Anders ex rel. Anders v. Fort Wayne Commu. Schools

• Decision Date: 14 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1:00CV0096CAN.,1:00CV0096CAN.
• Citation: 124 F.Supp.2d 618
• Parties: Jerrod ANDERS, by his next friend and father, Stephen ANDERS, on his own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

124 F.Supp.2d 618

Jerrod ANDERS, by his next friend and father, Stephen ANDERS, on his own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant.

No. 1:00CV0096CAN.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

December 14, 2000.

Jacquelyn E. Bowie, Elizabeth P. Freitag, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

William L Sweet, Jr., Craig R Patterson, Martha M. Kinder, Matthew J. Elliott, Beckman Lawson Sandler Snyder and Federoff, Fort Wayne, IN, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NUECHTERLEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Jerrod Anders, a 16 year old Northrop High School student, brings this suit by his next friend and his father Stephen Anders, seeking compensatory damages, declaratory relief, and to enjoin the defendant, the Fort Wayne Community Schools, from authorizing the search of student vehicles where there is no reasonable suspicion, or consent for the search. There are two distinct parts to the Complaint: Mr. Anders asks this court to determine whether the October 19, 1999, search of Anders' vehicle was consistent with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, and to judge the constitutional propriety of the defendant's implied consent policy. The matter is currently before the court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, both of which were filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Relevant Facts & Procedure

On October 19, 1999, Jerrod Anders was a sophomore at Northrop High School in Fort Wayne, Indiana. (Complaint, ¶ 11). On that day, he asserts that he left the school building during his lunch period, to go to his car to look for an art project. (Anders Deposition, at 18-19, 29-30). Northrop High School has written rules requiring a student to have a pass before going to his or her vehicle during the school day (Selvia Deposition at 15); Anders had no pass. (Id. at 20). Consequently, following a series of events starting with Anders being observed in the parking lot by a school security officer, his car was searched giving rise to the lawsuit which he ultimately filed on March 6, 2000. Anders challenges the October 19, 1999, search of his car, and also challenges the Fort Wayne Community Schools' implied consent policy, which he alleges was implicated by the October 19, 1999, search.

During the 1999-2000 school year, Jerrod Anders had applied for a Parking Permit as required of all students wishing to drive to school. (Complaint, ¶ 13). One was issued to Anders. (Id.). The terms of the Fort Wayne Community Schools Student Rights and Responsibilities & Behavior Code, bound him to the terms of the implied consent policy which he now challenges. (Id. ¶ 29). The relevant code section states as follows:

"Authorized school personnel may conduct a search of a student, locker, book bag, student possessions/belongings, or automobile if they have reasonable suspicion for a search. A student who requests parking privileges gives implied consent for a search."

(1999-2000 Fort Wayne Community Schools Student Rights and Responsibilities & Behavior Code, pg. 3). Anders' Complaint alleges that both the policy and the search at issue were unconstitutional violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and an unconstitutional violation of Article 1 § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

The defendant school corporation has responded to Anders' Complaint by arguing that the policy being challenged by plaintiff is irrelevant to this case. Defendant maintains that although the implied consent policy was in effect at the time of Anders' search, it was never relied upon to justify the search of his car. Instead, defendant contends, Anders' vehicle search was justified by a reasonable suspicion created by Anders' conduct in combination with activities that had been taking place in the Northrop High School parking lot over the weeks leading up to the search.

Approximately a week to a week and a half prior to the challenged search, numerous complaints were lodged by Northrop High School staff concerning students smoking in the school parking lot. (Selvia Deposition, pg. 14). The assistant principal recognized a problem, notified security, and asked that security address the issue. (Id.). They did, and several students were caught smoking in the parking lot during the week leading up to the search challenged by Anders' Complaint. (Id.).

At the time the challenged search took place Officer Timothy Selvia was a nine-year veteran of the Fort Wayne Police Department, and had worked as part time school security guard for eight years. (Selvia Deposition, pg. 5). On October 19, 1999, Selvia was working in the Northrop High School parking lot. (Id. at 14). He positioned himself between cars in the lot so he could see students who exited the building over the lunch period. (Id.). After about thirty-five minutes at that location Selvia spotted Jerrod Anders walking briskly through the lot toward the school entrance. (Id. at. 16). Selvia had not seen Anders exit the building, and therefore assumed that he had been outside for some time. (Id. at 19). Selvia shouted at Anders a few times, but failed to get his attention, so he followed Anders into the school building. (Id. at 18). When questioned by Selvia inside the school building, Anders admitted he did not have a pass to be outside; he told Selvia that he had gone to his car to retrieve an art project that he thought was in the car, but as it turned out it was not there. (Id. at 20). At that point Selvia became suspicious that Anders had violated several regulations, and asked Anders to go with him back to his vehicle. (Id. at 23-25).

As stated by the plaintiff, Officer Selvia's reasons for searching Jerrod's car were the reasons he gave in his sworn deposition testimony. In responding to questions during deposition, Officer Selvia described his suspicion in detail, and he explained the particular regulations he thought Anders had violated at the time the search was initiated:

A. He says that he was going to get an art project that he does not have, there is no art project, he did not have permission to go out and get the art project in the first place; that coupled with the fact that we were having the problems with the kids out in their cars smoking and just by previous experience of dealing with kids when they've been out in their cars during a school day when they weren't supposed to be out there was an indication to me from experience that he was probably out doing something in the car he wasn't supposed to be doing. And so that's why we were going back out to see, at that point, if he had contraband of some sort or another in his car.

Q. Okay. So you thought you wanted to go out to the car because you thought he might have contraband, is that the reason?

A. We're going to go find out what he was doing out in his car, you know, what were we doing out in the car. And at that point in time, the suspicion probably was that we were out smoking in our car.

* * * * * *

Q. Okay. Did you think that he violated a specific rule?

A. Well, yeah, he did violate a specific rule.

Q. Which?

A. He went out to the parking lot and got in his car without a pass.

Q. Other than that rule, did you think that he had violated any other rule?

A. Possibly skipping class as well, at that point.

Q. Okay. Okay, I mean in relation to you said you wanted to take him out to the car because you thought he might have violated some rule, and I'm asking if there's a specific rule that you thought he had violated at that point?

A. Well, like I said, from all the dealings I've had with kids out in their car, there could have been several violations, okay. And at that point in time was there one particular one in mind? Smoking may have been more than maybe some other ones.

(Selvia Deposition, at 22-24).

As indicated by his testimony, smoking was among the violations suspected by Selvia prior to the search of Anders' vehicle. And the suspicions were apparently correct. The resulting search of the car turned up an open pack of cigarettes, two lighters, and two pocket knives. (Selvia Deposition, pg. 27 & 29). Anders was thereafter given a citation for the tobacco violation, (Selvia Deposition, pg. 31) and expelled from school. (Complaint, ¶ 34). The expulsion was later modified to allow Anders to attend school on a probationary basis. (Id.).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

"It is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained." Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983). Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that summary judgement is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but it is rather an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). Initially, under Rule 56(c), a party seeking summary judgment bears the responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying evidence which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the party that bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial cannot resist the motion by merely resting on its pleadings. Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). As ...