Anderson v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 24 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 84 CIV. 3214 (PKL).,84 CIV. 3214 (PKL).
• Citation: 657 F. Supp. 1571
• Parties: Allen ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

657 F. Supp. 1571

Allen ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

No. 84 CIV. 3214 (PKL).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 24, 1987.

Stevens, Hinds & White P.C., New York City (Richard J. Harvey, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Charlotte Biblow, of counsel), for defendants.

LEISURE, District Judge:

This case arises out of an incident which occurred during the 1982 strike of the Center for Problems of Living (the "Center") by employees who were members of Union Local 1199. Plaintiff Allen Anderson, a nurse clinician at the Center, was arrested by officers of the New York Police Department (the "NYPD") and charged with several criminal violations, which were subsequently dropped. Anderson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 for alleged deprivations of his civil rights secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and for pendent state claims. Specifically, plaintiff, a black male, claims that the physical violence, allegedly accompanying his arrest, as well as the arrest and prosecution itself, were manifestations of a policy of civil rights deprivations against racial minorities and those in minority neighborhoods. Plaintiff claims that the alleged policy was promulgated, implemented and enforced by the defendants: the officers involved in the arrest, other officers, superior officers, the former and current Police Commissioner, the Mayor of New York, the members of the Civilian Complaint Review Board (the "CCRB"), and the City of New York (the "City").¹

The action is now before the Court on a motion for summary judgment and dismissal, advanced on behalf of all defendants, with the exception of the arresting officer, Officer Appel. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted with regard to all defendants, except those actually present at the scene of the incident.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are developed from the virtually identical Local Rule 3(g) statements submitted by the parties to this motion. Plaintiff — a black male — was a nurse clinician at the Center. In or around September, 1982, employees of the Center, including plaintiff, went on strike; the work stoppage lasted several months. NYPD officers were assigned to strike detail to oversee the pickets. Prior to the incident of October 13, 1982, which forms the basis of this action, there were no arrests of strikers or violent incidents at the Center, within the time frame involved herein.

At approximately 5:30 p.m. on October 13, 1982, plaintiff was arrested by Officer Appel, who was assisted by Officer Miller and others. Plaintiff had never been arrested before. During the arrest, plaintiff sustained injuries which caused him to be transported from the 30th Precinct to Columbia Presbyterian Hospital, where he was treated and released back into police custody. Plaintiff was charged with Assault in the Second Degree, Riot in the First Degree, Resisting Arrest and Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree. He was later released on bond. On February 10, 1983 all criminal charges against plaintiff were dropped.

A complaint was filed with the CCRB on behalf of Anderson, alleging police misconduct during the arrest. Although plaintiff was contacted by CCRB representatives twice, he declined to speak with CCRB investigators pending the conclusion of the criminal case against him. The CCRB investigation was closed, due to lack of victim cooperation, prior to the dismissal of charges, and was never reopened. No complaint was brought with the Internal Affairs Division of the NYPD.

The major area of disagreement between the parties concerns the actual events surrounding the arrest, which are not clearly described or substantively supported by either side; accordingly, these facts must be pieced together from the incomplete deposition transcripts submitted by the parties. Defendants allege that plaintiff was engaged in violent behavior directed against those crossing the picket line, Affidavit of Charlotte Biblow, Esq., sworn to on March 30, 1986 ("Biblow Aff."), Exhibit F, attached thereto, at 7; that plaintiff struck Officer Appel when the officer asked him to stop, and that plaintiff resisted arrest. Affidavit of Richard J. Harvey, Esq., sworn to on March 30, 1986 ("Harvey Aff."), Exhibit A, attached thereto, at 1. Defendants describe an arrest scene with outnumbered police officers and a mob of angry strikers hurling insults, obscenities and other more substantial objects. Id.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges that he and other strikers were simply maintaining a presence at the strike site, id. Ex. B. at 1; Biblow Aff. Ex. F. at 2, when Officer Appel, unprovoked, pushed plaintiff, Biblow Aff. Ex. F. at 12, and threw him to the ground. Harvey Aff. Ex. A. at 1. Plaintiff claims Appel, Miller and other officers, then kicked and beat him while he was lying on the ground, id. at 3-4; Biblow Aff. Ex. G. at 2, arresting him. Plaintiff further claims that Sergeant Gunther and Detective Lewis either participated directly in the incident or had immediate command or supervision of the officers involved.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Four Theories of Liability

Plaintiff's action is predicated upon four theories of liability, each relevant as to one or more of the defendants.² Plaintiff first argues that this incident is not merely an isolated act by an individual police officer, or group of police officers, but rather is reflective of a general policy of racially motivated discrimination, hostility, and violence on the part of the City and the other defendants. P. Memo. at 4. Second, plaintiff claims that the incident resulted from inadequate training of the officers involved. Plaintiff's third theory of liability is that his arrest and injury resulted from inadequate and ineffective supervision of the officers involved in the arrest. P. Memo. at 6. Finally, plaintiff asserts that failure to discipline the officers, and others who commit such acts, indicates that a discriminatory policy exists and that this policy caused the behavior which violated plaintiff's civil rights. P. Memo. at 7.

1. General City Policy of Racially Motivated Discrimination, Hostility and Violence

To hold a municipality liable under plaintiff's first theory, plaintiff must prove the municipality caused, in some meaningful sense, the harm suffered. Generally, this requires that "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated...." Monnel, supra, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035; Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986); Raysor v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1227, 89 L.Ed.2d 337 (1986); Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir.1984). Furthermore, there must be a "causal link between an official policy or custom and the plaintiff's injury...." Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.1983); Martin v. City of New York, 627 F.Supp. 892, 895 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Augustyniak v. Koch, 588 F.Supp. 793, 798 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd 794 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.1984); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). This same reasoning applies to supervisory personnel. "The plaintiff must show either that the official was personally involved in the unlawful actions or that there is some causal connection between an act of the official and the alleged violation." McQurter v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 572 F.Supp. 1401, 1415 (N.D.Ga.1983), app. dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.1984) (citations omitted); Carter v. Harrison, 612 F.Supp. 749, 758-59 (E.D.N.Y.1985).

Plaintiff cannot infer a policy from the alleged violation of his own civil rights. "Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-4, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Martin, supra, 627 F.Supp. at 896-97; Loza v. Lynch, 625 F.Supp. 850, 853 (D.Conn.1986).

2. Inadequate Training and Supervision

The law governing plaintiff's second and third theories — his assertions of inadequate training and supervision on the part of the police officers — is similar to that governing his first theory of liability. Once again, a single incident alone does not prove the inadequacy of training and supervision and, again, proof of such a claim does not give rise to liability. Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S. at 823, 105 S.Ct. at 2436; see Martin, supra, 627 F.Supp. at 896-97; Loza, supra, 625 F.Supp. at 853.

Early cases in this area of the law permitted a finding of liability based upon the idea that "a single, unusually brutal or egregious beating administered by a group of municipal employees may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to deliberate indifference or `gross negligence' on the part of officials in charge." Turpin v. Mailet 619 F.2d 196, 202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 (1980) (citations omitted). More recently, however, the Supreme Court held that a single incident — even one involving excessive force — could not prove the existence of a policy of insufficient training. Tuttle, supra, 471 U.S. at 823, 105 S.Ct. at 2436. To follow the early cases would undermine Monell and impose liability on what amounts to a respondeat superior theory. Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the prerequisite of finding a policy before extending the liability of municipalities. Tuttle, supra,...