Anderson v. Barkley
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00198,Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00199 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | BRENDA ANDERSON, Administratrix of the Estate of Kimberly Anderson, Plaintiff, v. NATHANIEL BARKLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; THE WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, an agency of the State of West Virginia; JAMES E. JAMISON, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; DEVIN M. BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; SGT. ROBERTA M. EVANS, individually and in her official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; SGT. MARK A. GOODMAN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; ADMINISTRATOR DEBRA MINNIX, individually and in her official capacity as administrator of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and JOHN DOE, unknown person or persons, individually and in their official capacity as correctional officers of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Defendants. KARA FALKNER, Plaintiff, v. NATHANIEL BARKLEY, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; THE WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, an agency of the State of West Virginia; JAMES E. JAMISON, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; DEVIN M. BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; SGT. ROBERTA M. EVANS, individually and in her official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; SGT. MARK A. GOODMAN, individually and in his official capacity as a correctional officer of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; ADMINISTRATOR DEBRA MINNIX, individually and in her official capacity as administrator of The West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation; and JOHN DOE, unknown person or persons, individually and in their official capacity as correctional officers of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Defendants. |
Pending are defendant Devin M. Brown's motions to dismiss filed in the related above-styled cases on January 31, 2020 (Mot. to Dismiss, Anderson v. Barkley, No. 2:19-cv-00198, ECF No. 47; Mot. to Dismiss, Falkner v. Barkley, No. 2:19-cv-00199, ECF No. 53).
The original plaintiffs, Kimberly Anderson1 and Kara Falkner, initiated separate civil actions in Kanawha County circuit court against defendants the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("WVDCR"), Nathaniel Barkley, in his individual capacity and official capacity as a WVDCR correctional officer, and other, unnamed WVDCR correctional officers, individually and in their official capacities. See Anderson, ECF No. 1 at 2; Falkner, ECF No. 1 at 2. Both actions were removed to this court on March 21, 2019. See Anderson, ECF No. 1; Falkner, ECF No. 1
Anderson and Falkner both filed amended complaints on November 5, 2019, adding as defendants five additional WVDCRofficers, including Devin M. Brown and James E. Jamison, in both their individual capacity and in their official capacity as WVDCR correctional officers.2 See Anderson, No. 2:19-cv-00198, ECF No. 47 (hereinafter, "AAC") ¶¶ 5-9; Falkner No. 2:19-cv-00199, ECF No. 53 (hereinafter, "FAC") ¶¶ 5-9.
In their amended complaints, the plaintiffs allege the following. Anderson and Falkner were female inmates residing at Tygart Valley Regional Jail ("Tygart Valley") in Randolph County, West Virginia. See AAC ¶ 2; FAC ¶ 2. Since it opened in 2005, there has existed at Tygart Valley a "continuing practice and pattern of sexual harassment, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation visited upon female residents at the hands of correctional staff and deliberate indifference thereto." AAC ¶ 16; accord FAC ¶ 16. Defendant Barkley, in particular, had a pattern of "act[ing] inappropriately with the female inmates at [Tygart Valley], including committing sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, and other illegal, threatening, or oppressive behavior." AAC ¶ 19; FAC ¶ 19. Both Anderson and Falkner allege that Barkley "sexually assaulted [them], sexually harassed [them], sexually abused[them], threatened [them] and oppressed [them] under threat of retaliation" on multiple occasions. AAC ¶ 25; FAC ¶ 25; see AAC ¶¶ 26-27.
Anderson and Falkner allege that other WVDCR officers were aware of Barkley's conduct. For instance, Barkley had previously been reprimanded by his supervisors for engaging in this kind of conduct with female inmates. See AAC ¶ 22; FAC ¶ 22. And, Barkley had been removed from supervising female inmates in certain areas of Tygart Valley because of this conduct, but he eventually returned to working there. See AAC ¶¶ 23-24; FAC ¶¶ 23-24. Further, in some instances, Barkley engaged in this conduct "openly in front of other officers," including defendant Brown. AAC ¶ 20; accord FAC ¶ 20.
On April 1, 2017, Defendants Brown and Jamison were "sitting at the desk in the booking area and talking with . . . Barkley," when Barkley ordered Anderson and Falkner to enter a laundry storage room with him. AAC ¶ 31; accord FAC ¶ 29; see AAC ¶ 28; FAC ¶ 26. The laundry storage room did not have surveillance cameras. See AAC ¶¶ 28-29; FAC ¶¶ 26-27. In the laundry storage room, Barkley "cornered [Anderson] and placed her hand on his crotch area on the outside of his pants," AAC ¶ 30; accord FAC ¶ 28, while Falkner "was made to watch" FAC ¶ 28. Barkley then told Anderson and Falkner "to kiss andperform sexual acts on each other." AAC ¶ 30; accord FAC ¶ 28. Barkley then "put his hand down [Anderson]'s pants and inserted his finger into her vagina." AAC ¶ 30.
Brown and Jamison both "observed . . . Barkley remain in the laundry storage room with the female inmates for approximately 27 seconds." AAC ¶ 32; accord FAC ¶ 30. After 27 seconds, "Jamison called out for . . . Barkley to return to the booking desk." AAC ¶ 32; accord FAC ¶ 30. After he had left the laundry storage room, Barkley tried to re-enter while Anderson and Falkner were still in the room, but Jamison started a conversation with him to prevent him from doing so. See AAC ¶ 33; FAC ¶ 31.
Anderson and Falkner allege Brown "knew or should have known" that Barkley should not be alone in a room with female inmates and that doing so was a violation of the WVDCR code of conduct and other policies. AAC ¶¶ 35-36; accord FAC ¶¶ 34-35. They allege Brown knew or should have known that Barkley "was committing inappropriate conduct, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, and rape," and that he had an affirmative duty to report Barkley's violation in writing to his supervisors. AAC ¶¶ 37-38; accord FAC ¶¶ 36-37. Despite his knowledge, Anderson and Falkner allege that Brown "knowingly anddeliberately ignored the situation and failed to report . . . Barkley to [his] supervisors." See AAC ¶ 38; accord FAC ¶ 37.
Based on these allegations, the amended complaints assert claims against Brown for: (1) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;3 (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia constitution; (3) battery; (4) assault; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) civil conspiracy. See AAC ¶¶ 52-71; FAC ¶¶ 49-68. Both amended complaints seek compensatory and punitive damages, see AAC at 15; FAC at 14, but only up to the amount of "coverage afforded by applicable liability insurance policies," AAC ¶ 1; accord FAC ¶ 1.
Brown filed Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the complaints as to him.4 See Anderson, ECF No. 80;Falkner, ECF No. 84. The motions have been fully briefed and are ready for disposition.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleader provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) correspondingly permits a defendant to challenge a complaint when it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
Specific facts are not necessary in a pleading, "but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The pleading "must give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572). However, the court is not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. The motion should only be granted if, "after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the...
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