Anderson v. Baptist Medical Center

• Decision Date: 16 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 25237.,25237.
• Citation: 343 S.C. 487,541 S.E.2d 526
• Parties: Catherine ANDERSON, Respondent/Petitioner, v. BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER and Palmetto Hospital Trust Fund, Petitioners/Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

343 S.C. 487

541 S.E.2d 526

Catherine ANDERSON, Respondent/Petitioner, v. BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER and Palmetto Hospital Trust Fund, Petitioners/Respondents.

No. 25237.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 15, 2000.

Decided January 16, 2001.

Vernon F. Dunbar, Turner Padget, Graham & Laney, Columbia, for petitioners/respondents.

Frank A. Barton, West Columbia, for respondent/petitioner.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

BURNETT, Justice.

This case involves cross-appeals from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding an order of the Workers' Compensation Commission. We affirm.

FACTS

The instant case concerns a September 1, 1995 fall at Baptist Medical Center (BMC)¹ where Respondent/Petitioner Catherine Anderson (Anderson) was employed. The case is factually complicated by Anderson's involvement in two previous accidents: a 1988 on-the-job injury and a 1993 automobile accident.

In 1988, while working in a clerical position at Providence Hospital, Anderson injured her lower back and legs. She was treated conservatively by Dr. James Bethea, the carrier-approved orthopedic surgeon, for four years. Anderson left Providence Hospital and took a similar position with BMC in December of 1989. During this time period, Anderson received counseling and began taking anti-depressants. After four years of continued back pain, Anderson eventually sought treatment from Dr. Gal Margalit, who referred her to Dr. John Williams, a neurosurgeon in Augusta, Georgia. In July of 1992, Dr. Williams performed surgery on Anderson for a herniated disk.

In 1993, Anderson was involved in a serious, non-work-related automobile accident in which she injured her neck, head, and teeth, and aggravated prior back, shoulder, and knee injuries. Dr. Margalit referred Anderson to Dr. Robert Peele, who performed surgery on June 10, 1995 on Anderson's left knee related to the automobile accident. Anderson also began seeing Dr. Sale Estefano, a psychiatrist, after her automobile accident. Dr. Estefano diagnosed Anderson with post-traumatic stress disorder with severe depression, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and adjustment reaction with depressed mood.

After a hearing on June 15, 1995, Anderson was awarded workers' compensation benefits for the 1988 accident at Providence Hospital with a 42% impairment to her back. At the time of this hearing, she was out of work due to the recent knee surgery related to her automobile accident. However, immediately prior to the surgery, she had been working approximately thirty hours per week. Her claim for psychological injuries was not addressed by the hearing commissioner, and an appeal was not perfected.

After Anderson recovered from her knee surgery, she resumed her work schedule of approximately thirty hours per week. On September 1, 1995, less than three months after her knee surgery and workers' compensation hearing, Anderson fell at work, precipitating the instant case. Anderson claimed injury to her "left knee, right knee, left arm and shoulder, right hand and arm, back, neck, psychological injury, and all other areas of the body directly/indirectly effected [sic]." BMC admitted injury to Anderson's left knee only. The Hearing Commissioner found Anderson sustained an injury by accident to her left knee only and "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an aggravation of her pre-existing right knee, back, and right and left arm injuries." The Commissioner also found Anderson "failed to prove that she sustained a mental injury or an aggravation of a pre-existing mental injury/condition as a result of her admitted accidental injury." Furthermore, the Commissioner rejected Anderson's argument that fringe benefits should be included in the average weekly wage calculation. The Full Commission affirmed and adopted the Hearing Commissioner's order in its entirety. The Circuit Court also affirmed. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues except Anderson's claim of psychological injury, which it reversed and remanded. Anderson v. Baptist Medical Center and Palmetto Hospital Trust Fund, Op. No. 99-UP-335 (S.C.Ct.App. filed June 1, 1999). The parties filed cross-appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the Commission's finding Anderson did not aggravate her pre-existing psychological condition when she fell?

II. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding no statement of maximum medical improvement was necessary regarding Anderson's left shoulder and back?

