Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti

• Decision Date: 01 August 2001
• Docket Number: PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,No. 99-2409,99-2409
• Citation: 266 F.3d 487
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2001) RUSSELL T. ANDERSON,, v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF YPSILANTI, Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 487

266 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2001)

RUSSELL T. ANDERSON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF YPSILANTI, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

No. 99-2409

Argued: August 1, 2001

Decided and Filed September 21, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 94-70047--Paul V. Gadola, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Gerard Mantese, Mantese, Miller & Shea, Troy, Michigan, for Appellant.

James E. Tamm, Julie McCann-O'Connor, O'connor, Paul T. O'Neill, O'Connor, DeGRAZIA & Tamm, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: Clay, Gilman, and Wallace, Circuit Judges.^*

OPINION

Ronald Lee Gilman, Circuit Judge.

Russell T. Anderson filed suit in a Michigan state court, challenging the Charter Township of Ypsilanti's denial of his application for rezoning. Anderson's lawsuit, in which both federal and state causes of action were alleged, was removed to the appropriate federal district court by the Township. Pursuant to the Pullman abstention doctrine, the district court remanded the state claims back to the Michigan state court, while retaining jurisdiction over and placing a stay on the pending federal causes of action. After the state trial court ruled on the state claims several years later, Anderson returned to federal court, requesting that the stay be lifted and the federal claims resolved by the district court. The district court instead dismissed the federal claims, reasoning that any adjudication of the remaining claims would run afoul of the Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Anderson is the owner of three parcels of land in the Township. On one 8-acre parcel he has developed an apartment complex known as the Russell Anderson Apartments. The second plot of land, comprising 8.15 acres and lying immediately west of the developed parcel, is undeveloped and classified by the Township as a multiple-family residential parcel. Finally, the third parcel, which lies directly west of the 8.15 acre undeveloped plot, is a 15-acre plot of land which is zoned for light industrial use. It is this third parcel that is the subject of the underlying lawsuit. According to Anderson, the 15-acre lot is landlocked and therefore incapable of being developed for light industrial use.

On March 16, 1988, Anderson filed a petition with the Township, requesting that the 15-acre parcel be rezoned for multiple-family residential use. He proposed that the Russell Anderson Apartments be expanded onto both of the undeveloped parcels that are west of the current apartment complex. The petition was approved by the Township Planning Commission and the Washtenaw County Metropolitan Planning Commission. Despite these positive recommendations, however, the final decision-making body, the Township Board, rejected the proposal on October 18, 1988.

B. Procedural background

Anderson filed his initial complaint against the Township on November 15, 1988 in the Washtenaw County Circuit Court, alleging only state-law claims. After the state trial court dismissed his suit on the basis that there had been no unconstitutional taking and that the Township had not acted illegally, Anderson appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The state appellate court reversed the Washtenaw County Circuit Court, concluding that the trial court had applied an incorrect standard of review. On remand, Anderson filed an amended complaint, alleging that (1) the zoning was an uncompensated taking in violation of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10, 2 of the Michigan Constitution, (2) the zoning deprived Anderson of his right to property and to the due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (3) the Township acted illegally under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. Because the complaint as amended now contained federal causes of action, the Township timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on January 4, 1994.

Anderson promptly moved to remand the case back to the Washtenaw County Circuit Court, arguing that "unsettled issues of state law predominate" and that "plaintiff's state law claims are intertwined and virtually indistinguishable from the federal claims and, under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a ruling on plaintiff's federal constitutional claims by this court can be avoided by an appropriate determination of state law in the Washtenaw County Circuit Court." The district court granted Anderson's motion to remand the state-law claims back to the state court, although the district court noted that "it is unclear which portions of the state constitution plaintiff seeks to have applied to his claims." Stating that an attempt to reconcile state and federal takings law would be unduly burdensome, the district court reasoned that

[i]n the instant case, the state-law claims and the federal-law claims do arise out of a common nucleus of fact. However, a plaintiff would not be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. Without having exhausted his state law remedies, plaintiff's federal claims are premature . . . If plaintiff obtains the relief he is seeking at the state court level, the need for this court to decide plaintiff's constitutional and statutory claims will be obviated.

Instead of accepting pendent jurisdiction over the state-law claims, the district court then applied the abstention doctrine set forth in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941), authorizing the remand of state-law claims to the state courts under appropriate circumstances. The district court retained jurisdiction over the federal causes of action, and placed a stay on those claims. In its remand ruling, the district court noted that the stay was intended to preserve "the defendant's right to have a federal court determine the federal issue." (emphasis added).

After the state-law claims were remanded to the Washtenaw County Circuit Court, the state court held a bench trial late in 1994, following which both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The case then remained under advisement in the state court for the next three and a half years. This caused Anderson to finally file a complaint for a "writ of superintending control" with the Michigan Court of Appeals in April of 1998, requesting that the trial court be ordered to issue a judgment and schedule a hearing on damages. One week later, the state trial court issued its decision, rejecting all of Anderson's state claims and entering judgment for the Township. This decision was appealed by Anderson to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

On June 22, 1999, Anderson filed a motion in the district court to lift the stay on the federal claims and for summary judgment in his favor. His motion not only raised the federal-takings claim and the due process claim previously stayed by the district court, but also included a charge that his due process rights were violated by the state trial court's long delay in issuing its opinion. On November 8, 1999, the district court dismissed Anderson's suit, concluding that the Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction.

Anderson appeals, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the deferred federal claims and the new due process challenge to the state court's delay. On December 1, 2000, while this appeal was pending, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the state trial court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Application of the Pullman abstention doctrine

As a threshold matter, we cannot help but note that the procedural complexities now facing us could have been entirely avoided if the district court had simply denied Anderson's motion to remand the case back to the state trial court. In its application of the Pullman abstention doctrine, the district court reasoned that Anderson's claim under the Michigan Takings Clause would obviate the need for a federal court's determination on the parallel Fifth Amendment takings claim. The Supreme Court, however, "has previously determined that abstention is not required for interpretation of parallel state constitutional provisions." Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984). Furthermore, the classic reason to apply the Pullman abstention doctrine is where the remanded state-law question is an independent and unsettled issue best decided by the state courts, see Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1974), a circumstance not present in the case before us.

The Court in Moore described the considerations that should be taken into account when deciding whether to apply this abstention doctrine:

Where there is an action pending in state court that will likely resolve the state-law questions underlying the federal claim, we have regularly ordered abstention. Similarly, when the state-law questions have concerned matters peculiarly within the province of the local courts, we have inclined toward abstention. On the other hand, where the litigation has already been long delayed, or where it has seemed unlikely that resolution of the state-law question would significantly affect the federal claim, the Court has held that abstention should not be required.

Id. at 83-84 (internal citations omitted). Had the district court taken into account the above considerations, it would almost certainly have concluded that Pullman abstention was not warranted in the present case. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 237 n.4; see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (holding that abstention, in general, should be applied only in "exceptional circumstances"). A denial of Anderson's motion to remand...