Anderson, In re
Decision Date | 11 February 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 491,491 |
Citation | 315 A.2d 540,20 Md.App. 31 |
Parties | In the Matter of William ANDERSON et al. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
James G. Klair, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, State's Atty. for Baltimore City and Howard B. Merker, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellant.
Peter S. Smith and Herbert J. Hirsch, Baltimore, with whom were Michael S. Elder, Baltimore, Victoria A. Salner and Adrienne E. Volenik, legal assistants and law students, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before ORTH, C. J., and MOYLAN and POWERS, JJ.
These appeals present two questions which are not only dispositive of the cases at hand but of substantial significance in the overall administration of juvenile justice. The first question concerns the right of the State to appeal in juvenile proceedings. The second question involves the application to such proceedings of the double jeopardy clause of Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States.
Petitions against William Anderson, Michael A. Epps, Larry Smith and Donald Brady, appellees, 1 were filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division for Juvenile Causes (Juvenile Court). Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (hereinafter cited as 'Courts Art.') § 3-803(b). See Maryland Rules 901-905. The parties have stipulated what thereafter occurred: 2
3
On 16 May 1972 the State filed written exceptions to the master's finding that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the charge against Anderson and his recommendation that the case be dismissed. 4 On 26 September Anderson filed a motion to dismiss the exceptions. The crux of the motion was that an adjudicatory hearing before the judge of the juvenile court would put him twice in jeopardy on the matter of his delinquency. He urged that the finding of the master be final. According to the docket entries in Matter of Anderson, Docket No. 158187, on 13 October there was an 'Exception Hearing on Motion to Dismiss' before Hammerman, J., presiding in the Juvenile Court. 5 Ruling on the motion was held sub curia. Memoranda were filed by the parties. There were further hearings on 27 March 1973 and 17 May. On 29 June stipulations of fact were filed and on 1 August the court granted the motion to dismiss the exceptions, and confirmed the recommendation of the master to dismiss the petition.
The State filed exceptions to the findings and recommendation of the master as to Brady on 26 January 1973, as to Epps on 16 May 1973, and as to Smith on 20 July 1973. In each case a motion to dismiss the exceptions was filed, and in each case, following its holding as to Anderson, the court entered an order on 3 August 1973 dismissing the exceptions and confirming the recommendation of the master to dismiss the petition filed against the child. 6 On 7 August the State filed a 'Consolidated Appeal' from the order of 1 August as to Anderson and from the orders of 3 August as to Brady, Epps and Smith. 7
'The right to take an appeal is entirely statutory, and no person or agency may prosecute an appeal unless the right is given by statute.' Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 309, 242 A.2d 506, 509; State v. Lohss, Md.App., 313 A.2d 87, filed December 28, 1973. 8 Prior to 1 January 1974 the right to appeal in juvenile proceedings was set out in Code, Art. 26, § 70-25, under the subtitle 'Juvenile Causes': 'An aggrieved party may appeal from any final order, judgment, or decree of the juvenile court to the Court of Special Appeals in the manner prescribed by the Maryland Rules.' In Matter of Waters, 13 Md.App. 95, footnote 6, at 99, 281 A.2d 560, and in Aye v. State, 17 Md.App. 32, footnote 5, at 36, 299 A.2d 513, we suggested by way of obiter dictum that the State had no right of an appeal from a determination of a juvenile court not to waive its jurisdiction. The primary basis of this conclusion was that under Code, Art. 26, § 70-16(c) as then in effect, only 'an order of waiver' was to be considered a final order, terminating the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. If jurisdiction was not waived, the juvenile court, of course, retained its jurisdiction, and the case proceeded under juvenile procedures. Thus, an order refusing to waive jurisdiction was interlocutory. But we also indicated, and this is what appellees seize upon, that because the definition of 'party' in the juvenile cause subtitle, Art. 26, § 70-1(e), did not include the State, the right of 'an aggrieved party' to appeal, did not encompass the State.
Since our dictum in Waters and Aye, we have been afforded a new insight into the legislative intent concerning appeals in juvenile causes. Chapter 2, Acts 1973, First Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly of Maryland, repealed the provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland dealing with courts and the judiciary and re-enacted them with revisions to be codified as the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 9 This was a result of the Governor's establishment of a Commission to Revise the Annotated Code. The Governor charged the Commission with the responsibility of a formal revision of the public general laws, including an improved scheme of organization, elimination of obsolete or unconstitutional provisions, resolution of inconsistencies and conflicts in the laws, and the general improvement of language and expression. The laws as reenacted made, in large measure, only stylistic revisions, and those in which substance appears were, in general, not changes of a major nature. 10 Among the statutes repealed and re-enacted were those involving juvenile causes. Statutes concerning juvenile causes now appear in subtitle 8 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
The right to appeal in juvenile proceedings no longer appears as a separate section in the Juvenile Causes subtitle; it is now § 12-301, 'Appeals from Final Judgments', subtitle 3, 'Review of Decisions of Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction', Title 12, 'Appeals, Certiorari, and Certification of Questions'. The section reads:
11
We find it clear from the discussion of § 12-301 in the Commission's Report No. 3 F, pp. 77-78, and the revisor's note to the section, that the only substantive change intended from the law as it formerly existed was to allow an appeal from a trial court's exercise of special statutory original jurisdiction, as opposed to common-law original jurisdiction, which appeal, by case law, was...
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...appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.' (emphasis supplied) See also Matter of Anderson, 20 Md.App. 31, 315 A.2d 540 (1974), affirmed, Md.App., 321 A.2d 516 (1974); Aye v. State, 17 Md.App. 32, 299 A.2d 513 While we must dismiss the appeal, we n......
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