Anderson v. Cornejo

• Decision Date: 04 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 97 C 7556.,97 C 7556.
• Citation: 284 F.Supp.2d 1008
• Parties: Sharon ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mario CORNEJO, individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

284 F.Supp.2d 1008

Sharon ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.Mario CORNEJO, individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.

No. 97 C 7556.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

September 4, 2003.

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Paul L. Strauss, Jeffrey Irvine Cummings, Judson H. Miner, John F. Belcaster, Bridget Arimond, Miner Barnhill & Galland, Alan J. Shefler, Shefler & Berger, Ltd., Sharon Kay Legenza, Clyde E. Murphy, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, Edward M. Fox, Ed Fox & Associates, Chicago, IL, Derrick A. Carter, Valparaiso University Law School Faculty, Valparaiso, IN, for plaintiffs.

James Michael Kuhn, United States Attorney's Office, Kenneth Leo Cunniff, Kenneth L. Cunniff Limited, Chicago, IL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HART, District Judge.

As presently constituted, this case has approximately 90 named plaintiffs, virtually all of whom are African-American women with United States citizenship¹ who allegedly were searched by employees of the United States Customs Service at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport ("O'Hare") following their arrival on international flights.The searches of the named plaintiffs allegedly occurred between March 1996 and August 1999.Named as defendants are the United States, the United States Customs Service, and approximately 70 current or former employees of the Customs Service, Management officials, lower-level supervisors, and nonsupervisory employees have been sued in their individual capacities.A ruling was recently issued regarding a summary judgment motion brought by Managerial Defendants.SeeAnderson v. Cornejo,225 F.Supp.2d 834(N.D.Ill.2002)("Anderson VIII").Thereafter, defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims made by six selected plaintiffs.There is an expectation that ruling on the present motion may aid in the resolution of the similar claims of the other plaintiffs.

I.SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant.Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc.,330 F.3d 991, 994-95(7th Cir.2003);Palmer v. Marion County,327 F.3d 588, 592(7th Cir.2003);Abrams v. Walker,307 F.3d 650, 653-54(7th Cir.2002).The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant.Outlaw v. Newkirk,259 F.3d 833, 837(7th Cir.2001);Wollin v. Gondert,192 F.3d 616, 621-22(7th Cir.1999).The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which she will bear the burden of proof at trial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986);Binz v. Brandt Construction Co.,301 F.3d 529, 532(7th Cir.2002);Traylor v. Brown,295 F.3d 783, 790(7th Cir.2002).The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements.Celotex,477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record.SeeNLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc.,45 F.3d 231, 236(7th Cir.), cert. denied,515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257(1995);Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc.,950 F.2d 481, 485(7th Cir.1991);Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd.,844 F.2d 473, 476-77(7th Cir.), cert. denied,488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110(1988).As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:

The party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of production to identify "those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,96 F.3d 971, 978(7th Cir.1996)(citingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)(citation and internal quotation omitted)).The moving party may discharge this burden by "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."Celotex,477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmovant must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)."The nonmovant must do more, however, than demonstrate some factual disagreement between the parties; the issue must be `material.'"Logan,96 F.3d at 978."Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute."Id.(citation omitted).In determining whether the nonmovant has identified a "material" issue of fact for trial, we are guided by the applicable substantive law; "[o]nly disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.,102 F.3d 295, 298(7th Cir.1996)(citation omitted).Furthermore, a factual dispute is "genuine" for summary judgment purposes only when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).Hence, a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the existence of a genuine fact issue is not enough to stave off summary judgment, and "the nonmovant fails to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial `where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party....'"Logan,96 F.3d at 978(quotingMatsushita Elec. Indus., Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986)).

Outlaw,259 F.3d at 837.

II.PENDING CLAIMS

Following prior rulings on motions to dismiss, for class certification, and for summary judgment, the following claims remain pending in the Seventh Amended Complaint.SeeAnderson VIII, supra;Anderson v. Cornejo,199 F.R.D. 228(N.D.Ill.2000)("Anderson IV");Anderson v. Cornejo,1999 WL 258501(N.D.Ill.April 21, 1999)("Anderson II").See alsoAnderson v. Cornejo,1999 WL 35307(N.D.Ill.Jan.11, 1999)("Anderson I").²Count I is an equal protection claim that Customs Inspectors targeted African-American women for nonroutine personal searches.³Count III is a Fourth Amendment claim that Customs Inspectors lacked sufficient cause or suspicion to seize, detain, and search plaintiffs.Count V is a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") claim against the United States that the conduct of the individual defendants constitutes false imprisonment, assault, and battery.Count VI is a Fourth and Fifth Amendment claim that Customs Inspectors⁴ denied due process by not obtaining judicial authorization for the searches and by holding plaintiffs"in communicado."⁵

Count II is an equal protection claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants failed to take proper action to prevent or stop the discriminatory selection of African-American women for nonroutine personal searches alleged in Count I. Count IV is a Fourth Amendment claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants failed to take proper action to prevent or stop the illegal seizures, searches, and detentions alleged in Count III.Only the official capacity injunctive relief aspect of Count IV remains pending.SeeAnderson VIII,225 F.Supp.2d at 864-65; Minute Order dated March 27, 2002[342].Count VII is a Fourth and Fifth Amendment due process claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants promulgated and executed a "policy and practice allowing the Customs Inspectors, on nothing more than alleged `reasonable suspicion,'(a) to detain plaintiffs for an indefinite and wholly discretionary time-period; (b) to conduct the non-routine personal searches described herein without judicial authorization; (c) while holding the plaintiffsin communicado."7th Am. Compl. ¶ 175.Only the official capacity injunctive relief aspect of Count VII remains pending.SeeAnderson VIII,225 F.Supp.2d at 865-66; Minute Order dated March 27, 2002[342].Counts VIII, IX, and X have previously been dismissed.See Order dated April 25, 2002[250];Anderson VIII,225 F.Supp.2d at 866-67.

The damages claims of each count are on behalf of the named plaintiffs only.⁶Classes were certified for injunctive relief only as to Counts II, IV, VII, VIII, IX, and X.⁷Anderson IV, 199 F.R.D. at 237-45, 264-65, 267.As previously indicated, Counts VIII, IX, and X have been dismissed in their entirety.

The pending summary judgment motion concerns the Count I, II, III, V, and VI damages claims of six named plaintiffs: Michelle Absolam, Adunni Allen, Jacqueline Jones, Ruby Mendenhall, Katherine Milner, and Yvette Price(the "Summary Judgment Plaintiffs").The defendants that are alleged to have been involved in the searches of the Summary Judgment Plaintiffs are Customs Inspectors Michelle Belcastro, Carol Czech, Guadalupe Corona, Victoria Diez, Lynda Hall, Olga Martinez, Douglas Nathaniel, Alma Reyther, Maria Rocha, and Melissa Zitowsky; Supervisory DefendantsGloria Banks, William Desmond, and Mary McCarthy; and Managerial DefendantsSergei Hoteko and Patrick Noonan.SeeAnderson VIII,225 F.Supp.2d at 838 n. 2.The United States is the defendant as to the Count V FTCA claim.

III.SEARCH FACTS

Resolving all genuine factual disputes and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, the facts assumed to be true for purposes of summary judgment are as follows.

A.GENERAL SEARCH PROCEDURES

International passengers arriving at O'Hare first pass through the Customs Services' primary inspection area.If the passenger's luggage or person is to be searched, the passenger...