Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 11 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-2000(RCL). |
| Citation | 466 F.Supp.2d 51 |
| Parties | Kenneth ANDERSON-BEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Kenneth Anderson-Bey, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Daniel McCrea Schember, Gaffney & Schember, PC, Mark McLaughlin Hager, American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC, Samuel M. Shapiro, Rockville, MD, for Plaintiffs.
Elbert Blango, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Michangelo Blount, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Adrian Brockenberry, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Anthony Brown, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Calvin Brown, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Ricardo Carroll, Youngstown, OH, pro se.
Antonio Clark, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Richard Clark, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
James Edward Arnold, Terre Haute, In, pro se.
Richard Clements, Florence, AZ, pro se.
Lawrence Clifton, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Herbert S. Cooper, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Wade K. Cosby, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Marvin K. Davis, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Patrick Davis, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Ricardo Davis, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Herman Elliott, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Herman Epps, Florence, AZ, pro se.
Eric A. Glascoe, Youngstown, OH, pro se.
Howard Glascoe, Atlanta, GA, pro se.
Stanley Grayson, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Darryl Gregg, Youngstown, OH, pro se.
Tyrone James, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Willie Johnson, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Henry Marshall, Florence, AZ, pro se.
John H. Mathis, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Allen Matthews-Bey, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Albert C. McCoy, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
James McQueen, Florence, AZ, pro se.
Marcellus Burns, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Stanley Easton-El, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Lester Irby, Leavenworth, KS, pro se.
Bernard Smith, Estill, SC, pro se.
Orlando R. Willis-Bey, Washington, DC, pro se.
Cary D. Pollak, Office of Corporation Counsel District of Columbia, Robert C. Utiger, DC Attorney General, William Johnson Earl, Jr., Office of Attorney General DC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Before the Court is defendants' Motion [77 & 80] to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the Motion, plaintiffs' opposition, the reply thereto, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Motion is
DENIED as to Defendant District of Columbia. Having determined that plaintiffs have stated claims for the violation of their constitutional rights against the individual defendants, but not having had the benefit of briefing on the issue of qualified immunity, the Court hereby
ORDERS that plaintiffs shall either voluntarily dismiss the individual defendants, or shall file a memorandum of points and authorities within ten (10) days of this date explaining why the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court is defendants' Motion [77 & 80] to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. In this class action lawsuit a class of prisoners who were incarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections ("D.O.C.") allege that D.O.C. officers violated their constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments, and committed common law torts, while transporting the prisoners between correctional facilities in Ohio and Virginia in 1999. The defendants — the District of Columbia and the individual guards — have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Having considered matters outside the pleadings, the Court treats the motion as one for summary judgment.
Upon consideration of the motion, the memorandum in support, the opposition and the reply thereto, the stipulations between the parties, and the entire record herein, the motion is denied as to the District of Columbia. As to the individual defendants, the Court holds that plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they violated the prisoners' constitutional rights. The Court tentatively concludes, however, that the individual defendants are, entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claims, on the basis that the Eighth Amendment rights in question were not clearly established at the time. Since this issue has not been briefed by the parties, the Court orders that plaintiffs shall either voluntarily dismiss the individual defendants, or shall file within 10 days of this date a memorandum of points and authorities explaining why the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court's reasoning, is explained more fully below.
Under Federal. Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court grants summary judgment only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of record disclose no genuine issues of material fact and show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The movant initially bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine, material fact issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A disputed issue of material fact is genuine and thus precludes summary judgment where the Court determines that a reasonable jury could conceivably find in favor of the non-moving party on that fact issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
A court generally must "assume the truth of all statements proffered by the party opposing summary judgment" and construe all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). See Anderson at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Carter v. Greenspan, 304 F.Supp.2d 13, 21 (D.D.C.2004). Indeed, the Court must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). See also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C.Cir.1989).
In addition to the affidavits submitted on behalf of plaintiffs, the parties have stipulated as follows: "Each plaintiff class representative in his interrogatory answers verified under oath the truth of those allegations in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint that the complaint indicates are within his personal knowledge." Stipulation [84]. The First Amended Complaint is, for the most part, therefore treated as a verified complaint.
Plaintiffs are a class of District of Columbia criminal convicts who were transported from a prison in Youngstown, Ohio to one in Waverly, Virginia in 1999. First Amended Complaint [27] ("1AC") 1. The prisoners were transported by bus in two groups; one traveled on February 15-16, 1999, in a trip alleged to last at least 15 hours, while the other group traveled on March 1-2, 1999, in a trip that allegedly took 10 or more hours. The prisoners were, at all relevant times, being held under the custody of the District of Columbia. They were incarcerated in facilities in other states because of the District's practice of contracting with other states for prison space, due to space shortages in the District's facilities.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendant District of Columbia, through its Department of Corrections ("D.O.C."), as well as the individual defendants, who are or were D.O.C. corrections officers, were responsible for the bus transports from Youngstown.1 The named class representatives in this case had participated in a class action lawsuit against Corrections Corporation of America, the private company that ran the Northeast Ohio Correctional Facility at Youngstown.2 The suit challenged prison conditions at Youngstown. Because the District of Columbia housed prisoners in the Youngstown prison, the suit had received some publicity in the Washington, D.C. area. After the suits were brought, plaintiffs in this case were scheduled to be transferred from the prison at Youngstown to the Sussex II correctional facility in Waverly, Virginia.
The D.C. guards were responsible for preparing and loading the prisoners on the buses at Youngstown, transporting them by bus to Sussex II, and unloading them upon arrival. Plaintiffs describe each trip as a "ride from hell." First and foremost, the prisoners allege that the guards secured their restraints far too tightly. The prisoners wore handcuffs which were secured with a "black box," a black device that fits between each hand and provides for a tighter, more rigid, and presumably more secure restraint. Apparently, at least some of the plaintiffs also had belly chains applied — chains that are secured around the waist and then fastened to the handcuffs, thus limiting a prisoner's range of mobility — and had ankle shackles.
According to the complaint, each prisoner's restraints were applied far too tightly, with the handcuffs cutting off circulation and digging into and sometimes cutting the skin. There are also some complaints about ankle shackles being applied too tightly. The restraints remained too tight throughout the trip, despite the prisoners' complaints. Upon arrival at Sussex, prisoners all experienced pain and discomfort; several had injuries, ranging from minor ones to serious injuries requiring ongoing medical attention. The most common complaint is of bleeding lacerations around the wrist.
Plaintiffs allege other forms of abuse. For instance, some were not given food or anything to drink, though meals and drinks had been packed for them at Youngstown. Factoring in the time between their last meal or drink at Youngstown and their first meal or drink at Sussex II, this meant that some prisoners went as long as 24 hours...
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