Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC

• Docket Number: 1:21CV778
• Decision Date: 14 March 2023
• Citation: 661 F.Supp.3d 415
• Parties: Tonya ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. DIAMONDBACK INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

661 F.Supp.3d 415

Tonya ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. DIAMONDBACK INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Defendant.

1:21CV778

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

Signed March 14, 2023

Wilson F. Fong, Hensel Law, PLLC, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth A. Martineau, Geoffrey A. Marcus, Martineau King PLLC, Charlotte, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and discrimination for the lawful use of lawful products during nonworking hours in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.2.(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20-32.)This matter is now before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.(ECF No. 19.)Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Seal certain documents filed by Defendant in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.(ECF No. 22.)For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant both motions.

I.BACKGROUND

It is undisputed in this case that Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant who worked for Defendant from October 20, 2020, to January 4, 2021.(ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 10, 17;5 ¶¶ 10, 17; 20-1.)Her offer of employment was made in writing and included a provision that for her first ninety days of employment, she would be an "introductory" employee who could be "laid off or discharged . . . as exclusively determined by Management."(ECFNo. 20-1.)In addition, Plaintiff was provided an employee manual which explained that Defendant had a "Drug Testing" policy that stated:

[C]urrent and prospective employees will be asked to submit to drug and alcohol testing.No prospective employee will be asked to submit to testing unless an offer of employment has been made.An offer of [employment], however, is conditioned on the prospective employee testing negative for drugs and alcohol.All employees are subject to random drug testing with or without cause.Refusal of drug testing can/will result in immediate termination.

(ECFNo. 20-3at 11.)

At the start of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff took the required drug test described in the company policy.(ECFNo. 20-6at 5.)This test returned a positive result for marijuana.(Id.)After receiving the results of the test, the Defendant's co-owners offered Plaintiff the opportunity to take a second drug test.(ECFNo. 20-8at 2.)Plaintiff then sent them an email thanking them for a second chance and explaining that she was "not sure why [her] first results came back positive."(Id.)She further explained in this email that she had a history of trauma caused by domestic violence and had begun taking CBD while at her previous job because she"did not want to take [her] service dog in to [sic] the office with [her]."(Id.)She offered that she could "supply [Defendant] with [her] dog's service animal license," and "[could] get [her] doctor to verify the reason why [she] use[d] CBD."(Id.)

Plaintiff took a second drug test in early December; however, the results were inconclusive because the specimen provided was the wrong temperature.(ECFNo. 20-7at 1.)Plaintiff then took a third drug test and tested positive for marijuana once again.(ECFNo. 20-9at 5.)Defendant discharged Plaintiff on or about January 4, 2021.(ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 17;5 ¶ 17.)It is undisputed that Defendant discharged Plaintiff because she failed her drug tests.(ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 17;5 ¶ 17;20 at 12;21 at 9.)

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)."A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," and "[a] fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.' "Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568(4th Cir.2015)(internal citations and quotations omitted)."[I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, a district court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant" and to "draw all reasonable inferences in his favor."Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 272(4th Cir.2019)(citingJacobs, 780 F.3d at 568).A court"cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,"Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 569(citations omitted), and thus must "usually" adopt "the [nonmovant's] version of the facts," even if it seems unlikely that the movingparty would prevail at trial, Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276(4th Cir.2011)(quotingScott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686(2007)).

Where the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of "pointing out to the district court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986).If the moving party carries this burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point out "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986).In so doing, "the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence."Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311(4th Cir.2013).Instead, the nonmoving party must support its assertions by "citing to particular parts of . . . the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);see alsoCelotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III.DISCUSSION

Defendant's motion requests summary judgment on all three of Plaintiff's claims: (1) wrongful discharge in violation of the ADA, (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-27); (2) failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA, (id.¶¶ 20-23); and (3) discrimination for the lawful use of lawful products during nonworking hours in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.2, (id.¶¶ 28-32).Before the Court addresses the parties' substantive arguments regarding these claims, the Court must first address a procedural irregularity in Defendant's filings that Plaintiff argues might prevent this Court from considering Defendant's motion.

A.LocalRule 56.1(a)

Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider Defendant's motion because Defendant violated LocalRule 56.1(a) by not filing a notice of dispositive motion within fourteen days of the close of discovery.(ECF No. 21at 6.)Defendant responds that its failure to notice the motion was a mistake, but notes that the motion itself was timely filed.(ECF No. 23at 1-4.)Defendant therefore asks that the Court consider the motion despite the lack of notice pursuant to LocalRule 56.1(g).(Id.)

LocalRule 56.1(a) provides that "[a]ny party who intends to file a motion for summary judgment . . . must file and serve notice of intention to file a dispositive motion within 14 days following the close of the discovery period."

LocalRule 56.1(g) provides that "[a] dispositive motion which is not noticed and filed within the prescribed time will not be reached by the Court prior to trial unless the Court determines that its consideration will not cause delay to the proceedings."

The Court, having reviewed the scheduling order and the contentions of the parties in their briefs, has determined that it can adjudicate Defendant's motion without delaying the proceedings.See, e.g., Pless v. Watkins, No. 12-CV-94, 2013 WL 3052824, at *1(M.D.N.C.June 17, 2013)(considering motion for summary judgment filed over three months after the deadline because it was "simple" and "the [c]ourt was able to resolve it before trial").However, the Court admonishes Defendant that compliance with the Local Rules is necessary "to promote the just and prompt determination of all proceedings."L.R. 1.1(emphasis added).

The Court will nonetheless proceed to the substance of Defendant's motion.

B.Wrongful Discharge

"The ADA prohibits an employer from terminating a qualified employee because of her disability."Graves v. Bank of Am., N.A., 54 F. Supp. 3d 434, 439(M.D.N.C.2014)(citing42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))."Disability discrimination may be proven through direct and indirect evidence or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework."Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572(4th Cir.2015).Here, Plaintiff argues that her evidence establishes a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, (ECF No. 21at 9), therefore the Court concludes that Plaintiff is proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework to establish the viability of her claim.

"Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination."Boone v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 395 F. Supp. 3d 657, 669(M.D.N.C.2019), aff'd, 858 F. App'x 622(4th Cir.2021)."In an ADA wrongful discharge case, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case if [s]he demonstrates that (1)[s]he is within the ADA's protected class; (2)[s]he was discharged; (3) at the time of [her] discharge, [s]he was performing the job at a level that met [her] employer's legitimate expectations; and (4)[her] discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702(4th Cir.2001).

"If the plaintiff succeeds [in establishing a prima facie case], 'the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.'...