Anderson v. City of Groveland
| Decision Date | 08 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 5:15-cv-26-Oc-30PRL |
| Parties | GEOFFREY H. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GROVELAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Lake County's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 53) and Plaintiff's response (Doc. 64); the City of Groveland (the "City"), Officer John Moore, Officer Charles Russell, Officer John "Flinn" (Flynn), Officer Andy Auld, and Officer Scott Penvose's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with Prejudice (Doc. 56) and Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 64). The Court, having reviewed the motions, responses, and other relevant pleadings, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, concludes that Lake County's motion should be granted and the City and Officer Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff's second amended complaint contains the following facts which are accepted as true for the purposes of evaluating the motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, alleges that on January 22, 2011, Officers John Flinn and Andy Auld from the Groveland Police Department ("GPD") conducted a search of his residence located in Groveland, Florida. According to Plaintiff, the officers, who did not have a search warrant, told Plaintiff that he would be arrested for obstructing an officer if he did not permit the search of his residence. Plaintiff acquiesced to the search because he did not want to be arrested. The following day, January 23, 2011, GPD Officer Scott Penvose returned to Plaintiff's home and obtained Plaintiff's consent to search his residence by threatening to arrest Plaintiff for obstructing an officer if he did not permit the search.
Plaintiff subsequently moved to a new residence for individuals fifty-five and older, also located in Groveland, Florida, where he shared a residence with Joseph Jurewicz, Jr. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Jurewicz often caused disturbances resulting in officers from the GPD being repeatedly called to the residence. The GPD officers warned Plaintiff that if they were called to the residence again, they would arrest everyone on the premises, including Plaintiff.
On August 5, 2011, in response to a call from a neighboring apartment reporting a break-in, officers from the GPD, including GPD Officers John Moore and Charles Russell, broke through the window at Plaintiff's new residence, threw Plaintiff to the floor, kicked him, handcuffed him, and berated him with insults. The officers then interrogated Plaintiff for an hour. No charges were filed against Plaintiff as a result of this incident. On August 16, 2011, Plaintiff sent a "Notice of Claim" to the GPD Chief of Police.
On August 21, 2011, Plaintiff visited a home on 372 Beach Street. Plaintiff was standing on the front porch of the home when Chris Craig, another visitor, starting taunting Plaintiff. Plaintiff retrieved his bag and was leaving the premises when he was confronted by several individuals from the home who insulted him, threw a full soda can at him, and pushed him. Plaintiff walked four blocks away from the home and sat down along a curb. About twenty minutes later, Officer Penvose arrived and told Plaintiff that the GPD received a call that Plaintiff was causing a disturbance on Beach Street. Officer Penvose arrested Plaintiff and transported him to the GPD jail. While at the jail, Plaintiff experienced chest pain and was transported to the hospital. During his hospitalization, Plaintiff was shackled to the hospital bed by his feet and observed by GPD officers.
Plaintiff alleges that a first appearance was held on August 22, 2011, which he was unable to attend due to his hospitalization. According to Plaintiff, the first appearance was not rescheduled. Officer John Moore and a representative from the state attorney's office for the Fifth Judicial Circuit were present at the first appearance hearing. Plaintiff was never given an opportunity to attend a first appearance hearing.
Once Plaintiff was released from the hospital and transported to the Lake County Detention Center,1 he claims that jail personnel denied him proper medical care. He also alleges that the jail placed him in maximum security isolation and denied him use of a wheelchair. Without the wheelchair, Plaintiff was unable to move about his cell to retrieve food or take care of personal needs. Plaintiff was also denied access to his medicationsbecause the jail maintained a policy that medical treatment would not be provided to a detainee until the jail obtained the detainee's medical records. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of the treatment he received, his ongoing physiological and psychological impairments were exacerbated, and he attempted suicide on the second day of his jail stay. After two days, the jail provided Plaintiff with a walker. After ten days, Plaintiff was released from maximum security isolation and moved to the medical ward.
On September 7, 2011, the state attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit issued a notice that no information would be filed against Plaintiff because the case could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Plaintiff was released from jail on September 8, 2011. Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to walk unassisted out of the jail, and it was not until he was crawling on the floor that jail personnel provided him with a cane.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on January 16, 2015, and requested to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1). The Court conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and determined that it suffered from a number of pleading deficiencies, including, among other things, that several causes of action were frivolous or failed to state a claim and that the complaint named as defendants individuals immune from suit or entities not subject to suit. (Doc. 5). The Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint and renew his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 1, 2015, and renewed his request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docs. 8, 9). The Court granted Plaintiff's request, and Defendants were served with the amended complaint. (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff's amended complaint asserted thirteen claims against Defendants arising from the events of January 22, 2011, through September 8, 2011, including Plaintiff's August 21, 2011 arrest and his seventeen-day jail stint. (Doc. 8). Lake County, the City and Officer Defendants, and Sheriff Borders each filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Docs. 21, 22, 23). The Court dismissed all counts of Plaintiff's amended complaint except Count III, but provided Plaintiff leave to amend Counts I, II, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XIII.2 (Doc. 50). Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on December 3, 2015. (Doc. 51). Plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs against each defendant. (Doc. 51 at 60). Lake County and the City and Officer Defendants now seek to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint. (Docs. 53, 56). Sheriff Borders filed an answer and affirmative defenses on December 10, 2015, to Counts V and VII. (Doc. 52).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and evaluate all inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts, however, arenot entitled to the assumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
In recognition of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court affords Plaintiff wide latitude when construing his pleadings. Although the Court holds Plaintiff as a pro se litigant to a "a less stringent standard," Plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations or legal conclusions in the place of factual allegations to overcome a motion to dismiss. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff asserts two claims against Lake County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arguing constitutional violations on the basis of his deprivation of the right to counsel by failure to provide an initial appearance and deprivation of proper medical care during his detention in the Lake County Detention Center (Counts V, VII). (Doc. 51). By its motion to dismiss, Lake County asserts, among other things, that it does not control the day-to-day operations of the Lake County Detention Center and that Sheriff Borders is an independent constitutional officer who has absolute control over the employees of the Lake County Detention Center. (Doc. 53). Plaintiff concedes that Sheriff Borders is the appropriate defendant and consents to dismissal of Lake County as a defendant. (Doc. 64). Accordingly, Lake County's motion to dismiss is granted and Lake County is dismissed as a defendant in this case.
By his second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims against various subsets of the Officer Defendants: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Officers Flinn and Auld regarding the January 22, 2011 search of Plaintiff's residence (Count I), (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Officer Penvose regarding the January 23, 2011 search of Plaintiff's residence (Count II), (3) violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Officers Moore and Russell regarding entry of Plaintiff's...
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