III. Should fringe benefits be included in calculating average weekly wage?

DISCUSSION

I. Psychological Injury

BMC argues the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission's finding Anderson did not aggravate her pre-existing psychological condition as a result of the September 1, 1995 fall. We disagree.

The findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 320 S.C. 515, 466 S.E.2d 357 (1996). Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached. Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture, 317 S.C. 306, 454 S.E.2d 320 (1995). Where there is a conflict in the evidence, either by different witnesses or in the testimony of the same witness, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive. Glover v. Columbia Hospital of Richland County, 236 S.C. 410, 114 S.E.2d 565 (1960).

Mental injuries are compensable if they are induced either by physical injury or by unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment. Getsinger v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 335 S.C. 77, 81, 515 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ct.App. 1999) (citing Kennedy v. Williamsburg County, 242 S.C. 477, 131 S.E.2d 512 (1963)

and Stokes v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 50, 410 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1991)). The right of a claimant to compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition arises only where there is a dormant condition which has produced no disability but which becomes disabling by reason of the aggravating injury. Hines v. Pacific Mills, 214 S.C. 125, 51 S.E.2d 383 (1949). Aggravation of pre-existing psychiatric problems is compensable if that aggravation is caused by a work-related physical injury. Toler v. Black & Decker, 134 N.C.App. 695, 518 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1999); see Adams v. Texfi Industries, 320 S.C. 213, 217, 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (decisions of North Carolina courts interpreting that state's workers' compensation statute are entitled to weight because the South Carolina statute was fashioned after North Carolina's).

At the hearing on BMC's stop payment motion, Anderson testified her depression had worsened since her fall at BMC and her dosage of Prozac had been doubled. Anderson's husband corroborated her testimony. Anderson's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Sale Estefano, stated in a letter dated May 2, 1996 that he was treating Anderson for her fall of September 1, 1995, which "aggravated her pre-existing psychiatric diagnosis." These contentions are, if not supported, at least not contradicted by the notes of Dr. Robert Peele, the carrier-approved treating physician. Dr. Peele noted on September 25, 1995 Anderson "will see Dr. Estefano for depression. Certainly another factor here." On November 6, 1995, Dr. Peele stated that Anderson could return to work from his perspective, but since Dr. Estefano had her out of work for psychological problems, "that will be Dr. Estefano's call." On December 26, 1995, Dr. Peele noted Anderson had a "difficult combination of problems orthopaedically and psychologically." The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the Commission's finding Anderson's psychological condition was not aggravated by her September 1, 1995 fall. Although Anderson was receiving treatment for depression prior to this accident, the only substantial evidence in the record clearly shows her condition was aggravated by the work-related fall.

II. Maximum Medical Improvement

Anderson argues the Court of Appeals erred in holding no statement of maximum medical improvement (MMI) was necessary with regard to injuries to Anderson's left shoulder and back.² We disagree.

Barbara Griffin, BMC's workers' compensation nurse, testified that Dr. Peele was authorized to treat Anderson's left shoulder, knee, and back as a consequence of the September 1, 1995 fall. However, BMC only admitted injury to Anderson's left knee. Dr. Peele's letter attached to BMC's stop payment application certified he believed Anderson had "most probably reached maximum medical improvement relative to her left knee" and gave her an 11% impairment rating to her left lower extremity. He made no mention of Anderson's left shoulder or back.

Anderson argues the Commission erred in determining she reached MMI with regard to injuries to her left shoulder and back. However, the Commission did not find Anderson reached MMI as to those injuries. Rather, it found Anderson "sustained an accidental injury only to her left knee" and "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an aggravation of her pre-existing right knee, back, and right and left arm injuries."

The findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 320 S.C. 515, 466 S.E.2d 357 (1996). The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Commission and it is not the task of this Court to weigh the evidence as found by the Commission. Sharpe v. Case Produce, Inc., 336 S.C. 154, 160, 519 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1999).

The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed because substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision in this case.

III. Average Weekly Wage Calculation

Anderson argues the $95.02...