Anderson v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 16 June 1920 |
| Docket Number | No. 13143.,13143. |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. ANDERSON et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Superior Court, Cook County; Denis E. Sullivan, Judge.
Suit by Franklin S. Anderson against Oscar Louis M. Anderson and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
E. W. Adkinson and E. J. Whitehead, both of Chicago (H. W. Magee, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
David K. Tone and Elmer J. Tone, both of Chicago, for defendants in error.
Plaintiff in error, Franklin S. Anderson, filed his bill in the superior court asking that the will of Julia Anderson, deceased, be set aside because of fraud and undue influence, and that a certain understanding and agreement between her and his father be directed to be specifically performed by his half-sister and half-brothers. The bill alleges:
That in 1875 John Anderson married Julia Sampson. That John Anderson was then a widower and that plaintiff in error was his only child. That there were subsequently born to John and Julia Anderson three children, Oscar Louis M. Anderson, John Arthur Anderson, and Marie Anderson, who subsequently married one Eilert and to whom was born a daughter, Arlyn Eilert. That plaintiff in error was 16 years older than the eldest of the children of Julia Anderson, and that he helped his father accumulate the property here in question. That there was an agreement and understanding between John Anderson and Julia Anderson that no distinction should be made betweenthe four children of John Anderson in the distribution of whatever property remained after the death of John and Julia Anderson. That pursuant to this agreement John Anderson on the 17th day of December, 1895, made and executed his will, by which he conveyed all of his real and personal estate to his wife, Julia Anderson, and in the third clause of said will provided as follows:
‘My four children [naming them], and any child or children who may be born to me hereafter, I leave to the care and authority and control of my said wife, Julia Anderson, relying upon her to make such just and proper provision for them in the future as in her sole judgment may be proper.’
That further pursuant to the said agreement Julia Anderson on the 15th day of July, 1905, made and executed her will, by which she gave all her property to her husband in case he should survive her, and directed that in case he should not survive her all her property be placed in trust, the trustees to pay over to each of the four children one-fourth of the net income for a period of ten years, and that upon the expiration of said ten years the trustees should pay over one-fourth of the estate to each of said four children, with the provision that $2,000 should be deducted from the fourth interest of her stepson, Franklin, and added to the one-fourth interest of her son John. That John Anderson, father of plaintiff in error, died February 24, 1910, and his will was duly admitted to probate. That later, on the 2d day of August, 1916, Julia Anderson made and executed another will, by which she revoked the will made during the lifetime of her husband and redistributed the property, giving to plaintiff in error the sum of $2,000 only, and dividing the remaining property among her three children and granddaughter. That the estate was a very large one, consisting of real and personal property, and that the provision for plaintiff in error was grossly inequitable and contrary to the understanding and agreement between his father and stepmother. That Julia Anderson died March 15, 1918, and her will of August 2, 1916, was promptly admitted to probate as her last will and testament, and that this will was obtained by fraud and undue influence practiced and exercised by the children of Julia Anderson. The three children and the granddaughter of Julia Anderson were made defendants. A general and special demurrer was filed, the special ground of demurrer being that the bill is multifarious, in that it seeks to set aside the will of Julia Anderson on the ground of fraud and undue influence, thereby invoking the statutory jurisdiction of a court of equity, and that it at the same time seeks to enforce a trust agreement, thereby invoking the general jurisdiction of a court of equity. The chancellor sustained the demurrer on the ground that the bill is multifarious, and, the plaintiff in error electing to stand by his bill, the chancellor dismissed it for want of equity. This writ of error is prosecuted to review that decree.
Defendants in error contend that the decree should be affirmed on the ground that a party cannot in a bill ‘seek to contest a will on statutory grounds by reason of alleged undue influence, and in the same bill seek to reach property under an alleged trust agreement which, if valid at all, entitles the complainant to his share of the property as such beneficiary, independently of any provision of the will.’ They rely on three former decisions of this court, Hollenbeck v. Cook, 180 Ill. 65, 54 N. E. 154,Calkins v. Calkins, 229 Ill. 68, 82 N. E. 242, and Tagert v. Fletcher, 232 Ill. 197, 83 N. E. 805, and contend that those decisions are conclusive of the question here presented.
In determining whether or not a bill is multifarious the court must look to the facts and circumstances of the particular case under consideration, and it can hardly be said that a decision in any other case is necessarily conclusive of the question in the case under consideration. To lay down any rule universally applicable to the question of multifariousness, or to say what...
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