Anderson v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 20 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 17-cv-02131-RCL |
| Citation | 317 F.Supp.3d 444 |
| Parties | Keith ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jesse Isaac Winograd, Gowen, Rhoades, Winograd & Silva PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
John Leslie Davie, Michael A. Tilghman, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Before the Court is defendants' motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 17 and 25. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part—as to Counts 1, 2, and 5—and declines to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims—Counts 3 and 4. For the reasons listed below, the Court DISMISSES Counts 1, 2 and 5, and REMANDS the remainder of the case to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
On February 23, 2016, the plaintiff Keith Anderson, pleaded guilty to a kidnapping charge and entered into a sentencing agreement, which would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor if certain conditions were met. ECF No. 13, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Approximately one month later, Mr. Anderson was arrested and charged with burglary. Id. ¶ 27. On March 24, 2016, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia ordered plaintiff to undergo a full competency evaluation. Id. ¶ 33. And on April 21, 2016, the court found Mr. Anderson incompetent and committed him to St. Elizabeths Hospital to participate in inpatient competency restoration. Id. ¶ 35. Mr. Anderson remained at St. Elizabeths Hospital from April 2016 to October 2016. Id. ¶ 51. He pleads that he was not provided medication from April 2016 to July 18, 2016. Id. ¶ 43.
Mr. Anderson filed the present suit on September 14, 2017 in Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendant District of Columbia removed the case on October 16, 2017 to this Court. Mr. Anderson twice amended his complaint. In the second amended complaint, he alleges (1) that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 all the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment "right to timely and adequate medical treatment" (Count 1); (2) under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that all the defendants violated his Fifth Amendment to receive "essential care" (Count 2); (3) that all defendants were negligent in not providing him proper care (Count 3); (4) that defendant District of Columbia was negligent in not providing proper training and supervision to the doctors and medical professionals at St. Elizabeths Hospital (Count 4); and (5) that under 42 U.S.C. 1983 defendant District of Columbia violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to properly train and supervise medical personnel at St. Elizabeths (Count 5).
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "the court must assume ‘all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact),’ and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.’ " Aktieselskabet AF 21.Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc. , 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
A claim is facially plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While the factual allegations in the complaint need not be "detailed," the Federal Rules require more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The facts alleged in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Mr. Anderson alleges that under 42 U.S.C. 1983 the defendants failed to properly medicate him in violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights (Counts 1 and 2). Mr. Anderson further alleges that under 42 U.S.C. 1983 defendant District of Columbia violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to properly train and supervise medical personnel at St. Elizabeths (Count 5).
Defendants District of Columbia (the District), Mayor Muriel Bowser, Director of the District of Columbia Department of Behavioral Health Director Tanya Royster, and Chief Executive Officer of Saint Elizabeths Hospital Mark J. Chastang, in their official capacities (Official Capacity Defendants), moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2. ECF No. 17.1 Defendant Benjamin Adewale—a psychiatrist at St. Elizabeths—separately moved to dismiss those counts. ECF No. 25.2
Baker v. District of Columbia , 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). The D.C. Circuit clarified in Baker that "all that is being established at [the first step of the inquiry] is that there is some constitutional harm suffered by the plaintiff, not whether the municipality is liable for that harm." Id.
Mr. Anderson has failed to state a claim for a predicate constitutional violation. In order to establish a Fifth or Eighth Amendment violation for failure to provide adequate medical treatment, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) his medical need is serious; and (2) that defendant officials acted with a "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ; Young v. District of Columbia , 107 F.Supp.3d 69, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) () (internal quotations and citations omitted). A complaint that alleges negligence in diagnosing or treating the plaintiff does not suffice to state a constitutional claim for inadequate medical treatment. Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. Rather, the plaintiff must establish that "officials had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need and recklessly disregarded the excessive risk to [his] health or safety from that risk." Baker , 326 F.3d at 1306.
Here, the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Nothing in the second amended complaint indicates that Dr. Adewale, or any official at St. Elizabeths, knew of a serious medical need for the medication and recklessly failed to provide the plaintiff with the medication despite knowing that risk. The second amended complaint indicates that Dr. Adewale stated that he did not prescribe psychotropic medications because he believed Mr. Anderson "would not respond to psychotropic medications." ECF No. 13, ¶ 47. Without additional facts indicating otherwise, Dr. Adewale's perspective on the best treatment plan does not rise to deliberate indifference. Westlake v. Lucas , 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) ().
The plaintiff submits that defendants "were well aware that depriving Mr. Anderson would lead to the serious harm to Mr. Anderson." ECF No. 21 at 6. However, the plaintiff points to no facts in the second amended complaint supporting that conclusory statement. Paragraph 59, which the plaintiff cites in his opposition brief, merely provides that defendants were aware that the plaintiff suffered mental illness and had previously been prescribed medications treating his illness. Those facts do not establish that defendants therefore knew that failing to provide the medication would lead to serious harm. As noted above, Dr. Adewale stated that he made the affirmative decision to not prescribe medication because he believed it would not be effective. His decision was based on a belief that a treatment plan without medication was optimal. In other words, he did not believe that his decision would lead to serious harm. Whether Dr. Adewale made the right medical decision is beyond the scope of the constitutional claims. Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. Since defendants have failed to allege facts indicating subjective knowledge that failing to prescribe medication would lead to serious harm, the Court finds that the plaintiff has not stated a claim for a violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the defendants that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to this case. The Eighth Amendment does not apply until after "a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Eighth Amendment "protections do not attach until after conviction and sentence." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Here, the plaintiff was detained at St. Elizabeths for competency...
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