Anderson v. Atl. City Gas Co.

Decision Date20 March 1929
Docket NumberNo. 13.,13.
Citation145 A. 238
PartiesANDERSON v. ATLANTIC CITY GAS CO.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Atlantic County.

Action by Maud Anderson against the Atlantic City Gas Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued October term, 1028, before TRENCHARD, KALISCH, and LLOYD, JJ.

Thompson & Hanstein, of Atlantic City, for appellant.

Carlton Godfrey and William I. Garrison, both of Atlantic City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in the Atlantic common pleas; the judgment being founded upon the verdict of a jury.

A rule to show cause was granted by the judge, the point being that the verdict was excessive, and he dismissed the rule. We now have the case on appeal of the defendant.

The situation was this: The plaintiff was employed as a waitress at a restaurant on St. James place, Atlantic City, and had been employed at the same restaurant for two years. On July 11, 1927, at 10:30 a. m., when she went to work, she discovered that illuminating gas was escaping in the street in front of her place of employment. She entered the restaurant, and about 1:30 p. m. she was taken sick and vomited. She went home and returned to the restaurant about 4 o'clock. The street was still filled with the fumes of illuminating gas, and she worked until 7 p. m., when she was compelled to go home because of headache and vomiting. The foregoing matters of fact appearing at the trial seem not to be in dispute. We believe that the evidence justified the inference that the escaping gas entered the restaurant and was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's sickness.

The plaintiff's claim was that, as a result of the inhalation of the monoxide gas, she was injured and suffered for a long time, and still suffered at the time of the trial, and this suit was brought to recover the consequent damages.

It is alleged that the court erred in the admission of testimony. The question complained of is as follows:

"Now, Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff had a dormant disease like tuberculosis or weak heart, what effect would the inhalation of monoxide have on that condition?"

The witness was the plaintiff's doctor, and was admittedly an expert, and the question was proper, in view of some evidence of the development of a tubercular condition and a weak heart.

Other testimony objected to was stricken out, and, if erroneous, in the circumstances constituted no reason for reversal.

The motions to nonsuit and to direct a verdict were properly denied. The testimony tended to show that the street was full of gas; that it came from a pipe in the street over which the defendant had control; that at 10 o'clock in the morning the company was notified of the dangerous condition that existed at that point; that the gas company failed to pay any attention to the complaint until it was notified the second time, and that was after the plaintiff and other nearby persons had been affected or overcome by the gas; that some time in the evening the company sent a number of its employees to investigate, and they found a leak in the pipe and stopped the flow of gas; that the next day the employees of the defendant returned and removed a rusty pipe which had rusted and had holes in it.

It is alleged that the court erred in charging the jury as follows:

"Gas being an extraordinarily dangerous element, an extraordinarily high degree of care and skill is exacted, and the rule of ordinary care with respect to its transmission is adjusted, in view of its known dangers and probable entailment, by a standard of care proportionate to the probable dangers."

The complaint respecting this phase of the charge is the assumption by the judge that "gas is an extraordinarily dangerous element." We think the assumption was correct. It is certainly, in some circumstances and under certain conditions, an extraordinarily dangerous...

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7 cases
  • Rodrigues v. Elizabethtown Gas Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • February 17, 1969
    ...by the inhalation of natural gas. As noted above, plaintiff stipulated that the gas was nonpoisonous. Cf. Anderson v. Atlantic City Gas Co., 7 N.J.Misc. 297, 145 A. 238 (Sup.Ct.1929) (poisonous monoxide gas). Adams testified that the gas was odorized. We take judicial notice of the fact tha......
  • Pevesdorf v. Union Electric Light & Power Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1933
    ... ...           Appeal ... from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. James F ... Green , Judge ...           ... Reversed and ... must be rejected. Sullivan v. Ry., 308 Mo. 66; ... Anderson v. Asphalt Distributing Co., 55 S.W.2d 693; ... Williams v. Ry., 257 Mo. 112; Buesching v. Gas ... ...
  • Andreoli v. Natural Gas Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • October 13, 1959
    ...and defendants' negligence only a condition? Gas has been recognized as an inherently dangerous substance. Anderson v. Atlantic City, 7 N.J.Misc. 297, 298, 145 A. 238 (Sup.Ct.1929). In Seward, an exploding propone gas case, our Supreme Court said that the test of negligence is what an ordin......
  • Araujo v. New Jersey Natural Gas Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • June 21, 1960
    ...129, 81 A. 434 (Sup.Ct.1911); De Feo v. Peoples Gas Co., 6 N.J.Misc. 790, 142 A. 756 (Sup.Ct.1928); Anderson v. Atlantic City Gas Co., 7 N.J.Misc. 297, 300, 145 A. 238 (Sup.Ct.1929). In Fullerton v. Glens Falls Gas & Electric Light Co., 157 App.Div. 191, 141 N.Y.S. 838 (App.Div.1913), it wa......
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