ANDERSON BY ANDERSON v. Indiana HS Athletic Ass'n

• Decision Date: 26 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. EV 88-139-C.,EV 88-139-C.
• Citation: 699 F. Supp. 719
• Parties: Allison Lynn ANDERSON by Next Friend Terry ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, C. Eugene Cato and Gerry Adams, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

699 F. Supp. 719

Allison Lynn ANDERSON by Next Friend Terry ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, C. Eugene Cato and Gerry Adams, Defendants.

No. EV 88-139-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Evansville Division.

September 26, 1988.

Theodore Lockyear, Lockyear & Kornblum, Evansville, Ind., for plaintiff.

James Flynn, Evansville, Ind., for defendant Gerry Adams.

Frederick D. Emhardt, Indianapolis, Ind., and Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald & Hahn, Evansville, Ind., for defendants Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n and C. Eugene Cato.

MEMORANDUM

BROOKS, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before this Court upon the plaintiff, Allison Lynn Anderson's, (hereinafter "Ms. Anderson"), who is a minor (sixteen years of age), institution of this action on August 29, 1988, by and through her next friend and parent, Terry Anderson, to obtain injunctive relief against the defendants, Indiana High School Athletic Association (hereinafter "IHSAA"), C. Eugene Cato in his capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana High School Athletic Association (hereinafter "Commissioner Cato"), and Gerry Adams in his capacity as principal of Evansville Reitz Memorial High School (hereinafter "Principal Adams"). The injunctive relief sought was for the purpose of restraining the IHSAA, acting by and through Commissioner Cato, and Principal Adams from declaring Anderson ineligible from participation in interscholastic athletics.

The facts of this case may be briefly summarized as follows:

Ms. Anderson is a 16-year-old female who resides with her parents at 7120 East Olive Street in Evansville. In early August of this year she decided to transfer from Evansville Day School, which is a small private school, to Evansville Reitz Memorial High School, which is a large private parochial school. Ms. Anderson is now fully enrolled at Memorial and her parents have paid her tuition. This transfer was made without a corresponding change of residence by her parents.

The IHSAA is a voluntary association open to all public, private, parochial and institutional high schools of the State of Indiana, which administers a program of high school interscholastic athletics. The IHSAA was established for the purpose of adopting uniform standards to regulate interscholastic athletics and contests among member schools. Both Evansville Day School and Evansville Reitz Memorial High School are members of the IHSAA. Membership in the association is contingent upon strict adherence to the rules and regulations promulgated by the IHSAA.

Ms. Anderson began trying out at Memorial for the girls varsity volleyball team in hopes of making the squad. On August 10, 1988, Ms. Anderson's father informed Memorial of his intent to enroll his daughter and completed his portion of the IHSAA athletic transfer report. Mr. Anderson set forth on the report that the reasons for transfer were not related to athletics but were to assist Ms. Anderson in "broadening her horizons." Apparently, although Evansville Day School had an excellent academic reputation, the social and extracurricular activity opportunities were limited based on the size of the school's student population. Accordingly, Mr. Anderson, as well as Ms. Anderson, attempted to explain that the decision to transfer from Evansville Day School to Evansville Reitz Memorial High School was made after consultation with her parents, and was based on their beliefs that Memorial, a larger private school, would offer Ms. Anderson a broader range of social and extracurricular opportunities. Mr. Anderson set forth in the report that participation in interscholastic athletics at Memorial was not impetus to the transfer decision nor did it play any part in that decision. Neither plaintiff, nor her parents, were ever "recruited, solicited or influenced" by any official, teacher or other person affiliated with Memorial in connection with the decision to transfer to Memorial. This report was forwarded to the Principal of Evansville Day School who, on August 15, 1988, recommended eligibility. On August 17, 1988, Principal Adams of Memorial High School also recommended eligibility.

