Anderson v. Baughman

• Decision Date: 13 July 1859
• Citation: Anderson v. Baughman, 7 Mich. 69 (Mich. 1859)
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Ebenezer Anderson and others v. John C. Baughman and others

7 Mich. 69

Ebenezer Anderson and others v. John C. Baughman and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 13, 1859

Heard July 6, 1859[Syllabus Material][Syllabus Material]

Appeal in chancery from Wayne circuit.

The bill alleges that, on November 5th, 1855, John C. Baughman and John E. King, as principals, and Bela Hubbard, as surety, gave to James L. Lyell a bond in the penal sum of $ 20,000, conditioned for the payment of $ 10,000 in one year from the date thereof; that, in order to secure the payment of said bond, Baughman and King gave to Lyell a mortgage on the premises described as all that piece or parcel of land situate in Springwells, Wayne county, Michigan, known as lot four (but which is described, by mistake or inadvertence, in said mortgage, as being lot four in block one) of the La Fontaine farm, so called, lying south of the River road and fronting on Detroit river, being then used and occupied, with the steam saw-mill thereon, by the parties of the first part to said mortgage; that said mortgage was duly acknowledged, and properly recorded, November 7th, 1855; and that, on September 28th, 1857, Lyell assigned the same to complainants; that, at the time of the execution of said mortgage, it was agreed between the parties thereto that it should be given upon, and embrace said lot four; that said lot or block four was then, and is still, occupied by said steam saw-mill, and the parties at the time believed the mortgage to cover and embrace the said lot or block four; that there is no such lot as lot four of block one of said La Fontaine farm, south of said River road, and fronting said Detroit river; that part of said farm was platted and divided into four lots or blocks, numbered one, two, three and four, of which number four was the one intended to be covered by the mortgage; and that these lots or blocks were never subdivided.

The bill further states, that Bela Hubbard, to whom the premises were subsequently conveyed, gave to Thomas Walker, as president of the bank of Utica, a mortgage, May 13th, 1856, on said lot or block four, together with lots or blocks one and three; but alleges that said Walker and said bank, their officers and agents, had notice before and at the time of the giving of the last mentioned mortgage, of the existence of the Lyell mortgage.

And the bill prays for a correction of the said mistake, and the sale of the premises to satisfy the amount of complainants' mortgage.

Hubbard answered, admitting the agreement to give a mortgage on said lot or block four as alleged in the bill.

Walker and the bank of Utica also answered, denying all knowledge of what was the agreement with respect to the giving of the mortgage, and denying expressly any notice of the existence of the Lyell mortgage at the time the mortgage was given to Walker, as president of the bank.

Replications were filed to these answers, and the cause heard on pleadings and proofs.No testimony was introduced to show any agreement as to what land should be described in the mortgage; but some was taken which was claimed to be sufficient to charge Walker with notice of the Lyell mortgage at the time the one to him, as president of the bank, was executed.The testimony, with respect to the subdivisions of the La Fontaine farm, is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The circuit court ordered decree for complainants, in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and Walker and the bank of Utica appealed.

Decree of the court affirmed, with costs.

A. D. Fraser, R. McClelland, and S. T. Douglass, for complainants:

Baughman & King's mortgage to Lyell was a valid conveyance inter parties of the premises claimed.

Reading the whole mortgage (2 Pars. on Cont., 13) in the light of the facts established by the extrinsic evidence admissible for the purpose of explaining it (I bid., 61, 69, 73, 74), it clearly appears that these premises, and no others (I bid., 15), were intended to be conveyed; and that, by a very natural mistake, they are erroneously described as being "in block No. 1," when there is no such subdivided block on the La Fontaine farm.And the general rule is, that, "in construing deeds, effect will be given to every part of the description, if practicable; but if the thing intended to be granted appears clearly and satisfactorily from any part of the description, and other circumstances of the description are mentioned which are not applicable to that thing, the grant will not be defeated, but those circumstances will be rejected as mistaken."Per Sutherland J. in Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. 717, approved byBell J. in Emerson v. White, 9 Fos. 499;4 Pars. on Cont., 26, 62, and note v;4 Greenl. Cr. Dig., 246, 247, and note;Broome'sLeg. Max., 403, 409.

From the numerous cases which affirm and illustrate this principle, we select the following, as most analogous to the present: 4 Mass. 196, 205;7 Johns. 217;18 Johns. 81;19 Johns 449;6 Cow. 282;21 Barb. 406, 409;10 Cush. 242, 246;10 Ohio 313, 315, 316;2 Cush. 393;6 Hill 453, 456, 457;6 Ind. 63;12 Wheat. 570;4 Wis. 106;16 Johns. 178.

The mortgage being a valid conveyance of the premises inter parties, the registry of it was notice to all the world.If the mistake in our mortgage had been one which rendered it wholly inoperative to convey the premises until reformed by a decree in chancery, the case might have been different; although even then we might have claimed that sufficient appeared upon its face to put appellants upon inquiry, and that they were therefore chargeable with notice of our equities.But no decree reforming our mortgage was necessary, because the intention of the parties is ascertainable by mere construction of the instrument.

Walker & Russell, and C. I. Walker, for defendants:

The Lyell mortgage is so vague and uncertain in the description, that it is impossible to arrive at the true intention of the parties, or to define the lands thereby attempted to be conveyed--and no property passed: Greenl.Cruise, Title 32, Deed, chap. 20, § 24, and note;Boardman v. Reed, 6 Peters 345;Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass. 204.

We admit that if one description point out with sufficient certainty the premises to be conveyed, an additional false or mistaken description does not vitiate: Proctor v. Pool, 4 Dev. 370;Mayo v. Blount, 1 Ired. 283;Jackson v. Sprague, 1 PaineC. C., 496;Seaman v. Hogeboom, 21 Barb. 404.

But let the court here place itself "in the situation of the party at the time of its execution, with the knowledge of the surrounding circumstances," and ascertain, if it can, from the language of the mortgage thus illustrated, the intention of the grantors.

It is in proof that there is no such lot as lot number four in block number one, of the La Fontaine farm--that there is a false description, and it is to be stricken out.The description left may then as well refer to the whole inclosure as to the single block on which the mill is situated."The steam mill" is not used as a phrase of limitation, but of description rather.If there is any phrase of limitation, it is the occupation, and this extended to the four lots.

We say that there is nothing to show that the mortgage was to cover block four, and only block four; and a description that is as well applicable to two pieces of land as to one, is too uncertain to pass any thing.

Christiancy, J. Manning and Campbell, JJ. concurred.Martin, Ch. J. did not sit in this case.

OPINION

Christiancy J.:

The first, and, as we think, the only question in this case, is whether the description of the premises in the mortgage from Baughman & King to Lyell, when considered in connection with the plats and extrinsic evidence of facts upon the ground, and referred to in the mortgage, is sufficient to identify lot number 4, on that part of the La...