Anderson v. City of Boston
Decision Date | 23 August 1978 |
Citation | 380 N.E.2d 628,376 Mass. 178 |
Parties | Richard L. ANDERSON et al. 1 v. CITY OF BOSTON et al. 2 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Harold Hestnes, Boston (John G. Fabiano, Waban, and Kenneth R. Berman, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.
Laurence H. Tribe, Cambridge (Harold J. Carroll, Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Herbert P. Gleason, Corp. Counsel, Boston, with him), for City of Boston and others.
Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, WILKINS and ABRAMS, JJ.
The plaintiffs, eleven taxable inhabitants of the city of Boston (city), seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to G.L. c. 231A, and equitable relief pursuant to G.L. c. 40, § 53, concerning the legality of certain actions contemplated by the city in support of a referendum proposal which will be presented to the people at the November, 1978, general election. The referendum proposal concerns an amendment (the classification amendment) to Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth which would authorize the Legislature to "classify real property according to its use in no more than four classes and to assess, rate and tax such property differently in the classes so established, but proportionately in the same class" and to grant reasonable exemptions. Currently, except for reasonable exemptions (Assessors of W. Springfield v. Eastern States Exposition, 326 Mass. 167, 170, 93 N.E.2d 462 (1950)), it is constitutionally impermissible for a municipality to assess various classes of real property disproportionately in relation to the properties' fair cash value. Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. See Weinstock v. Hull, 367 Mass. 66, 69, 323 N.E.2d 867, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S.Ct. 14, 46 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Opinion of the Justices, 344 Mass. 766, 181 N.E.2d 793 (1962).
The complaint was filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 23, 1978. A hearing was held on June 28, 1978, on the question of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The defendants stipulated that they would not expend certain appropriated funds. A single justice reserved and reported the case for determination by the full court on the pleadings and a statement of agreed facts.
We summarize the material facts agreed to by the parties. On May 30, 1978, the mayor submitted a proposed ordinance to the city council (council), which the council passed by a five-to-four vote on June 7, 1978. That ordinance authorized, subject to appropriation, the expenditure of city funds "for the purposes of providing educational materials and disseminating information urging the adoption by the people of a proposed amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution relating to the classification of property for purposes of taxation." 3 On May 31, 1978, the mayor submitted to the council an appropriation request for funds for the purpose of funding an "Office of Public Information on Classification." On June 7, 1978, again by a five-to-four vote, the council passed an order appropriating $975,000, to be raised by taxation (G.L. c. 59, § 23), for the expenses of the Office of Public Information on Classification. 4 The mayor approved the ordinance and the appropriation order on June 23.
The mayor has organized the Office of Public Information on Classification "for the purpose of collecting and disseminating information about the impact of 100% Valuation on the residents of the City and on the potential of the classification amendment to mitigate that impact." That office would include in its information the fact that the city urges the voters to approve the classification question. It is encouraging the formation of a group of unpaid citizen volunteers to assist in the collection and dissemination of information concerning the classification amendment. The city intends to provide office space and telephones to the volunteers to enable them "to augment the City's efforts." The city will provide printed materials at its expense for distribution to the voters. Some city employees have volunteered to serve full time on the staff of the office as part of their official duties. Others have volunteered to devote part of their time during regular city business hours aiding the operations of the office. The mayor initially requested city department heads to spend three hours each day "in this effort" in addition to their regular duties.
Other studies indicate that, "while many Boston voters understand the impact of 100% Valuation on their taxes, few were acquainted with the Classification Amendment or had any idea of its possible impact in mitigating the effects of 100% Valuation." There are persons and interests opposed to the passage of the classification amendment who will work to defeat it and who are raising funds from individuals and corporations for that purpose.
On June 30, 1978, the city paid an assessment of $112,550 to the Massachusetts Mayors' Association as its share of $500,000 which that association seeks to use for a Statewide information campaign on the classification amendment. On June 28, 1978, the city executed two contracts which were filed with the city auditor. One, with Lee-Grigsby Associates in the amount of $123,000, provides for instruction to volunteers in effective voter communication about the classification amendment. On June 29, 1978, the city made a payment of $10,000 on that contract for work already performed. The other contract, in the amount of $100,000, calls for Butcher-Forde Consulting to conduct a study of the level of public understanding on the classification issue and to design informational materials and a strategy for their distribution. No payments have been made on this contract.
