Anderson v. City of Atlanta
| Citation | 778 F.2d 678 |
| Decision Date | 16 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-8493,84-8493 |
| Parties | Sherry J. ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
John H. Ridley, Atlanta, Ga., Robert D. Stein, Hapeville, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.
W. Roy Mays III, Jeff S. Klein, Marva Jones Brooks, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and PECK *, Senior Circuit Judge.
I. FACTS
This civil rights action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleges constitutional violations which plaintiffs contend resulted in the death of Larry Gene Anderson while he was in custody at the Atlanta Pre-trial Detention Center. Named as defendants were the individual police officers involved in the arrest of Larry Gene Anderson, R.L. Kelly, W.R. Burks, A. Bieri and M.T. Pickering. Also named as defendants were George Napper, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety; Morris Redding, the Chief of Police of the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services; J.D. Hudson, the Director of Bureau of Corrections of the City of Atlanta; and the City of Atlanta. 1
The trial of this case began on March 13, 1984. On March 19, 1984, after receiving special interrogatories from the court specifically setting out the degree of liability necessary for finding each defendant liable, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs. The jury awarded $1 nominal damages and $25,000 punitive damages against J.D. Hudson and $175,000 compensatory damages against the City of Atlanta. On May 15, 1984, the trial judge, on motion by defendants, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. He further granted a new trial if the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with his decision to grant the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This appeal followed.
In the early morning hours of January 4, 1983, while on routine patrol, Officer Kelly, of the Atlanta Police Department, observed an automobile, carrying six passengers and being driven by a white female, pull into the parking lot of a closed business. Officer Kelly observed the woman exit the car and walk around in a manner which indicated she was unsteady on her feet. He investigated and determined that the woman, Sherry Nelson, was intoxicated. He then arrested her for driving under the influence. Larry Gene Anderson, one of the passengers in the car, then approached Officer Kelly and stated that he was the person driving the vehicle. He subsequently changed his statement and maintained that he was not driving the vehicle. Based upon Anderson's statement and the fact that Officer Kelly had seen the woman driving the car, Mr. Anderson was arrested for making a false statement to a police officer. While Officer Kelly was verifying information given to him by Ms. Nelson, Elizabeth Jones, another passenger in the car, attempted to shift gears in the vehicle and gave Officer Kelly the impression she was attempting to leave. Officer Kelly then arrested Ms. Jones for driving under the influence. While Officer Kelly was filling out his paper work, Billy Moncus, another occupant of the vehicle, approached Officer Kelly in order to ask several questions regarding the arrest of his friends. As Mr. Moncus walked back to the vehicle, Officer Kelly observed the outline of what he believed to be a gun in Mr. Moncus' back pocket. Moncus was then arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. A paddy wagon was called to transport the prisoners and a female officer was summoned in order to search the female prisoners. Officer Pickering arrived with a paddy wagon and Officer Anna Bieri responded to the call for a female officer. 2
The search of the female prisoners revealed that Elizabeth Jones possessed controlled substances. During the search, it also appeared that Ms. Jones had swallowed some of the pills which were found on her person.
Once Mr. Anderson and Mr. Moncus were transferred to the paddy wagon, Officer Pickering searched Mr. Moncus and found a small amount of what he believed to be marijuana in his shirt pocket. He then observed Mr. Anderson remove a bottle of pills from his right sock and pass the bottle to Mr. Moncus. Officer Pickering then went around to open the paddy wagon and discovered that the contents of the bottle, approximately 50 red and blue capsules, had been emptied onto the floor of the van. The pills were then confiscated. The female prisoners were placed in Officer Kelly's patrol car, which was searched. Numerous pills and capsules of various kinds were found under the seat. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Moncus passed out in the rear of the paddy wagon. Mr. Anderson informed the officers that Moncus had swallowed a number of tuonols, a barbiturate. He indicated to Officer Burks that Mr. Moncus and Ms. Jones, as well as himself, had taken pills.
Mr. Moncus was transported by ambulance to Grady Memorial Hospital for treatment. Ms. Nelson and Ms. Jones were transported to the detention center at Grady Memorial Hospital to receive sobriety tests in connection with their driving under the influence charges. On the way to Grady, Ms. Jones became unconscious in the back of Officer Kelly's patrol car. Mr. Anderson was the only detainee transported to the Atlanta Pre-trial Detention Center. Upon arrival at the pre-trial detention center, Officer Pickering gave custody of Mr. Anderson to the corrections intake officer, Michael Marshall. According to Officer Marshall, Officer Pickering told him that Mr. Anderson had taken a "large quantity of pills." Officer Pickering denied making the statement as well as having any knowledge that Anderson had used drugs.
Mr. Anderson was initially processed by Officer Marshall. During the intake process, Officer Marshall allegedly completed a medical screening form on Mr. Anderson and noted on the form that he was under the influence of drugs and had taken a large quantity of pills. Officer Marshall testified that Mr. Anderson told him that he was overdosing on drugs. The shift commander, Lieutenant Irvin, was present at the time Officer Marshall repeated to her that Mr. Anderson had stated that he was overdosing on drugs. She instructed Officer Marshall to make sure that he noted on Mr. Anderson's medical screening form that he was overdosing. Lieutenant Irvin further instructed Officer Marshall to put Mr. Anderson in a single cell and keep a close watch on him. Accordingly, Anderson was placed in a single cell. Another detainee was subsequently placed in the cell along with Mr. Anderson.
Mr. John Carl Weisgerber, a detainee at the pre-trial detention center that night, indicated that he saw Mr. Anderson and that he was obviously under the influence of drugs and that he heard Mr. Anderson tell the officers that he was sick and needed to go to the hospital.
Officer Marshall testified that he spoke to Mr. Anderson at 4:30 A.M. and again at 6:00 A.M. and that both Officer Marshall and his relieving officer, Tommy Smith, stated that they made Mr. Anderson get up and come to the door of his cell at 7:00 A.M. Doctor Stivers, the Fulton County Medical Examiner, testified, however, that Mr. Anderson in all likelihood died between 4:00 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. and that he was probably in a coma for some time prior to death. Mr. Anderson was found dead in his cell at approximately 9:25 A.M.
There are two issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court properly granted the City of Atlanta's and J.D. Hudson's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and (2) Whether the trial court properly granted a new trial should this court not agree with its decision to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II. THE LEGAL ISSUES IN CONTEXT
The district court in granting defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict stated:
The court finds that there is no evidence of record to support 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 liability against either defendant, J.D. Hudson, a supervisor with no personal participation, or the municipality itself, the City of Atlanta. All defendants having any actual participation in the incarceration of plaintiff's deceased had verdicts rendered in their favor. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 [101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420] (1981).
In reviewing the district court's decision to grant the motion for judgment N.O.V., we must consider all of the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable persons could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, then the district court's decision to grant the motion was proper. Dresco Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Todd-CEA, Inc., 531 F.2d 1292, 1296 (5th Cir.1976). If there was substantial evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, then the district court's decision to grant the motion would be improper. Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc).
In this case we believe that the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was erroneous. The evidence indicates the following. Several police officers testified that the pre-trial detention center was inadequately staffed and that it was very difficult to do one's job properly. For example, Officer Marshall testified that he often worked a double shift at both the new and old detention centers because "there was a shortage of officers." 3 (TR V ...
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