Doc. 16.)

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “advertises as an organic and natural products company which participates in almost all natural categories with well-known brands, including Alba Botanica,” which produces sunscreen. (Doc. 13 at 2-3.) It is Plaintiff's position that Defendant “markets and sells chemical sunscreens with labeling and advertising that leads consumers to believe that the sunscreens are ‘Reef[]Friendly', when in fact the chemical sunscreens contain active ingredients known to damage coral reefs and the marine life that inhabit them.” (Id. at 3.) The FAC discusses the dangers various chemicals pose to coral reefs and states [c]hemical sunscreens generally consist of a combination of different chemical ingredients, primarily oxybenzone, octinoxate, and avobenzone, but also include[] other chemicals such as octocrylene and homosalate” each of which “are known to cause harm to coral reefs and marine life.” (Id. at 8.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendant labeling its sunscreen products as “Reef Friendly” is misleading because the products “contain avobenzone, octocrylene, homosalate and octyl salicylate.” (Id. at 13, 19.)

Defendant counters that [i]n 2018, Hawaii banned the use of oxybenzone and octinoxate in sunscreen based on the Hawaii Legislature's determination that these two specific ingredients are harmful to coral reefs.” (Doc. 16-1 at 7 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 342D-21).) Consistent with Hawaii law, Defendant's Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen does not contain oxybenzone and octinoxate, which Plaintiff does not dispute. (Id. at 7.) Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are defective because [t]he packaging of Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen does not state-or even suggest-that the sunscreen is free of avobenzone, octocrylene, homosalate, or octyl salicylate” and that [t]o the contrary, it discloses the presence of these ingredients in the ‘Active Ingredients' panel,” which appears on the back of the product. (Id.) Defendant's “Reef Friendly” label refers to the fact that, pursuant to Hawaii law, their sunscreen does not contain oxybenzone and octinoxate. (Id.)

The FAC includes Plaintiff's individual allegations as well as class allegations. (Doc. 13 at 20-26.) In regard to Plaintiff's individual allegation, she explains she “has been purchasing Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen Coconut Clear Spray 50 and Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen Green Tea 45 (cream version) consistently for the past two years for personal and household use.” (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff is “eco-conscious” and “believed the products to have clean chemicals and be reef friendly as advertised.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff alleges she “paid an unlawful premium for the product advertised as reef friendly when it in fact is not safe for coral reefs and marine life” and “would not have purchased the products had the product been truthfully advertised.” (Id. at 23.) Accordingly, Plaintiff claims she “was harmed and suffered injury in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant's false, unfair and fraudulent practices.” (Id.) In regard to Plaintiff's class allegations, Plaintiff lists a total of fourteen of Defendant's chemical sunscreens (the “Products”)[1] “which bear labeling stating ‘Reef Friendly,' yet contain octocrylene and/or avobenzone.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff thus brings a class action on behalf of a nationwide class and a California subclass of individuals who, within the applicable limitations period, purchased any of the fourteen products from Defendant. (Id. at 23.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

However, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the Court “required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

When a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Request for Judicial Notice

A court generally cannot consider materials outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). A court may, however, consider materials subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a court may take judicial notice, either on its own accord or by a party's request, of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are (1) “generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). A court may also take judicial notice of “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Finally, under the incorporation by reference doctrine, courts may “take into account documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleading.” Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The incorporation by reference doctrine “treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself,” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018), so long as “the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003).

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of four exhibits: (1) images of the labeling of a lotion version of Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen (Ex. 1); (2) images of the labeling of a spray version of Alba Botanica Hawaiian Sunscreen (Ex. 2); (3) a copy of a webpage from the Hawaii State Legislature's website titled SB132 SD2 HD1” (Ex. 3), and (4) a copy of the current version of Hawaii Senate Bill 132 (Ex. 4). (Doc. 17 at 2.)

The Court takes judicial notice of images of the labeling of the lotion and spray versions of Alba Botanica Hawaiian...

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