Anderson v. Gen. Motors Corp.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BUSHNELL
• Citation: Anderson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 313 Mich. 630, 22 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1946)
• Decision Date: 04 March 1946
• Docket Number: No. 69.,69.
• Parties: ANDERSON v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, OLDSMOBILE DIVISION.

313 Mich. 630

22 N.W.2d 108

ANDERSON

v.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, OLDSMOBILE DIVISION.

No. 69.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 4, 1946.

Appeal in the Nature of Certiorari from the Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by George O. Anderson, claimant, opposed by General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, employer. Claimant was awarded compensation, and employer appeals.

Affirmed.

BOYLES, J., and BUTZEL, C. J., dissenting.

Before the Entire Bench.

Henry M. Hogan, of Detroit (Philip McCallum, G. W. Gloster, and E. H. Reynolds, all of Detroit, of counsel), for defendant and appellant.

Raymond H. Rapaport, of Lansing, for plaintiff and appellee.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

When plaintiff George O. Anderson entered the employ of defendant General Motors Corporation on April 11, 1935, he was given a physical examination and found to be strong and well.

His work on November 1, 1943, consisted of cutting stock from 20 millimeter gun barrels over six feet in length and weighing about 106 pounds. This operation required that the barrels be lifted to a machine by two men, one at each end. After he had thus handled two barrels, while lifting the third, he experienced severe pains in his left leg. He was sent to defendant's first aid station, where he was given tablets with instructions to take two of them every two hours. Although he requested permission to go home because of the severe pain, he was told to remain on the job until quitting time. He was under a doctor's care until March 22nd, when he returned to lighter work, on which he continued for approximately three weeks, until the lifting of some jigs weighing several hundred pounds caused a recurrence of the pains in his back and leg. Further treatment was prescribed and he was sent to Dr. W. O. Badgley, a bone specialist, who pronounced his condition as probably a ruptured nucleous polyposis. Anderson returned to work again on May 18th, and on July 10th, again experiencing pains, was unable to continue further.

At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Anderson admitted having had pain in his back prior to November 1, 1943, but he insisted that the one he experienced at that time was different from any former pain. There is very little disagreement between the medical experts as to Anderson's condition. Dr. Badgley testified for plaintiff and, after describing Anderson's symptoms and medical history, characterized his condition as ‘a reptured disk, ruptured nucleous polyposis,’ which he said was much the same as ‘ruptured intervertebrae.’ He attributed Anderson's present condition to the lifting.

Dr. A. S. Isaacson, who testified for the defendant, also examined Anderson. In relating the histsory of the case as he understood it, Dr. Isaacson referred to a diagnosis by a local physician, of ‘sciatic neuritis,’ and stated that Anderson could not remember any direct correlation between any fall and the pain in his back. The pathology of the case was explained from the examination of X-ray pictures, but Dr. Isaacson was unable to definitely conclude that Anderson was suffering from a ruptured nucleous polyposis. He did say, however, that there was a causal connection between the disability and the employment in that ‘heavy lifting and such, do create an exacerbation of his difficulty.’ Dr. Isaacson, in reply to a hypothetical question, agreed that the lifting was a contributing factor, and that there was ‘a causal connection between this one lift, after which time he was unable to work, and his present disability.’ He concluded his testimony with the observation that the ‘disability could be due to a series of things, which manifested themselves on November 1st,’ stating ‘this final one being just the straw that broke the camel's back.’

The opinion of the commission on review, after reciting the facts and medical testimony, disposed of defendant's contention that an accidental injury must be established, as follows:

‘Defendant has appealed and in its brief contends that the claimant had to establish the fact of an accidental injury if he was to be held to have sustained a personal injury within the meaning of Section 1 of Part II of the Compensation Act as amended July 30, 1943; also, that since the claimant did not even claim an accidental injury his case must be predicated upon the theory of an occupational disease and it was, therefore, incumbent upon him to show that his disability was due to causes and conditions which are peculiar to and characteristic of the business of the employer; finally, that the claimant failed to give sufficient notice of the claimed personal injury within the period of time required by the Act.

‘We have heretofore held in a number of opinions that since July 30, 1943, being the effective date of Act 245 of the Public Acts of 1943, which amended the Compensation Act, it is not necessary for a claimant to have sustained an accidental injury in order to become entitled to receive compensation on account of a personal injury arising out of and of in the course of his employment. Without elaborating upon all of the reasons for our conclusion we believe it sufficient in this case to say that if it was the intention of the Legislature to compensate for a personal injury due to a single event only if such event was caused by an accidental occurrence, then the word ‘accident’ undoubtedly would have been used in Section 1 of Part II of said Act rather than the term ‘single event.’ ‘As to whether plaintiff's disablement during the periods covered by the award of Deputy Commissioner Silas J. McGregor is related to his personal injury of November 1, 1943, the record leaves no doubt but what this question must be answered in the affirmative and we so find.

‘The claimant's disablement occurred while he was engaged at obviously strenuous work and in the absence of some rebuttal testimony, and the record contains none, we do not believe that there can be any doubt but that the defendant had ample notice within the statutory period of the fact of the claimant having received a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and we so find.’

Defendant was granted leave to appeal from the order entered in the light of the quoted opinion, and contends that there is no ‘competent evidence to support the finding of the Department of Labor and Industry that the plaintiff and appellee sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law.’

Plaintiff argues that under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, Act No. 10, Pub.Acts 1st Extra Session of 1912, Stat.Ann. § 17.141 et seq., as amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, injuries need not be accidental in order to be compensable, and he insists that competent evidence was presented to support the commission's finding that his...