Funds to meet the city's obligations to the Massachusetts Mayor's Association and to Lee-Grigsby Associates and Butcher-Forde Consulting "were transferred from the Public Facilities Department to the Administrative Services Department by the City Auditor on June 28 and 29, 1978, with the approval of the Mayor under section 3B of the City Charter (St.1909, c. 486)." The fiscal 1978 budget had no funds expressly designated for expenditures on behalf of the classification question. Because of the conclusions we reach, we need not decide whether the transfer of funds was authorized by the city charter.
The full court heard argument on July 13, 1978, and, on July 19, 1978, entered an order which is set forth in the margin. 5 That order enjoined the city from expending the funds appropriated for the Office of Public Information on Classification and from making payments pursuant to the contracts, described above, which were executed on June 28, 1978.
This opinion is in explanation of that order.
We conclude that (1) the city does not have authority to appropriate funds to be expended in support of the classification amendment, and (2) the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require that the city be authorized to appropriate funds to influence the result of the vote on the classification amendment. We consider first the city's appropriation authority, then consider the Federal constitutional question, and finally discuss the plaintiffs' requests for relief.
1. A municipality has no authority to appropriate funds for the purpose of taking action to influence the result of a referendum proposed to be submitted to the people at a State election. We reach this conclusion on the basis of the existence of broad regulatory legislation concerning the collection and expenditure of funds for election purposes.
We do not rest the result on the plaintiffs' claim that municipalities are restricted to appropriating funds solely for those purposes enumerated in G.L. c. 40, § 5. Section 5 of G.L. c. 40, St.1951, c. 798, provides that a municipality may "appropriate money for the exercise of any of its corporate powers, including the following purposes: (listing numerous purposes)." 6 Neither as a matter of statutory construction nor in practice are municipal appropriations limited to those purposes enumerated in G.L. c. 40, § 5. There are other statutory provisions explicitly authorizing the appropriation of funds. See, e. g., G.L. c. 40, § 5A ( ); § 5B (stabilization funds); § 6A ( ). Moreover, there are traditional municipal functions for which funds have been appropriated without any explicit statutory authorization beyond the general authorization to expend funds "for the exercise of any of its corporate powers." Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the Legislature has not manifested an intention after the enactment of the Home Rule Amendment in 1966 (art. 89 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, amending art. 2 of those Amendments) to limit the appropriation powers of municipalities to those purposes which are mentioned explicitly in legislation. 7 See Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 155-156, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973).
The Home Rule Amendment authorizes a municipality by ordinance or by-law to "exercise any power or function which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight" of the Home Rule Amendment, provided the municipality's ordinance or...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. Dorsey
...funds for the purpose of influencing an election on a state referendum, citing M.G.L.A. ch. 55, Sec. 22A. Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628, 633 (Mass.1978). "The Legislature may decide, as it has, that fairness in the election process is best achieved by a direction......
-
Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of Town of Dennis
...89 of the Amendments. See Beard v. Salisbury, --- Mass. ---- B, 392 N.E.2d 832 (1979); Anderson v. City of Boston, --- Mass. ---- C, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978); Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). Relying on this constitutional provision, the plaintiffs assert that the Denn......
-
American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S.
...cannot interpose the Fourteenth Amendment between itself and the state of which it is the creature, Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637-38 (1978), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 1060, 99 S.Ct. 822, 59 L.Ed.2d 26 (1979), and a......
-
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Whiffen
...will do anything inconsistent with '[f]airness and the appearance of fairness' in the electoral process. [Anderson v. Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 195, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978) ]. It does not ensure that all candidates receive the same level of public exposure. No governmental agency erected any bar......
-
Freedom of speech and information privacy: the troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you.
...out that many such "fair information practices" rules are not subject to my analysis). (15.) See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637 (Mass. (16.) See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 9......
-
Cities, Free Speech, and Confederate Statues.
...removed them). (39.) See Blank, supra note 18, at 368-70 (listing examples of states censoring city speech); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 640 (Mass. 1978) (prohibiting City from supporting tax reform referendum); TEX. Gov't Code Ann. [section] 752.053(a)(1) (West 2022) (banni......