Anderson v. Carder
Decision Date | 20 July 1944 |
Docket Number | 36200. |
Citation | 159 Kan. 1,150 P.2d 754 |
Parties | ANDERSON v. CARDER (BOWLES, Administrator of Office of Price Administration, Intervener). |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Sept. 2, 1944.
Syllabus by the Court.
Price Administrator is empowered to intervene in suit to set aside and enjoin enforcement of a judgment rendered in an inferior court and arising out of an alleged violation of Emergency Price Control Act. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205 (d) (e), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925 (d) (e).
A litigant who consented to an order of intervention could not thereafter complain concerning such order.
Ordinarily one cannot appeal from a judgment unless he has a particular interest therein and is aggrieved thereby, and such interest must ordinarily be immediate and pecuniary.
Appeals are not allowed for purpose of settling questions, however interesting or important to public generally, but only to correct errors injuriously affecting appellant.
A payment of costs by a defeated litigant discloses acquiescence in the judgment and cuts off right of appellate review in so far as such litigant is concerned.
Where defendant, in suit to set aside judgment he had previously obtained against plaintiff by reason of plaintiff's alleged violation of Emergency Price Control Act, acquiesced in judgment setting aside previous judgment, Price Administrator, as an intervener, could not appeal for purpose of obtaining rulings on abstract questions of law. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205 (d) (e), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925 (d) (e).
The record in an injunction suit instituted in the district court to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of a judgment rendered against plaintiff in the court of Topeka for violating Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, §§ 901, 925(e) examined, and held:
1. The voluntary payment of the judgment for costs by defendant in full satisfaction of the judgment rendered against him in the district court constitutes acquiescence in the judgment by the party aggrieved.
2. Such acquiescence leaves no issues to be litigated by the principal parties to the action and would preclude an appeal by the aggrieved defendant if he were appealing.
3. After such acquiescence in the judgment by the party aggrieved, this court will not entertain an appeal taken only by the intervenor, the administrator of the price control act, for the purpose of obtaining rulings on abstract questions of law.
Appeal from District Court, Shawnee County Division No. 2; Paul H Heinz, Judge.
Suit by C. W. Anderson against J. F. Carder to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of a judgment previously obtained by defendant against plaintiff pursuant to Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205 (e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e). Chester Bowles, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, intervened. Judgment was for the plaintiff defendant paid the costs assessed, and intervener appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
David London, of Washington, D. C., and James B. Nash, of Wichita (Thomas I. Emerson, Fleming James, Jr., and Edward H. Hatton all of Washington, D. C., and Ellis C. Clark, of Wichita, on the brief), for appellant.
Edward Rooney, of Topeka (Jacob A. Dickinson, of Topeka, on the brief), for appellee C. W. Anderson.
This was an injunction suit in the district court to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of a judgment defendant had obtained against the plaintiff in the court of Topeka pursuant to Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 901, 925(e). Plaintiff prevailed. The costs of the action were assessed against the defendant and he paid the judgment for costs. The intervenor, administrator of the office of price administration, alone appeals. The intervenor served notice of appeal upon the plaintiff and defendant but defendant is not participating in the appeal. Before reaching the merits of the case we are confronted with a motion of plaintiff, appellee, to dismiss the intervenor's appeal. The nature of the action and defense, as well as the motion filed by the intervenor, is disclosed by a summary of the pleadings. The amended petition, in substance, alleged:
The residence of plaintiff and defendant was Topeka; the defendant in the instant case, J. F. Carder, had filed a suit in the court of Topeka entitled, "J. F. Carder vs C. W. Anderson"; his bill of particulars in that action alleged:
The amended petition in the instant action further alleged:
Plaintiff, appellee, prayed to have the judgment of the court of Topeka declared a nullity and to have its enforcement enjoined. The defendant's answer admitted he had obtained the above described judgment but he denied it was void or illegal and affirmatively alleged the court of Topeka had jurisdiction to render it. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. It is not contended this motion did not raise every legal issue in the case and indeed it did. The motion was overruled. Approximately three weeks later but before judgment was formally entered the court, upon application of appellant to intervene and with consent of the parties, gave appellant leave to intervene. The intervenor filed the following motion:
a valid judgment, upon which execution for its satisfaction should issue.
The motion was overruled. The district court declared the judgment of the court of Topeka null and void, set it aside, enjoined the defendant from attempting to collect it and rendered judgment against the defendant for the costs of the action. The defendant promptly paid the judgment. Thereafter the intervenor served notice of appeal from the order overruling his motion and from the judgment rendered.
Appellee has formally moved to dismiss the appeal in this court for the following reasons:
Appellant was not a proper intervenor in the injunction suit; he has no personal interest in the judgment rendered; he is not prejudiced or aggrieved thereby; the defendant, the real party in interest, is not appealing and the intervenor is not a proper party appellant.
Appellant contends: As administrator of the price control act he is authorized to intervene under the provisions of the act; the parties consented to his intervention; he has an interest in the question of the jurisdiction of the court of Topeka over the subject matter and in the enforcement of the price...
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