Anderson v. Bourbeuse View, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 51137,51137
• Citation: 726 S.W.2d 873
• Parties: Elmer L. ANDERSON and Sydne K. Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOURBEUSE VIEW, INC. and Fuqua Homes, Inc., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 873

726 S.W.2d 873

Elmer L. ANDERSON and Sydne K. Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOURBEUSE VIEW, INC. and Fuqua Homes, Inc., Defendant-Respondent.

No. 51137.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division One.

March 24, 1987.

David C. Godfrey, Clayton, for plaintiffs-appellants.

George A. Dorsey, Lee Gary Kline, Clayton, for defendant-respondent.

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Elmer L. and Sydne K. Anderson, husband and wife, plaintiff-appellants, filed this action in two Counts, Count I against Bourbeuse View, Inc., doing business as New Concept Homes ("New Concept") for breach of contract and Count II against defendant-respondent, Fuqua Homes, Inc. ("Fuqua") for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. The case was tried to a jury, but at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence the trial court sustained a motion for directed verdict. ¹ The Andersons have appealed this ruling.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

New Concept, a retail dealer of mobile homes in Times Beach, Missouri, maintained a small inventory of mobile homes on its sales lot. To acquire this inventory New Concept arranged with General Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC") to provide the necessary financing to pay the various manufacturers for the mobile homes. In return for the funds GECC lent New Concept, GECC maintained a security interest in the mobile homes financed by retaining the manufacturer's certificate of origin. Included in this arrangement was a stipulation that the manufacturer would repurchase the financed mobile homes from the dealer if the dealer defaulted in its agreement with GECC.

Although the formal contracts are not before us as exhibits, from the transcript we are able to make the following observations concerning GECC's and New Concept's business relationship.

In September of 1981, New Concept arranged with GECC to purchase a Fuqua Model 961 mobile home from Fuqua. GECC approved the purchase and paid Fuqua for the mobile home. Fuqua delivered the mobile home to New Concept's sales lot. During this period GECC held the manufacturer's certificate of origin on this particular mobile home as a security interest until New Concept paid GECC for the mobile home. However, in September of 1982 New Concept defaulted by failing to make payments on the mobile home thereby breaching its agreement with GECC.

Following New Concept's default, on September 23, 1982, GECC demanded that Fuqua repurchase the mobile home pursuant to their agreement between New Concept, GECC, and Fuqua. Sometime during the first few days of October, 1982, in accordance with agreement, an inspection was made by representatives of both GECC and Fuqua in order to ascertain any damaged or missing items on the mobile home, and a list of these items was prepared. This inspection was necessary before Fuqua could remove the mobile home from New Concept's lot. Mike Stockton, President of New Concept, signed this inspection list immediately after the inspection was completed. Although the repurchase agreement provided that the mobile home be picked-up within ten days of New Concept's default, Fuqua did not remove the mobile home from New Concept's lot until October 18, 1982.

On October 10, 1982, the Andersons and Elmer Anderson's mother, went to the retail lot of New Concept in Times Beach to look for a mobile home. The Andersons became interested in a big, yellow Fuqua Model 961 mobile home, the mobile home at issue here. It was the only Model 961 Fuqua mobile home on the lot. During the next two weeks the Andersons negotiated with Mike Stockton for the purchase of this mobile home. The Andersons were, throughout this period of time, unaware of the fact that Fuqua was repurchasing the mobile home from New Concept, and it was admitted by Mark Starkey, a salesman for Fuqua, that he had stalled in repossessing the mobile home from New Concept because he knew they had a deal pending for the Andersons to purchase the mobile home.

In the meantime Mr. Anderson had attempted to obtain a loan for the purchase of the mobile home and was told that the bank required a contract to apply for a loan. On October 22, 1982, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Stockton had a telephone conversation during which Mr. Anderson informed Mr. Stockton of this fact and an appointment was made to sign the papers at 8:00 a.m. the following day at Stockton's real estate office in Union, Missouri. The contract for the sale of the mobile home was prepared and signed on October 23, 1982.

After signing the contract the Andersons went back to work until noon and then took the contract to Carondelet Savings & Loan in Arnold, Missouri, to apply for a loan. They paid Carondelet $167.50 for the appraisal and a credit report, which they never recovered.

Early the next week Mr. Stockton was notified by Fuqua that the mobile home had been removed from his lot at Times Beach. His dealership had been cancelled because of his financial problems. Fuqua did not know of the contract entered into between the Andersons and Stockton on October 23, 1982. When Stockton could not deliver the mobile home to the Andersons this law suit was instituted by the Andersons against Fuqua.

In order to establish a claim for tortious interference with contract under Missouri law plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) that a contract was in existence; (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the contract; (3) that the defendant induced or caused the breach of the contract; (4) that the defendant's acts were without legal justification; and (5) that plaintiff was thereby damaged. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Williamson, 675 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Mo.App.1984); Fischer, Etc. v. Forrest T. Jones and Co., 586 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo.App.1978). Fuqua contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a cause of action because there was a failure of proof with respect to the fourth element, lack of justification. Since we agree it is unnecessary to consider whether there was a similar failure with respect to any other element of the cause of action.

In determining whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the appellate court must consider the evidence from the viewpoint most favorable to the plaintiff and give him the benefit of every reasonable inference which the evidence tended to support. Jurcich v. General Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Mo.App.1976). Although some jurisdictions take the position that a claim of absence of justification is in the nature of an affirmative defense, under Missouri law plaintiff has the burden of producing substantial evidence in support of this element of the cause of action. No fact essential to submissibility may be inferred in the absence of a substantial evidentiary basis. Tri-Continental Leasing Co. v. Neidhardt, 540 S.W.2d 210, 211 [1, 3] (Mo.App.1976). In fact, Tri-Continental makes it clear that a defendant cannot be held liable under this tort based upon speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. Thus, the question at issue becomes whether appellants carried their burden of proof regarding absence of justification.

Appellants allege that Fuqua's act of removing the mobile home from the New Concept lot was "intentional and without justification." Appellants present two arguments which they contend support their claim that they have made a submissible case of tortious interference of contract.

The backbone of appellants' first argument is that Fuqua had already breached its agreement with GECC regarding repurchase by waiting longer than ten days to remove the mobile home from New Concept's...