Andersen v. W.C.A.B. (Nat. Forge Co.)

• Decision Date: 22 February 1988
• Citation: 113 Pa.Cmwlth. 601,537 A.2d 971
• Parties: Todd ANDERSEN, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (NATIONAL FORGE COMPANY), Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 971

537 A.2d 971

113 Pa.Cmwlth. 601

Todd ANDERSEN, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (NATIONAL FORGE

COMPANY), Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 5, 1987.

Decided Feb. 22, 1988.

Bernard J. Hessley, Warren, for petitioner.

Harry K. Thomas, Richard E. Bordonaro, Knox, Graham, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, Inc., Erie, for respondents.

Before CRAIG, DOYLE and BARRY, JJ.

DOYLE, Judge.

This is an appeal by Todd Andersen (Claimant) from an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which barred Claimant's petition for modification on the basis that a prior decision of the Board was res judicata.

The facts surrounding this case are unusual. Claimant was employed by National Forge (Employer) as a crane operator. On June 22, 1982, he sustained a work-related back injury and received compensation benefits for total disability. On August 16, 1982, while Claimant was still receiving total disability benefits, and solely because of economic conditions, he was reclassified from a crane operator to a general laborer pursuant to the terms of a labor agreement between Employer and Claimant's labor union. On October 10, 1983 Claimant was officially placed on lay-off status also due to economic conditions. During the entire period, Claimant never returned to work in any capacity for Employer.

Three days prior to Claimant's lay-off, October 7, 1983, Employer filed a termination petition based on a report by Claimant's treating physician who opined that Claimant could return to his previous job as a crane operator, but that he could not return to a position which entailed heavy lifting or the shoveling of heavy loads because of a risk of recurrent injury to Claimant's spine. Claimant was therefore capable of returning to his pre-injury job, which no longer existed, but he was not capable of returning to his reclassified position as a general laborer, a job which he could no longer physically perform.

The referee found that Employer met its burden and terminated Claimant's benefits as of October, 1983. On January 17, 1985, the Board in its decision modified the decision of the referee from a termination of benefits to a suspension of benefits, stating that Claimant suffered from an ongoing residual disability. This decision was not appealed.

On May 14, 1985, just 4 months after the Board's decision, Claimant filed a petition for modification with the referee. In his petition, Claimant asserts that he is partially disabled, and that he is unable to locate employment with wages equal to, or in excess of, the wages he earned with Employer at the time of his injury. A hearing was held on this issue July 16, 1985. The referee found that Claimant's petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Board affirmed that decision.

Upon review of the evidence presented to this Court, we believe that Claimant is, in fact, seeking to have his suspension lifted and he should have filed a petition to reinstate his benefits. Claimant's characterization of his petition as one to modify, and the Board's treatment of it as such, was erroneous. However, as long as the evidence presented justifies relief under some section of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act), ¹ relief may be granted regardless of the section under which the petition has been filed. Dunmore School District v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Lorusso), 89 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 368, 492 A.2d 773 (1985). We will therefore treat this petition as such.

We also find the Board's application of the doctrine of res judicata to be erroneous. For strict res judicata to apply to bar relitigation of an action there must be "[a]n identity of causes of action [and] in both the prior and subsequent proceedings the subject matter and the ultimate issues [must be] the same. Res judicata applies not only to matters which were actually litigated, but also to those matters which should have been litigated...." Armco Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 60 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 195, 198-99, 431 A.2d 363, 365 (1981) (citation omitted). These elements do not exist in this petition. The prior petition was filed by Employer seeking a termination of benefits for total disability and what was granted was a suspension of benefits. The present petition involves an attempt to have Claimant's suspension lifted and benefits reinstated because Claimant's injury has subsequently resulted in a loss of earning power. Thus, the ultimate issues in both petitions are not identical and the doctrine of technical or strict res judicata is inapplicable.

Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or res judicata in its broad sense) is also inapplicable. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, determinations of particular questions of fact essential to a judgment, which are actually litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment, are conclusive between parties in any subsequent action on a different cause of action. Patel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Sauquoit Fibers Co.), 88 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 76, 488 A.2d 1177 (1985). This Court has stated:

Where the second...