Rule 19 of the By-Laws of the IHSAA was amended effective July 1, 1988. Under Rule 19-6 and Rule 19-3, a student who transfers schools without a corresponding change of residence by her parents is ineligible to play athletics at the school to which she has transferred for a period of up to 365 days unless the following conditions exist:

(1) There is no evidence of transferring for primarily athletic reasons;

(2) there is no evidence of undue influence; and

(3) there is bona fide evidence that one of the following is true:

(a) The student is a ward of the court;

(b) The student's parents have divorced in which case the student shall be eligible in the district of the residence of the parent with legal custody;

(c) The student is an orphan;

(d) The student's former school has closed;

(e) The student's former school is non-accredited;

(f) The transfer is made pursuant to a school board mandate;

(g) The student attended by error the wrong school for 15 or less days;

(h) The transfer is for student promotion purposes;

(i) The transfer is from a correctional school; or

(j) The student is emancipated and has established a bona fide new residence in district or territory.

It was apparent from both Ms. Anderson and Mr. Anderson's representations as to why a transfer was contemplated that a failure to present any bona fide evidence was inevitable under Rule 19-6.

Rule 17-6.1 provides as follows:

"In determining whether a rule has been violated and, if so, what action is to be taken because thereof, consideration shall be given to: (a) whether strict enforcement of the rule in the particular case will serve the accomplished purpose of the rule; (b) whether the spirit of the rule has been violated; and (c) whether there exists in the particular case circumstances showing an undue hardship which would result from enforcement of the rule. Note: It is to be understood that ordinary cases of ineligibility shall not be considered as coming under the hardship category."

On August 22, 1988, IHSAA Assistant Commissioner Ray Craft ruled Ms. Anderson ineligible to play interscholastic athletics for 365 days, pursuant to Rule 19-3 (IHSAA Transfer Rule). A letter from defendant Commissioner Cato to defendant Principal Adams at Reitz Memorial High School declared Ms. Anderson ineligible for athletics at Memorial. Commissioner Cato quoted from IHSAA Rule 19-3 as follows:

"Students who transfer may be eligible as to residence under the following conditions:

(a) They may represent a school to which they have transferred after 365 days from the date of enrollment therein provided their enrollment in that school has been continuous.

NOTE: This includes transfers from a private school to a private school, a private school to a public school, a public school to a private school, a public school to a public school.... See Section V of Athletic Transfer Form, a copy of which is enclosed."

Rule 17 — Rule Violations provides Ms. Anderson with a process of appeal from the decision of the Assistant Commissioner Craft. Ms. Anderson is pursuing this appeal. The appeal was scheduled to be heard on September 15, 1988, by the Executive Committee of the IHSAA.

The Current Executive Committee consists of nine members of the Board of Directors of the IHSAA. The Board of Directors are selected by the principals of the member schools on the basis of population and geography. In considering appeals, the Executive Committee operates pursuant to Rule 17 of the By-Laws of the IHSAA. Rule 17 provides for a hearing before the Executive Committee of which a record is made and witnesses may be called and for a written statement of the reasons for the decision of the Executive Committee.

After being notified by the IHSAA on August 22, 1988 of her ineligibility, Ms. Anderson waited until August 29, 1988 to move for injunctive relief in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, Cause No. 82C01-8808-CP-1619. Said Complaint was removed by Verified Petition for Removal of Civil Action unanimously filed by the defendants to the action. Said Complaint was filed as EV 88-139 in this Court on August 30, 1988. It was plaintiff's contention that although a right of appeal existed pursuant to Rule 17 of the IHSAA, said appeal was meaningless inasmuch as the volleyball season, for which the plaintiff would seek to be eligible, commences on Tuesday, August 30, 1988. The plaintiff further contended that before the Executive Committee met to hear her appeal seven games of a fourteen game season would be concluded. Thus, the plaintiff by virtue of being judged ineligible would be foreclosed from participation, thus resulting in immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage as provided in Rule 65(b), Fed.R. Civ.P. All parties appeared at the emergency hearing set late in the afternoon on August 30, 1988. Counsel for defendant Gerry Adams orally moved to dismiss his client from the case. The Court took the motion under advisement. All parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argument bearing on plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order. The Court immediately after the hearing denied the plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, stating that the immediate harm facing the plaintiff at this time, by virtue of missing seven games before a hearing, and potentially several other games pending a decision, was at least partially the fault of Ms. Anderson in waiting so late before she decided to transfer. This Court found that notice of ineligibility on August 22, and an appeals hearing set for September 15, was not unreasonable. This Court further found that being denied the opportunity to participate in the games did not rise to immediate or irreparable harm. No decision was rendered on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. A hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary...