Anderson v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 18 May 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43455
• Citation: 204 Conn.App. 712,254 A.3d 1011
• Parties: Francis ANDERSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

204 Conn.App. 712

254 A.3d 1011

Francis ANDERSON

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 43455

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 8, 2021

Officially released May 18, 2021

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Meryl R. Gersz, assigned counsel, and Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Janelle R. Medeiros, assistant attorney general, with whom were Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (state).

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Abrams, Js.

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J.

The petitioner, Francis Anderson, appeals from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in denying his petition for certification to appeal because his underlying claim for presentence confinement credit presented an issue of first impression that had merit, and the court could have granted relief. We dismiss the appeal.

The following procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the petitioner's appeal. In 2008, the petitioner received a total sentence of five years of incarceration for four separate convictions. In 2011, he received an additional five year sentence for convictions arising from his criminal conduct while in prison for the previous convictions. The trial court ordered the 2011 sentence to be served consecutively to the petitioner's 2008 sentence. While serving the aggregate ten year sentence, the petitioner was charged with various crimes after he assaulted a correction officer in July, 2012. During the related criminal proceedings, he was deemed not guilty by reason of insanity, and, in 2013, he was committed to the custody of both the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, and the Psychiatric Security Review Board.

After being transferred to the Whiting Forensic Hospital (Whiting), the petitioner assaulted residents and staff, and, as a result, he was charged with various new crimes (Whiting charges). During the ensuing criminal proceedings, the state requested that the court impose a monetary bond on the petitioner, and the court granted that request, setting the bond at $100,000. The petitioner did not post bond, and, after his arraignment on August 25, 2014, he was transferred to the Northern Correctional Institution (Northern). On April 29, 2016, the petitioner was convicted of the Whiting charges, and, on September 12, 2016, he was sentenced to a seven year term of imprisonment, execution suspended after five and one-half years, with two years of probation. The court ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to the ten year aggregate sentence the petitioner already was serving.

On July 7, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was entitled to 750 days of presentence confinement credit on the sentence for the Whiting charges for the time, between August 25, 2014, and September 12, 2016, that he spent at Northern while awaiting trial on the Whiting charges. On July 1, 2019, the habeas court sent notice to the parties that it would be holding a hearing to determine whether the petition failed to state a claim upon which habeas relief could be granted. Following the hearing, the court, on August 16, 2019, rendered a judgment of dismissal, concluding that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certification to appeal from the court's judgment, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

The petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in denying his petition for certification to appeal because his underlying claim for presentence confinement credit was an issue of first impression in Connecticut appellate courts, that it had merit, and that it was a claim upon which relief could have been granted by the habeas court. We disagree.

"Faced with the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner's first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. ... A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that [1] the issues are debatable among jurists of reason ... [2] [the] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] ... or ... [3] the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. ... The required determination may be made on the basis of the record before the habeas court and applicable legal principles. ... If the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. ...

"In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification ... we review the petitioner's substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria ... for determining the propriety of the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification. Absent such a showing by the petitioner, the judgment of the habeas court must be affirmed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Commissioner of Correction , 175 Conn. App. 460, 467–68, 167 A.3d 1020 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 912, 179 A.3d 1271 (2018). Previously, this court has concluded that issues of first impression in Connecticut appellate courts must meet one or more of the three criteria. See, e.g., id. (habeas court abused discretion in denying petition for certification to appeal because issues of whether General Statutes § 18-98e gives pretrial detainees opportunity to earn risk reduction earned credits to be applied retroactively to sentences, and whether failure to do so would be violation of pretrial detainees’ right of equal protection, presented two issues of first impression in Connecticut); see also Small v. Commissioner of Correction , 98 Conn. App. 389, 391–92, 909 A.2d 533 (2006) (petitioner's claim deserves encouragement to proceed further when no appellate case has decided precise issues), aff'd, 286 Conn. 707, 946 A.2d 1203 (2008), cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz , 555 U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008) ; Graham v. Commissioner of Correction , 39 Conn. App. 473, 476, 664 A.2d 1207 (petitioner's claim regarding appropriate jail time credit under unique circumstances not considered previously by any appellate court in Connecticut was one of first impression and, therefore, was debatable among jurists of reason and court could resolve issue in different manner), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930, 667 A.2d 800 (1995).

In the present case, after conducting a review of the petitioner's claim, we are not persuaded that his claim presents an issue of first impression for any Connecticut appellate court. Rather, it presents a unique and, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, wholly unpersuasive interpretation of the relevant statutes and of our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Anderson , 319 Conn. 288, 127 A.3d 100 (2015). We, thus, proceed to examine the merits of the petitioner's claim that, pursuant to the plain language of General Statutes § 18-98d and other related statutes, he was entitled to presentence confinement credit toward his sentence on the Whiting charges for the time he was held at Northern awaiting trial on those charges.

The petitioner contends that the only reason he was transferred to Northern, rather than being allowed to remain at Whiting, which is not a correctional facility, was because he was unable to post bond, and, therefore, pursuant to § 18-98d, he should have been given presentence confinement credit toward his sentence on the Whiting charges, in addition to the credit he was being given toward the aggregate ten year sentence he already was serving. We are not persuaded.

"[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review. ... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... A statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. ... Additionally, statutory silence does not necessarily equate to ambiguity. ... If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intention of the legislature and there is no room for judicial construction." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 175 Conn. App. at 470, 167 A.3d 1020.

Section 18-98d provides: "(a) (1) Any person who is confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, under a mittimus or because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of such person's sentence equal to the number of days which such person spent in such facility from the time such person was placed in presentence confinement to the time such person began serving the term of imprisonment imposed; provided (A) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement; and (B) the provisions of this section shall only apply to a person for whom the...