Andersen v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20131135–CA.,20131135–CA.
• Parties: Neil ANDERSEN, et al.,Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

347 P.3d 21

2015 UT App 63

Neil ANDERSEN, et al.¹ Plaintiffs and Appellants

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20131135–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 19, 2015.

Lauren I. Scholnick and Matt W. Harrison, Salt Lake City, for Appellants.

Sean D. Reyes and Peggy E. Stone, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Judge JAMES Z. DAVIS authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.

Memorandum Decision

DAVIS, Judge:

¶ 1 Plaintiffs appeal the district court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the Utah Department of Corrections (UDOC) on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. We affirm.

¶ 2 Plaintiffs are current and former transportation-unit correctional officers. In 1996, UDOC entered into an agreement with correctional officers who worked or anticipated working in the transportation unit. The agreement established a pay incentive amounting to a three-step pay-grade increase for transportation officers. This agreement was modified in 2000 following a dispute between UDOC and the transportation officers. The original agreement provided that an officer who left the transportation unit would lose the pay-grade steps the officer had gained by joining, but the modified agreement provided that officers who served in the transportation unit for at least three years would “not lose any steps” and would “maintain[ ] minimally their current rate of pay.” Officers who joined the transportation unit after the agreement was modified signed a memorandum of understanding reflecting the terms of the modified agreement.²

¶ 3 In 2007, UDOC's new executive director discontinued the practice of providing pay incentives to officers joining the transportation unit, and officers joining the transportation unit after the incentives were discontinued did not sign the modified agreement.³ In 2008, UDOC shifted all employees into a “straight-line career ladder pay scale.” In response, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against UDOC, claiming that the modified agreement provides for them to maintain a three-step pay-grade differential above other UDOC employees in perpetuity after three years in the transportation unit and that UDOC breached the modified agreement by shifting transportation officers who had signed the modified agreement into the new pay scheme.⁴

¶ 4 UDOC moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the modified agreement unambiguously establishes only that transportation officers who have reached the three-year mark cannot lose their three-step raise, not that they are entitled to maintain a three-step differential in perpetuity. Plaintiffs responded that the language in the modified agreement pertaining to raises and promotions makes the contract ambiguous as to whether the three-step differential must be permanently maintained. The district court examined the contract and determined that “[t]here is no language in the contract that supports the interpretation offered by Plaintiffs.” Accordingly, the district court granted UDOC's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 5 On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that the modified agreement is ambiguous and that the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to UDOC. “[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended.” WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ¶ 22, 54 P.3d 1139 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review[ ] a summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's decision.” Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 56.

¶ 6 A contract “is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the modified agreement is ambiguous because its provisions regarding salary, raises, and promotions can reasonably be interpreted as providing for a perpetual three-step pay-grade differential between transportation officers and non-transportation officers.

¶ 7 Plaintiffs point to three particular provisions in the modified agreement that they contend make the agreement ambiguous. First, they examine the provision indicating that “salary increases to Transportation Unit members will minimally be benchmarked to Correctional Officers in the Division of Institutional Operations.” Plaintiffs interpret this provision as requiring “that when [non-transportation] officers receive a pay raise, former or current [transportation] Officers also receive the equivalent pay raise. This interpretation ... would effectuate a constant pay differential whereby [current and former transportation] Officers would remain above [non-transportation] officers.” They next look to the provision indicating that an officer leaving the transportation unit “will not lose any steps, but will be able to transfer into a position that is the same as or closest to their current salary range that does not constitute a promotion, and maintains minimally their current rate of pay.” Plaintiffs interpret this provision as meaning “that the officer who received a three step increase when joining the [transportation] unit and then received all increases given [non-transportation] officers for at least the three years in [the transportation unit] ... will come back into the ranks with a three step advantage on any [non-transportation] officer.” Finally, Plaintiffs point to the provision indicating that a transportation officer who “receives a promotion ... will receive the same salary increase consideration that other officers receive when they are promoted.” They interpret this provision as requiring that even though a transportation officer may already be earning the typical salary of a promoted position, that officer should “receive the same percentage increase or same dollar increase that [a] promoted [non-transportation] officer [would] receive[ ],” which would, again, have the effect of keeping that officer three steps above non-transportation officers who followed a comparable career track.

¶ 8 We do not disagree with Plaintiffs that some language in the modified agreement may be ambiguous as to how transportation officers' pay raises and promotions are to be handled as compared to those of non-transportation officers. However, the action taken by UDOC that triggered the Plaintiffs' claims was the implementation of a new pay scheme applicable to all UDOC employees. Plaintiffs do not contend that the new pay scheme prevents transportation officers from receiving salary increases that are equivalent to those received by non-transportation officers, reduces transportation officers' salaries when they leave the transportation unit, or precludes promoted transportation officers from receiving raises on par with those of other promoted officers.⁵ Thus, we fail to see how the ambiguities pointed out by Plaintiffs could support a determination that UDOC breached the modified agreement by implementing the new pay scheme. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing that summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and...