Anderson v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 71799
• Parties: Morris ANDERSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee, and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 251

360 N.W.2d 251

138 Mich.App. 581

Morris ANDERSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION Respondent-Appellee and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 71799.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 21, 1984.

Decided Nov. 5, 1984.

Released for Publication Jan. 7, 1985.

Morris Anderson, Jr., in propria persona.

Alice M. Osburn, Detroit, for General Motors Corp.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Felix E. League and Martin J. Vittands, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Civil Rights Dept.

Before KELLY, P.J., and BEASLEY and O'BRIEN ^*, JJ.

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order of accelerated judgment in favor of defendant General Motors Corporation (GM) and from an order of summary judgment in favor of defendant Michigan Department of Civil Rights. The Civil Rights Department cross-appeals an order naming it a party defendant in the circuit court proceeding.

On September 28, 1977, plaintiff was discharged from his employment as a security guard for GM. Plaintiff does not dispute that he had informed a fellow employee, he believed to have stolen his CB antenna that, if the employee replaced the antenna and provided plaintiff with a new CB radio, he would neither seek that employee's discharge nor press criminal charges. According to the plaintiff, his supervisors were aware of and approved his efforts to reach a "private settlement" agreement with the coemployee. Plaintiff contended that GM's actions in discharging him were racially motivated and that his dealings with the coemployee were used by GM as a pretext for his discharge. GM responded that plaintiff was fired for failure to properly perform his duties as a plant security officer.

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights on October 26, 1977. He was reinstated on May 16, 1978, without back pay or benefits and pursued his Civil Rights Claim, seeking $5,416.86 in lost wages, the restoration of retirement credit and the removal of the discharge from his employment record. The staff investigator initially concluded that GM's actions were racially motivated and recommended issuance of a charge. However, the Civil Rights Commission subsequently found the evidence insufficient to warrant a hearing and ultimately issued an order of dismissal on June 9, 1980.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration and a hearing was conducted on February 5, 1981. The hearing referee found no cause to reverse the order of dismissal and that order was formally affirmed on May 20, 1981.

Plaintiff filed proceedings in pro per in circuit court on June 22, 1981, naming GM as the party defendant. GM subsequently moved to add the state as a party defendant, which motion the trial court granted by order dated November 22, 1982. Following oral arguments on the defendants' motions for accelerated and summary judgment, the trial court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of the state on the ground that its refusal to issue a charge was supported by the administrative record and was not arbitrary and capricious, and (2) granted accelerated judgment in favor of GM on the ground that plaintiff was barred from proceeding against his employer by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to this case. M.C.L. Sec. 600.5805(8); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5805(8).

As an aside, we note that this case is presented to us in a state of procedural confusion attributable in part to plaintiff's in pro per status and lack of familiarity with the distinction between appellate proceedings and independent causes of action. The state and trial court have added to the confusion by failing to identify the court rule under which the state's motion for summary judgment was filed and decided. Superimposed upon the procedural confusion is the paucity of statutory and appellate authority delineating the scope and nature of an appeal from a CRC refusal to charge. What is clear from the trial court record, however, is that the parties and the trial court viewed plaintiff's petition or "brief" initiating the circuit court proceeding at least in part as an appeal from the decision of the CRC and we thus approach this case on that basis.

Another panel of this Court has recently undertaken the task of identifying for the first time the precise nature of an appeal from a CRC refusal to issue a charge. See Walker v. Wolverine Fabricating & Manufacturing Co., Inc., 138 Mich.App. ---, 360 N.W.2d 264 (1984). We agree with the analysis in Walker and rely upon it in our disposition of the case before us.

The trial court in this case found that the CRC decision was supported by competent evidence in the administrative record and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In so holding, the court borrowed from the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L. Sec. 24.201 et seq.; M.S.A Sec. 3.560(101) et seq., for the judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies. However, that act defers to other standards where specifically provided by statute or the constitution. M.C.L. Sec. 24.306(1); M.S.A. Sec. 3.560(206)(1).

The Michigan Constitution mandates that appeals from decisions of the CRC are to be tried de novo:

"Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law." Const.1963, art. 5, Sec. 29.

We conclude that, because the constitution defines the scope of appellate review of CRC refusals to charge, the Legislature and courts are bound by this standard and the Administrative Procedures Act does not apply.

In Walker, supra, Judge Bronson considered at some length the meaning of the term "tried de novo" as set forth in Const.1963, art. 5, Sec. 29. Citing Kar v. Hogan, 399 Mich. 529, 251 N.W.2d 77 (1976), and 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 698, p. 597, the Walker Court concluded that review by trial de novo includes the right to an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court. The circuit court is...