Anderson v. Gengras Motors

• Decision Date: 23 November 1954
• Citation: 141 Conn. 688,109 A.2d 502
• Parties: Roy A. ANDERSON v. GENGRAS MOTORS, Inc. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 502

109 A.2d 502

141 Conn. 688

Roy A. ANDERSON v. GENGRAS MOTORS, Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 23, 1954.

Sidney D. Pinney, Jr., Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

Irving S. Ribicoff and Samuel Freed, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for injury to and loss of use of his automobile. The complaint was in two counts, one for the breach of a contract of bailment for hire and the other for negligence. The court found the issues for the plaintiff, and the defendant has appealed from the judgment.

The finding, which is not subject to material correction, recites the following facts: The defendant is engaged in the business of dealing in new and secondhand automobiles and, in connection therewith, maintains a garage in the city of Hartford. On the morning of November 19, 1947, the plaintiff brought his automobile to the garage to have some minor repairs made. He was told by one of the defendant's employees that the automobile would be ready by 5 p. m. that day. When the repair work was completed at 3:30 p. m., the employee, acting within the scope of his employment, drove the car to a parking lot adjoining the garage and left it. This was in accordance with a practice pursued by the defendant whenever the garage became overcrowded, as was the case on the day in question. The plainiff's automobile was not returned to the garage that day but was permitted to remain parked and unlocked on the lot, with the ignition key either under the floor mat or resting on the sun visor. When the plaintiff called at the garage for his automobile on the following day, he learned that it had been stolen during the night. Never before had an automobile been stolen from the lot.

Under the terms of an agreement with the proprietor of the lot, the defendant was permitted to park the automobiles of its customers there, and for this privilege it made weekly payments proportioned to the extent of the use of the lot. The proprietor and his attendant were under instructions not to allow a customer of the defendant to drive his automobile off the lot without first presenting a release slip issued by the defendant. The defendant's service department closed each day at 5:30 p. m., and the sales department at 9 p. m. Just before the closing of the former department all customers' automobiles, except those which were wanted by their owners that evening, were regularly brought back to the garage for the night. Release slips for any cars left on the lot were then turned over to the sales department. The parking lot was unattended after 9 p. m., and from then on through the night it remained open to any person, whether bent on mischief or otherwise. The attendant, before he left, customarily notified the defendant's sales department of the presence of any customers' cars still remaining on the lot.

On November 25, 1947, the plaintiff's automobile was found in a damaged condition. The defendant towed it back to Hartford and undertook to restore it to the condition it was in before the theft. The plaintiff lost the use of his automobile while it was in the defendant's possession for repairs. Other facts dealing with the value of the loss of use will stated hereafter.

The failure of the defendant as a bailee to return the plaintiff's automobile raised the presumption that the nonproduction was due to negligence on its part. Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 310, 106 A.2d 162. This was ample to make out a prima facie case. Murray v. Paramount Petroleum & Products Co., 101 Conn. 238, 242, 125 A. 617. The plaintiff, however, did not rely upon the presumption to support his claim of liability. He affirmatively established other facts from which the court was clearly entitled to reach the conclusion, as it did, that, in view of all the circumstances proven, the defendant was negligent. The court properly gave weight to the action of the defendant in leaving the plaintiff's car, unlocked and with its ignition key in a place where a thief would undoubtedly look for it, all night on a lot unguarded against thieves and vandals. One of the court's conclusions was that these narrated facts were ample to establish the defendant's negligence. We cannot hold as a matter of law, as the defendant urges us to do, that the conclusion was unwarranted on the facts or illogical.

In rendering judgment, the court incorporated an amount to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of use of his automobile. We have long held that the...