Anderson v. Armstead

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 1873 WL 8490,69 Ill. 452
• Parties: CHARLES G. ANDERSONv.ALICE M. ARMSTEAD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

69 Ill. 452

1873 WL 8490 (Ill.)

CHARLES G. ANDERSON

v.ALICE M. ARMSTEAD.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS F. TIPTON, Judge, presiding.

This was a proceeding, instituted by Charles G. Anderson, against Alice M. Armstead, to enforce a mechanic's lien for labor done and materials furnished on premises belonging to the defendant.

The facts of the case are, that plaintiff made a contract with H. H. Armstead, husband of the defendant, to paint the house in question, for which he agreed to give, when done, R. Cole and wife's warranty deed of lots, purporting to be in Washington Heights addition to Chicago, together with abstracts of lots, or in default of which to pay plaintiff $300 cash. The work was done and accepted, together with extra work amounting to $39.25. The plaintiff never received from the defendant, or her husband, any money or any thing except R. Cole and wife's warranty deed of what purports to be certain lots in the Washington Heights addition to Chicago, without any abstracts of title. The lots described in Cole's deed had no existence, there being no plat of the name on record in Cook county. The plaintiff signed two receipts on the back of the contract, one of which is worded as a full discharge of the contract. He did not read the receipts, and did not readily understand English, and was told by Armstead that they were receipts for the deeds.

A trial was had before the court without a jury, and the court found for the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's petition, to reverse which the plaintiff appealed.

Mr. F. A. WOODBURY, for the appellant.

Messrs. TRUMBULL, ANTHONY, CHURCH & TRUMBULL, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

We think it clear, from the evidence before us, that appellant has not been paid for his materials furnished, and work and labor done in painting the house. The Cole deed was a nullity, for the reason that there is no such property in existence as it assumed to convey, and appellant's receipt was given in ignorance of the facts, and does not conclude him.

The only question upon which there is any serious controversy is, whether the wife is, under the circumstances, bound by the acts of her husband.

The law is familiar, that where the owner of property holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner of, or as having full power of disposition over the property, and innocent parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, or person having the apparent power of disposition, they will be protected. Their rights, in such cases, do not depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with whom they have directly dealt, but they are derived from the act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing, as against them, the existence of the title or power he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party, upon the faith of whose title, or power, they dealt. Bigelow on Estoppel, 468; Higgins v. Ferguson et al. 14 Ill. 269; Donaldson et al. v. Holmes, 23 Id. 85; Schwartz et ux. v. Saunders, 46 Id. 18.

Here, the wife had the same complete and absolute power and control over her property, free from the interference of her husband, that she would have had if she had been a feme sole. While she could act by her husband as her agent, he had no authority, as husband, to meddle with or in any manner...